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ABSTRACT
LEGAL MODERNISM AND THE POLITICS OF FYPFRttqc-AMERICAN LAW’S CRISIS OF KNOWLEDGE AND AUTHORITY, 1870-1930
FEBRUARY 1999
WILLIAM D. ROSE
B.A., J.D., THE UNIVERSITY OF TOLEDO
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor John Brigham
In this dissertation, I explore the relationship between legal theory and legal
practice. My focus is on the response of late nineteenth and early twentieth century
American jurisprudence to a perceived crisis m American legal doctrine, a crisis that
threatened to undermine the legitimacy and authority of the American legal profession.
Uncertainty and complexity m the law were dominant characterizations of this historical
moment, more generally understood as a time of rapid social and economic growth,
producing a sense of chaos and fragmentation. I read formalism and realism (both broadly
construed) as forms of legal modernism which provide alternative discourses of
professional authority, emerging not necessarily as reactions to one another so much as to
the perceived problems of expertise entailed by such historical transfonnations. My
principal aim is to explore and articulate those dimensions of modernist legal thought
which serve as the foundation for this new juridical discourse of professional authority,
and to suggest some of the possible implications of failing to look at the early tradition of
VI
realist jurisprudence from this perspective. In this sense, I seek to lay the foundation for a
more general cntique and reconstruction of this tradition.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In what follows, I will argue from a perspective that draws a conceptual link between legal
thought and legal practice. That is. I will approach each from the perspective of the other.
My principal concern is with legal theory; yet 1 will engage with particular legal theorists
through questions raised by problems of and for legal practice - specifically, the response
of Amencan legal theory to a perceived crisis in the legitimacy of the American legal
profession.
It has been observed, in another context, that "theoretical discourses can be read as
responses to histoncal crises, to unsettling economic and technological developments, and
to social and intellectual turbulence produced by the disintegration of previously stable or
familiar modes of thinking and living" (Best and Kellner 1991, ix). And, m their important
study. Law and Society in Transition, Philippe Nonet and Philip Selznick contend that
legal theories are built upon implicit theories of authority. Many concerns and
controversies of contemporary jurisprudence have their roots in the crisis of authority that
has shaken public institutions" (1978, 4). While Nonet and Selznick were concerned with
the contemporary socio-legal landscape, in the following study of the relationship of legal
theory and legal practice, I return to the earlier period of the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. It was in that period of rapid social and economic change that a
distinctly American jurisprudence was bom, one which continues to shape our
understanding of law and politics. As such, it remains important to our understanding of
1
contemporary legal thought and practice. Although the dominant jurisprudential
movements of the time - formalism, sociological jurisprudence, realism - have been well-
documented, I believe that the ‘vision of practice’ each contains has been less well
understood. It is to that effort, the attempt to explore the connection between legal theory
and justifications of legal expertise, that I wish to make a contribution.
The status of American law, during the historical period under investigation, was
often characterized by the twin themes of uncertainty and complexity. Such a
characterization simultaneously raised the specter of politicized (or potentially
pohticizable’) judicial system. My concern is with how these developments might
threaten to undermine the legitimacy of that professional class (i.e., lawyers), whose
authority and power rest on its monopoly over a highly technical language comprising a
system of determinate legal rules which, theoretically, derive their meaning independent of
a prior political context.' More specifically, I am interested in specific theoretical
responses to this perceived threat, on behalf of the legal profession’s claims to expert
authority and, to explore the theoretical implications of these responses.
As Tocqueville understood, and contemporary sociologists of the professions have
maintained, the legal profession’s authority clearly seems to derive from an asserted
mastery of a politically neutral and objective body of knowledge. In his classic work.
Democracy in America, Tocqueville observed, "[sjtudy and specialized knowledge of the
'For example, professions traditionally have been distinguished from other occupations by
the fact that they require a specified level of formal academic training; maintain control
over entry into the profession; are self-regulating; and, make the claim that they possess
a monopoly over, or special access to, a discrete body of knowledge.
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law give a man a rank apart in society and make of lawyers a somewhat privileged
intellectual class. The exercise of their profession daily reminds them of this superiority;
they are the masters of a necessary and not widely understood science" (1969/1988, 264).
And, Magah Larson has pointed out that professions characteristically justify their special
status by claiming "cognitive exclusiveness": a unique access to some area of knowledge
that IS deemed crucial to the well-being of society ( 1 977, 1 5). The exact nature, or
content, of this "cognitive exclusiveness" is another matter however. We might assume
that it consists of technical procedural and doctrinal knowledge. Yet, any extended
contact with members of the profession suggests, at best, that this is insufficient. Lawyers
are exceedingly cynical people when it comes to an assessment of the legal system;
perhaps with good reason. From the ‘inside’, the legal system’s flaws are glaringly
apparent. A government of laws and not of ‘men’ seems, for the most part, less an ideal,
and more a naive wish. Judicial decisions often are revealed to be the product of personal
bias or political ideology, rather than the neutral, objective application of the law to the
facts. First-year law students soon enough learn that legal doctrine can be manipulated to
support virtually any position in a given dispute. Uncertainty, or doctrinal indetenninacy,
seems unalterably the state of affairs. This, we are told, is the lesson of legal realism.
We are all realists now, or so it is often said. "Realism," says David Luban, is "the
dominant school ofjurisprudence in twentieth-century America. This view so pervades
the culture of lawyers that one law school dean described it as the ‘ordinary religion of the
law-school classroom’. It is not a gross exaggeration to say that some version of realism
is believed by every practicing lawyer." (1988, 19). What all of that might mean, however.
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.s not entirely clear. In tins dissertation, I examine the critical insights of a line oflegai
analysis - what I shall sometimes refer to as ‘legal modernism’^ - that has its origin in the
work of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., and extends through the sociological jurisprudence of
Roscoe Pound, Benjamin Cardozo, and the legal realists of the 1920s and 1930s, to the
present day. Throughout this dissertation, I use the term 'realism' to designate a style of
thought - at once sociological and instrumental - that begins with Holmes and is
developed by Pound and others. Realism grew out of a dissatisfaction with aspects of
accepted legal doctrines and practices; it had both critique and reform as its basic aims.
I do not wish to deny many of the important differences between what we know as
American Legal Realism and its intellectual forerunners. However, for my purposes, the
similarities are more important. In this regard, I agree with Morton Horwitz's suggestion
that we emphasize the continuities in thought between Holmes, Pound and the Realists,
rather than their differences. (Horwitz 1992, 5). Horwitz views the development from
Holmes through Pound and other Progressive thinkers, to the Realists, as the continuation
of a challenge to legal orthodoxy's (Langdellian formalism) separation of law and politics.
This emphasis, according to Horwitz, combined with a thorough-going "cognitive
relativism," constitute realism's lasting contribution to American legal thought. (1992, 6).
In contrast to Horwitz, there are some scholars, such as Laura Kalman (1986),
who argue that legal realism simply ‘failed’ as a jurisprudential movement. While others
have suggested that realism emerged as a jurisprudential analogue of the New Deal; with
borrow this term from David Luban (1994).
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the passing of this period in American history, so too went realism.’ Finally, Grant
Gilmore maintained that realism emerged as "the academic formulation of a crisis through
which our legal system passed during the first half of this century." (Gilmore 1961, 1037).
The crisis was due to an overload on legal doctrine, with the result that "our case-law
system was beginning to break down of its own weight." According to Gilmore,
"[tjoward the end of the nineteenth eentury the rate of acceleration in printed case reports
became nightmansh....This flood set in during the last quarter of the nineteenth
century....This phenomenon strikes at the root of a case-law system." (Gilmore 1961,
1041). Yet, on Gilmore’s reading, the problem has been solved and the crisis has passed;
the system worked itself pure; "[wjithout anyone quite knowing how, the broken-down
machine was put back in running order - as if by an inspired job of tinkering." (Gilmore
1961, 1048).
Against those who argue that realism failed, or passed into history when the social
and political circumstances that gave rise to it came to an end, I would suggest that the
fundamental problem for realism remains: the indeterminacy of legal rules and the
unconstrained nature ofjudicial decision-making. This is Horwitz’s contribution to our
understanding of the place of realism in American legal thought. However, against
^Ronen Shamir (1995) offers a unique version of what is, otherwise, a fairly common
interpretation of the emergence of realism. Shamir appropriates Bourdieu’s concept of
the "legal field" to suggest that certain academic lawyers deployed realist jurisprudential
arguments, during the crisis posed by the New Deal for certain segments of the elite bar, in
order to gain dominance within the field. Nonetheless, Shamir’s analysis still leads to the
conclusion that realism was tied to a specific social and political context (i.e., the New
Deal), and not more general problems in the development of American law, as 1 wish to
argue.
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Honvitz, I wMl argue ,ha, reaHsm is no, sin,ply a challenge ,o legal onhodoxy, bu, ,ha,
both the conflation of law and politics, and cognitive relativism (or a, leas, some of its
theoretically derived effects), are important to a reconstituted discourse of legal authority
and professional expert,se/ That is, realism is the principal discourse of'legal modenhsnf.
Contemporary legal academics with a critical perspective, such as Horwitz and
others involved with the Critical Legal Studies Movement, argue for the need to resurrect
the realist project,' while sociologists and political scientists seem genuinely puzzled by an
intellectual program that seeks to resurrect something which they believe has never
disappeared. For example, Harry Stumpf wryly suggests that "[t]he political jurisprudent
can read most of critical legal thought with a big yawn, concluding that law professors, or
at least a vocal minority of them, have finally joined the club." (Stumpf 1988, 37)
Nevertheless, despite important differences, most legal academics and social
scientists share the view that realism has shaped our current understanding of the socio-
legal world. And, while the interpretations of realism's impact vary, I would suggest that
the dominant perspective views realism as a positive step beyond a (willfully) naive
formalist understanding of the law; that is, whatever its own shortcomings, realism was a
do not mean to suggest that Horwitz ignores this aspect of progressive or realist legal
thought; indeed, he explicitly situates it within the context of modernism. My disagree-
ment with Horwitz concerns his apparent disregard for the realist reconstruction of a
discourse of professional authority within, and as a response to, the perceived crisis of
modernism.
^Contemporary critical legal theorists are sometimes divided over which aspects of realism
warrant our attention. For example, John Henry Schlegel (1995) seeks to emphasize the
empirical work of the realists, while Gary Peller (1985) and Joseph Singer (1984) empha-
size the role of indeterminacy and cognitive relativism.
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helpful development ,ha, moved us beyond the glaring inadequacies of legal fonnalism as
an explanatoo' framework, particularly in its Langdellian fotm.‘ As John Brigham and
Christine Harrington note, "[s]ocio-legal scholars, particularly in the United States, have
understood law through a version of realism for some time.... At least since the 1930s, the
view that judges and legal scholars are naive and trapped in a formal orientation to rules
has grown progressively more influential until it may now be described as the framework
of the legal establishment." (1989, 41).
Working from a perspective that emphasizes the constitutive power of law, a view
that sees law as producing effects in the world rather than as merely reflective of a larger
social world, Brigham and Harrington seek to develop a post-realist approach that
incorporates the insights of realism" with their own concerns for understanding the
importance of institutions and "grounding socio-legal research in social relations." (1989,
42). Brigham and Harrington's analysis is an original and important contribution to our
understanding of realist and post-realist socio-legal scholarship. Their principal aim,
however, is to highlight the paradoxical aspects of the latter body of work. Unlike
Stumpf, who welcomes critical legal academics to the fold with little more than a yawn,
Brigham and Harrington discern something more in the realist-inspired work of CLS and
the judicial behavioralism of social scientists such as Harold Spaeth and Jeffrey Segal.
Brigham and Harrington understand realism itself as a form, both institutional and
discursive, of legal authority.
^For example, the judicial behavioralists, Harold Spaeth and Jeffrey Segal, locate the
"genesis" of their "attitudinal model" in the work of the legal realists of the 1920s.
(Spaeth and Segal 1993, 65).
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They observe that an "interesting paradox about legal realism today is that,
although It IS treated as a given by legal academics and social scientists, it is also
continually advanced as a vanguard project." ( 1 989, 41). This paradox veils a lacuna in
the realist perspective - the absence of any sustained discussion of the institutional
sources of legal power. Brigham and Harrington argue that this absence results from the
fact that "the institutional power of a legal community is, in part, linked to the continual
assertion oi realism." (1989, 41). As a system of authority, according to Brigham and
Harrington, realism possesses three interrelated aspects: it recreates a naive fomiaiist
vision of law; it institutionalizes realism in the legal academy; and, it asserts that law is
indeterminate. (1989, 43). They maintain that "[rjealism as legal authority promotes the
view that law is indeterminate but leaves intact social arrangements and institutions
determined by law." (1989, 42). That is, legal rules (the 'law') do not determine legal
outcomes, rather, individual interests and behavior do determine outcomes in court.
Brigham and Harrington's work is richly suggestive and offers many possible
avenues for future scholarship. Of particular importance here is the argument regarding
the relationship between legal indeterminacy and the constitution of institutional authority.
However, their explication of indeterminacy is underdeveloped in terms of its historical
context, suggesting at one point that indeterminacy critique is a relatively recent
characteristic of "modem legal scholarship." (1989, 44). Moreover, they seem primarily
concerned to identify realism as a system of authority of socio-legal scholarship, especially
in terms of its production within the contemporary legal academy.
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This dissertation seeks to elaborate and develop Brigham and Harrington's original
mstghts by historically situating the emergence of legal indetcnninaey as a legal and
professional problem. Further, 1 want to more carefully develop the reciprocal
relationship between indeterminacy and modem legal authority. Indetemiinacy critique is
not an artifact of modem legal scholarship, hut can be traced to the earliest extra-judicial
writings of Oliver Wendell Holmes in 1870. To that end, 1 will suggest a relationship
between realist theoretical work - realist jurisprudence - and the larger legal profession.
I will argue that, viewed historically, realism can be seen as a discourse of professional
expertise and legal authority that emerges in response to specific social and historical
conditions. It stands as an adjunct to, and in some sense a replacement of, formalism as
the principal legitimating discourse of legal authority. This, in turn, suggests a further
point: the jurisprudential 'response' to the crisis of legal modernism (uncertainty, or
doctrinal indeterminacy) emerged, in large part, from within an institutional space created
by the legal profession to deal with this very problem; that is, the law school.
While 1 do not wish to diminish the genuine insights of realism in tenns of its
contributions to socio-lcgal scholarship, 1 will also suggest the need for a heightened
awareness of the internal and external dimensions of realism. By 'internal', 1 mean an
epistemological framework and corresponding discourse that originates within the legal
profession itself.^ We arc most familiar with its theoretical articulation through the
jurisprudential writings of a number of scholars working within the American legal
academy. By 'external', 1 am referring to the work of scholars who have appropriated
^By ‘legal profession’, 1 mean the bench, practicing bar, and the legal academy.
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certain key insights of realism in order to analyze the legal profession and the larger soc.o-
legal world. In my opinion, it is diffieult to disentangle the two. Realism is. in Us origin, a
representative mode of thought - a discourse of expertise and professional power - that
gains full definition only when situated against a larger historical backdrop. To
incorporate the insights of realism into contemporary socio-Iegal analysis, then, is a more
problematic enterprise than it might at first seem.
With this m mind, I will attempt to provide a decidedly different analysis of the
nature and development of the engagement between realist legal thought, broadly
understood, and its assumed point of critical departure - Langdellian formalism. Simply
stated, my argument is that both formalism and realism are jurisprudential languages of
power - discourses of expertise which function to produce forms of social or professional
closure. To defend such a claim, I will adopt a critical perspective external to the
jurisprudential debates themselves.* This is not a work o/jurisprudence, but a theoretical
analysis of the social conditions in which particular types ofjurisprudential discourse have
emerged. In another context, Steven Best and Douglas Kellner have suggested the
importance of engaging with theoretical discourse. They point out that, "[n]ew theories
and ideas articulate novel social experiences and a proliferation of emergent discourses
*For example, I would juxtapose my use ofjurisprudence with that of Ronald Dworkin,
who views legal theory as providing the first and best defense of ‘law’s empire’;
Dworkin’s engagement with jurisprudence is designed to defend law’s integrity while
demonstrating theory’s central and lasting significance to law. (See: Dworkin 1986). In
The Politics ofJurisprudence, Roger Cotterrell criticizes Dworkin, correctly in my view,
for ultimately limiting the production and knowledge of law to legal ‘insiders’. (1989, 10).
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therefore suggests tha, important transfomiations are taking place in society and ct.lturc
(1991, ix).
Although I wish to argue for a close link between legal thought and legal practice,
I am mmdful of the fact that such an analysis always risks being misunderstood for the
claim that legal development is simply a struggle of competing ideas. As Morton Horwitz
urges, we need to cease discussing legal theory in an historical vacuum, and relocate our
analyses m social and historical context. Nonetheless, I believe jurisprudential discourse
provides important insight into the nature of social and legal change. For example,
following Weber, we can look to jurisprudence to see how it serves as a mechanism of
legal closure by legitimating the profession's status and authority.
Consequently, throughout much of this work, I engage with the texts of specific
legal theorists on a purely exegetical level, albeit not in an ahistorical manner. However,
following Pierre Bourdieu's injunction, my ultimate aim is to articulate a line of analysis
free "from the dominant junsprudential debate concerning law, between which
asserts the absolute autonomy of the juridical form in relation to the social world, and
instrumentalism, which conceives of law as a reflection, or a tool in the service of
dominant groups. (Bourdieu 1987, 814). Specifically, I will argue that instrumentalism,
or realism, should not be understood simply as a reaction to Langdellian-inspired
fomialism; but, that both can be understood as emerging in response to the same
phenomenon — a perceived crisis of legal and professional authority deriving from a
condition that 1 describe as 'legal modernism'. To ignore this aspect of realism risks
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eliding its role in the constitution of the authority ofmodem law and its carriers, the legal
profession.^
In laying out a partial history of this development, focusing on certain key texts
from that history, I do not wish my argument to be understood as calling for the return to
a pre-realist, or formalist, grounding for professional authonty. Nothing could be further
from the case. Rather, in suggesting that realism should be understood not so much as a
critique of formalism, but as another attempt to ground professional authority, I wish to
call into question the very conflation of law with the legal profession. I wish to do this in
order that we might lay claim to the ethical project of law - justice - a project that
otherwise seems secondary to the processes of professional closure.
The dissertation unfolds as follows: In Chapter Two, I briefly discuss the concepts
of professional autonomy and closure. The claim of specialized knowledge and expertise
is the principle by which professionals are typically siad to secure their socio-economic
advantages in society. In the case of the legal profession, the language of law constitutes
the knowledge base of lawyers. Attempting to establish the theoretical link between
professional knowledge and legal closure, I suggest the need to be sensitive to the
different strategies used by both formalist and realist approaches to effect closure. I argue
that the emergence of formalism was inspired, in large part, by a perceived threat to the
epistemological structure of legal doctrine, thereby threatening the legitimacy of the legal
profession as a whole. I give some attention to the rise of Langdell and his attempt to
“^For an important essay, representative of the ‘realism as reaction’ view, see Thomas
Grey (1983, 3), where he notes that "classical orthodoxy [Langdellian formalism] is the
thesis to which modem American legal thought has been the antithesis."
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construct a scientific and autonomous legal system for the common law. Langdell is
seldom considered as a serious intellectual infiuence on the development of American law;
rather Langdelliamsm
,s given attention mainly as that mode of thought which inspired a
realist reaction. My argument is that such an analysis misses the fact that Langdell is really
the first legal modernist, anticipating many of the concerns that would later be developed
by Holmes and his intellectual progeny.
The examination then moves on to Holmes in Chapter Three. At the heart of
Holmes’ work lies the central problem ofjudicial subjectivity: the judge’s power is legally
unconstrained - that is, indeterminate - and hence, potentially political in nature. This
suggests important implications for the theoretical foundations of professional authority;
the manifestations of which may be found at both the level of individual lawyer/client
relationships and, correspondingly, through concerns for the legitimacy of the legal
profession as a whole. Chapters Four and Five, respectively, deal with Pound and
Cardozo. Both, I argue, fill out the vision of legal practice suggested by Holmes’
jurisprudence, and add new layers of meaning to the space of law it suggests. Pound, in
his imaginative defense of the common law during a period of rapid social and economic
change, and Cardozo s elaboration of a modernist form of common law adjudication that
recognizes the inevitability of chaos and flux, provide important adjuncts to the initial
Holmesian vision. Together, they provide the foundation for what may be referred to as
American legal modernism, the central insights of which were then rearticulated by the
legal realists during the 1920s and 1930s, and which now may be viewed as an orthodoxy
for certain elements within the contemporary American legal academy and practicing bar.
13
I conclude, in Chapter Six, on a contemporary note, by looking at the work of several
important post-realist theorists who have addressed the relationship between legal theory
and practice.
14
CHAPTER 2
law, politics, and the authority of experts
Uncertainty and Complexity in the Law
In a compelling discussion of the epistemic properties of the common law, Tim
Murphy notes that, ”[t]he dominant image of law in Western thought is of something
written down and fixed, so that, fixed, it can be the object of informed interpretation,
systematic (or at least orderly) exposition, explicit critique and purposive alteration. The
common law emerged from this general image...." (Murphy 1994, 73). In late nineteenth
century Amenca, however, the common law was a rather messy place. With the
breakdown of the 'writ' system and forms of action, the common law had lost its internal
structure. Further, an explosion in published case reports, exacerbated by West Publishing
Company s development of a national reporter system, illustrated inconsistencies and
contradictions between (and sometimes within) jurisdictions.
Such a situation threatened to reveal a crisis of doctrinal uncertainty that would
ultimately undermine the authority of the judicial process. Calls to organize or 'arrange'
the common law, or for codification, were increasingly common, both within the newly
resurgent professional associations and legislative assemblies. For example, if one reads
public statements by members of the elite bar during the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, one recognizes that lawyers believed they faced something tantamount
to a 'legitimation crisis' in the foundational principles of liberal legalism - neutrality,
objectivity, and the rule of law. There was an articulated sense of fragmentation, of a
15
threat to the poss.b.lity of 'legal truth'. Such concerns culminated the fonnation of the
Atnencan Law Institute in 1923, whose founders identified the grow.ng uncerta.nty and
complexity of the law as undermining popular respect for the law and, thereby, threatening
the authority of the legal profession. (See ALI 1923).
Langdelhan formalism may be understood as one response to this situation. It
represented a desire to purge the law of the taint of’politics'; to take the idea of an
autonomous legal system senously, thereby making law 'seientific'; and, thus, to resituate
legal knowledge on firmer epistemological foundations. Although reformist in nature,
realism is less commonly understood as a direct response to a legitimacy crisis of the law
and the legal profession, however, and more as a reaction against formalism.'® For
example, this basic opposition serves as a principal organizing theme for legal historian
Morton Horwitz's second volume on the history of American legal development. (Horwitz
1992). Horwitz's focus is on the struggle of legal formalism - in his terminology,
'Classical Legal Thought' - to maintain and defend the separation of law and politics."
'°For a more general history from this perspective, the classic work is Morton White
0949/1975). For a more specifically legal analysis, see Ronen Shamir (1993). Shamir
interprets the development of American law in terms of a dialectical movement between
styles of thought that display formal or substantive rationality; one always in response to,
or reaction against, the other. Compare Neil Duxbury (1995, 2); Duxbury challenges this’
‘pendulum swing’ understanding of the history of American jurisprudence. In its place,
Duxbury argues that "American jurisprudence since 1870 is characterized not by the
pendulum swing view of history but by complex patterns of ideas. Jurisprudential ideas
are rarely bom; equally rarely do they die."
"‘Classical Legal Thought’, a term which Horwitz borrows from Duncan Kennedy,
includes the Langdelhan formalists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as
well as the ‘legal process’ school of thought which emerged in the 1950s and continues
to hold a place of importance in the legal academy today.
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Arrayed m opposition to Classical Legal Thought, Honvitz situates
'Progressive' legal
thinkers from Holmes, through Pound and the Legal Realists to CLS, all ofwhom are
characterized by their reaction against formalism in terms of an attempt to undennine the
formalist separation of law and politics.
Horwitz’s argument suggests four stages in the evolution of American law since
1 870. Classical Legal Thought, which aspired to construct a system of scientific
jurisprudence, dominated American law between 1870 and 1905. The second stage of
Horwitz s analysis is charactenzed by the development and consolidation of the
Progressive critique of Classical Legal Thought and the rise of Legal Realism. The
distinguishing feature here is the rejection of the law/politics distinction. The third and
final stages of the development of American law are marked by the decline of Realism in
the post-war period and the rise of the legal process school in the period from 1945 to
1960. In response to the revived formalism of the process school ofjurisprudence, which
attempted a reconstruction of the law/politics distinction, Horwitz documents a resurgence
of challenges to this distinction in the post-realist work of Law and Economics, and CLS.
To support his argument, Horwitz identifies some of the theoretical mechanisms
Classical Legal Thought deployed to maintain the separation of law and politics: the
public/private distinction; the creation of abstract and general legal categories which could
be mechanically applied in particular cases; and the introduction and development of a
formalistic mode of legal reasoning. Horwitz observes that Classical Legal Thought was
fraught with inherent contradictions which became only more pronounced during a period
of increasing modernization and industrial development, and which made attempts to
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defend the autonomy of the law inereasingly more difficult. Horwitz focuses on the
emergence of "institutional and ideological changes" in contract and cotporate law which,
he claims, "triggered the crisis of legitimacy at the turn of the century." (Horwitz 1992,
109)
.
A substantial portion of Horwitz’s argument is devoted to the work of Oliver
Wendell Holmes and his mfluenee on the later Progressive eritique of Classieal Legal
Thought. Horwitz eharaeterizes Holmes’s extra-judieial writings between 1870 and 1897
as an important manifestation of the emergenee of a erisis in Classieal Legal Thought.
Horwitz suggests that Holmes’s ’’own intellectual journey from The Common Law in 1881
to ’’The Path of the Law” in 1897 parallels a major change in American social, economic
and legal thought and in the structures of legitimacy in the two periods.” (Horwitz 1992,
1
10)
. Horwitz supports this claim by advancing an interpretation of Holmes’s work that
finds an ’early’ and ’late’ Holmes. The former was marked by a type of formalism which
sought external and objective standards for adjudication. The ’late’ Holmes, according to
Horwitz, abandoned all such efforts. The publication of ’’The Path of the Law” established
the moment at which advanced legal thinkers renounced the belief in a conception
of legal thought independent of politics and separate from social reality. From this
moment on, the late-nineteenth-century ideal of an internally self-consistent and
autonomous system of legal ideals, free from the corrupting influence of politics,
was brought constantly under attack. (Horwitz 1992, 142).
There is much to agree with in Horwitz’s analysis; however, I believe it is
important to emphasize thatformalism itself emerged, in large part, as a response to a
perceived crisis of legal and professional authority, and was not simply a doctrinal
instrument of capitalist interests. Further, Horwitz’s supporting claim that the shift from
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an
-early- to a -late- Holmes tracks larger developments m the legitimating structures of
American legal thought, is, I will contend, somewhat misleading. Certainly, Holmes
matured and developed as a legal theonst. And, there is a conceptualistie element evident
m his early work. Nevertheless, from his essays in the early 1870s to the
-watershed-
address of 1897, Holmes articulates a vision of law which emphasizes concepts of
perspectivism and legal indeterminacy. Moreover, Holmes- work, although cognizant of
the inadequacy of formalism as an explanatory framework, is equally concerned to
articulate the foundations of a new discourse of professional authority. Often written from
the perspective of the lawyer, Holmes-s work can be seen as marking a parallel
development, with formalism, and in response to a larger crisis of legal and professional
authority, of a new language of professional expertise and power. Horwitz-s interpretation
fails to acknowledge this and thus ignores the ways in which realism is itself complicit in
the development of the legal profession-s power through the construction of a professional
rhetoric grounded in the indeterminacy of legal doctrine. The weaknesses of Horwitz-s
interpretation are evident in his characterization of Holmes-
-external standard- of liability
as a type of formalism. As I will argue in Chapter Three, such a view misses the
theoretical foundations of a new discourse of professional authority grounded in the
management of legal uncertainty.
The political scientist, James Foster, provides an analysis that is, in some ways,
more similar to my own. In The Ideology ofApolitical Politics (1986), Foster focuses on
the concept of liberal legalism as a hegemonic ideology. He argues that the legal
profession in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was preoccupied with the
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need 10 respond lo a 'leg.lima.ion crisis'. Wlrat was al siakc, according |.oslcr, was the
legitimacy of the capitalist system itself. Conllating tite interests of capital, sn, and the
legal profession, he notes that, "[c]onscquenees Oowing Iron, the private ownersinp of
production for profit were causing growing numbers of people seriously lo question
capitalism,.... Government by lawyers was being challenged." (Foster 1<)86, 52). In
response, conservative lawyers attempted a resurrection of forgotten 'truths' and patriotic
values - the virtues of the American eonslilulional republic, veneration oflhc rule of law
and Its guardians, lawyers. Moreover, Foster documents legal conservatives' role in
reviving the bar association movement, arguing for its instrumental role as the protector of
threatened American virtues.
What IS interesting in Foster's analysis, however, is that he avoids an interpretation
that finds only elite, or conservative lawyers complicit in this process of ideological
production. A progressive wing of the legal profession, according to Foster, maintained
that the conservative response was reactionary and, ultimately self-defeating. The legal
progressives acknowledged problems in the administration ofjustice, particularly as a
result of the bar's connections to large-scale capitalist interests. However, their calls for
reform remained relatively modest and failed to challenge the prevailing capitalist
structure. More importantly, legal progressives championed the emergent bar association
movement as a vehicle to articulate the virtues of 'professionalism', as opposed to
patriotism. And, for the legal progressives, professionalism was defined by an apolitical
technical competence.
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Foster's analysis is compelling on one level. Yet, by arguing that the legal
profession's activities were solely in response to a crisis of capitalism, he seems to
oversimplify the full nature of the response. Foster's account characterizes law and its
pnncipal carriers simply as instruments in the maintenance of capitalist domination,
thereby denying any possibility for a relatively autonomous legal system. As a result,
Foster never acknowledges that the 'crisis' which both legal conservatives and progressives
were responding to might have been an epistemological crisis threatening the legitimacy
and authority of the profession itself
Shifting the focus from the more immediate problems of capitalist organization and
production, to more overarching epistemological problems allows us to see what Foster
misses — that the practicing bar and legal theorists alike were struggling with the
legitimacy of the intellectual foundations of the law and, as a result, with the legitimacy of
a profession whose authority was dependent on a monopoly over this knowledge base.
This struggle was engaged in by both formalist and realist legal theorists. And, while I do
not want to suggest that realism was not, in large part, constituted by a reaction to
perceived inadequacies in formalism, I do believe that a different perspective reveals
aspects of realism that have, for too long, been ignored. The perspective that I adopt in
this dissertation is to situate both formalism and realism within the context of 'legal
modernism'.
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(Legal) Mode,,,ism a„d the Crisis ofAuihorii}, i„ A,„erica„ Chare
Modernism is generally understood as an aesthetic category. That is, the tcnn
modernism' is most often understood to refer to a particuiar iiterary period, one which
emerged sometime around i890 and ended rotighiy in the eariy i930s. Sureiy, however,
modernism was more than simpiy an aesthetic phenomenon; and more than simpiy a
discreet historicai era. Yet, it does seem to have had certain defined characteristics, one of
which is said to be the desire for order through the visuai arts or iiterature. According to
Margaret Davies, ''[t]he basic idea of modernism was that art was a way of transcending
the poiiticai and sociai chaos of the times, of attaining a higher significance than that wiiich
was apparent in the lived world. Art became a search for aesthetic unity, order, and
universality - outside history, and outside social contexts." (Davies 1994, 221). For many
modernist writers, suggests Davies, "[bjeneath the chaos of texts, there [was] an
underlying 'universal book'."
My claim is that to properly understand the development ofmodem American
legal thought, we must situate it within the larger social and cultural context of
modernism. Rather than viewing the work of Holmes and his intellectual progeny simply
as a reaction against fomialism, we must instead see both formalism and realism as
jurisprudential responses to the perceived crisis of modernism. Obviously, the responses
took different forms; but, our reading of the difference must be understood within a larger
historical and cultural context. According to James Kloppenberg, "[t]he culture of
modernism springs from the unsettling but liberating experience of uncertainty. When
knowledge is recognized as contingent, standards that seemed stable start to wobble.
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convictions that felt solid start to crumble, and revolutionary fontts of expression emerge."
(Kloppenberg 1995. 69). it is my argument that formalism and realism emerged as
competing junsprudential strategies to meet the uneertainty oUegal modernism. The
former may be understood as a strategy of 'transcendence' - a search for. and an appeal to
overarching universal legal principles which would resolve the doctrinal indetenninacy and
chaos of the moment. The latter may be understood as a strategy of 'immanence', based
on a recognition of the inevitability of uncertainty; a recognition which resulted in efforts
not to transcend legal uncertainty, but to mam,ge it from within a space of professional
expertise.'^
To better sttuate the concept of modernism as an explanatory frame of reference
for the development of American legal thought, we can gain some insight from historians
of American cultural and intellectual life. Robert Wiebe. for example, has described the
United States during this period as a "distended society," where many felt that, as a
people, we had lost our way. He writes:
‘^This idea was initially inspired by a reading of Karl Llewellyn’s The Common Law
Tradition
-Deciding Appeals (1960), where, in the opening pages, he describes a "loss
of faith" among lawyers in the work product of the appellate courts. Llewellyn sets out as
his purpose the project of debunking what he believed to be the "myth" of uncertainty
which had, he conceded, contributed to this crisis of confidence among members of the
practicing bar. While he did not believe there existed a logical certainty that allowed for
scientific prediction ofjudicial decision-making, he did believe "that the work of our
appellate courts all over the country is reckonable." (1960, 4). More importantly, perhaps,
was the influence of Ronen Shamir’s Managing Legal Uncertainty: Elite Lawyers in the
New Deal (1995), directly from which I borrow the notion captured in his title. Nonethe-
less, my own analysis differs in important respects from his interpretation of the relation-
ship between formalists and realists. Specifically, Shamir views the development of
American legal thought to move in a ‘pendulum-like’ fashion, with realism emerging as a
direct reaction against formalism. For the reasons given above, I disagree.
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America in the late nineteenth century was a society without a core. It lacked thosea tonal centers of authority and information which might have given order to suchswin changes. American institutions were still oriented toward eomnnii y fcwhere family and church, education and press, professions and governmem aH
argely found their meaning by the way they fit one with another inside a town or adetached portion of a city. As men ranged farther and farther from their
comimmities they tried desperately to understand the larger world in terms of their
small, femiltar environment. They tried, in other words, to master an impersonal
world through the customs of a personal society. They failed, usually without
recognizing why; and that failure to comprehend a society they were helping to
make contained the essence of the nation's story. (Wiebe 1967, 12)
And, in his recent book, the American intellectual historian John Patrick Diggins
rebukes American pragmatism for its alleged failure to resolve the 'crisis of modernisin'.
For Diggins, modernism can be defined in terms of the problem of belief and the limits of
cognition. In a post-Darwmian world of rapid industrial expansion and social dislocation,
we have "lost our belief in the possibility of objective truth and have lost our faith in the
traditional modes of acquiring knowledge." (Diggins 1994, 7). The resultant crisis is the
product of a recognition of the loss of these traditional foundations for legitimate
authority. Diggins' critique is grounded in his assertion that pragmatism, because itself a
consequence of modemism, has failed to make good on its 'promise' of a resolution to the
crisis over the loss of foundations for legitimate authority. For Diggins, pragmatism
merely served as an apology for the acceptance of the modernist condition. While this
dissertation deals with work that was either instrumental to the development of the
pragmatist tradition (Holmes), or with work that emerges from it (i.c.. Pound and
Cardozo), 1 am not interested in developing a critique along Diggins' line of analysis; that
is, a straightforward critique of pragmatism.
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Rather, 1 am more concerned to situate both formalism and rcalisn, as rcspottses to
thts cns.s of modernism. There are. I believe, a number of implications to be drawn from
this point having to do with the legitimation of legal/expert authority. That is, by looking
more directly at the contours of realist expertise and authority, by not viewing realism
simply as a 'reaction’ against formalism, we avoid the limitation of understanding realism
only as a critical analysis of systemic distortions or breakdowns. Viewing realism
principally as a reaction to formalism provides a decidedly truncated analysis which veils
the emergence of realist 'expertise' - a reconstituted legitimation of legal authority.
Realtsm as 'reaction' suggests something almost ud hoc in nature, rather than a socially
constructed discourse of legal authority. As a corrective, I would suggest that a full
account of the 'cognitive exclusiveness’ that Magali Sarfatti Larson (1977) identified as
important to professional authority, must more seriously evaluate the constitutive elements
of the relationship between realism and legal uncertainty or doctrinal indetenninacy.'^
But, what does this new rhetoric of power look like -- a realist discourse of professional
authority?
Legal Modernism and the Problem of Trust
David Luban suggests that modernism can be understood by reference to the
metaphor of the 'Copemican Revolution'. Copernicus, Luban notes, "taught us to mistrust
common sense, to view it as merely a belief system resting on criticizable
‘^Larson defines this as a unique access to some area of knowledge that is deemed crucial
to the well-being of society. (See Larson 1977, 15).
25
presuppositions." (Luban 1994, 19). The in,pi,cation of 'Copemtcanisn,' forthe legal .nind
IS that "[t]he truth about legal structures must be radically different from the way they
manifest themselves in practice." (Luban 1994, 3). Luban’s insight here is profound and
compelling; and much of the work that follows relies on the simple image that he conveys
with this metaphor. The realist introduction of such concepts as uncertainty or
tndeterminacy, and the concomitant emphasis on 'perspective' serve to define the contours
of the legal manifestations of Luban's post-Copemican world. It is a jurispnidential
position pregnant with possibility - one which critical legal theorists, from the turn of the
century to the present day, have made great use. Specifically, it would seem to create a
more democratic space for social and political contestation over legal meaning, thereby
suggesting an indeterminate juridical future subject to progressive transformation, rather
than a closed set of limited alternatives.
However, even as it informs a style of legal reasoning and practice, the emphasis of
realism on legal uncertainty, and the professional knowledge deployed to 'manage' it, pose
new problems amenable to normative intervention. In her important essay, "Genealogy
and Jurisprudence: Nietzsche, Nihilism, and the Social Scientification of Law," Marianne
Constable (1994) laments the gradual expulsion ofjustice from modem law. The
expulsion' is brought about by the 'wedding' of law and social science, a union first
suggested by Holmes, and ultimately brought to fruition in the work of Legal Realism and
its contemporary intellectual heirs: 'Law and Economics', and Critical Legal Studies.
Constable's analysis is prompted by an imaginative reading of Nietzsche's Twilight
ofthe Idols', specifically, his six-stage history of Western metaphysics: "How the 'Real
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World’ at Last Became a Myth." Her purpose is to show "how 20th-century legal thought
- a legal thought that, fragmented though it may be, often traces its impetus, if not its
origins, to the insights of Oliver Wendell Holmes - corresponds to the final stages of
Nietzsche’s history of metaphysics." (Constable 1994, 555). According to Constable,
the first five stages of Nietzsche’s history can be taken to sketch the way in whichjurisprudence, like metaphysics, has, through reason, long sought its foundations in
truths residing m a ’real world’ outside of, beyond, and even in opposition to ’life’m this world. Justice lies, respectively, in the virtue of the wise citizen of the polism the natural law of the divinity of the unattainable world beyond, in the moral law
of Kant’s categorical imperative, in the positive law of the empiricists and
utihtanans, and m the social policy and distributive justice of economists and
philosophers. Striving for such justice signifies to Nietzsche a need and desire to
escape one s condition, as one turns to an illusory better world that is believed to
be ’real’. (555).
Similar to Cuban’s understanding of legal modernism. Constable understands the
’social scientification’ of the law - which corresponds to Nietzsche’s final stages of
Western metaphysics — as taking up "the task of grasping the so-called reality of
phenomena or appearances. As it does so, its knowledge comes to constitute the ’truth’
about perceptions and beliefs. And as sociology looks to appearances, justice disappears."
(Constable 1994, 555). The ideal ofjustice - in Nietzsche’s reversal, what is real - is
rendered unknowable on its own terms. The apparent world, or what is observable - a
world of surfaces and behavior - now constitutes the basis for knowledge of the socio-
legal world. Sociology merges with law, assumes its discursive space, and now "provides
access to a law disengaged from justice and attached to ’social realities’, which [sociology]
simultaneously renders problematic;" (Constable 1994, 556) or, in other words, "sociology
simultaneously provides and becomes the law of society." (Constable 1994, 589).
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The problem for Constable, a problem which this dissertation seeks, in part, to
engage with, is that the social scientification of law is the product of, and in turn seeks to
describe, a "social world [which] presents itself in terms of the regularities or laws that
comprise the domain of knowledge of the social sciences, which knowledge in turn
informs the social policies of government." (Constable 1994, 563). Realism purports to
demystify the ideological constructs of the various manifestations of legal formalism in
order to rehabilitate law's instrumental capacity to serve the ends of social and economic
justice. However, as Austin Sarat notes in his commentary on Constable's essay,
[ijnstead of enabling a new legality engaged in the process of building a more humane
world, realists and their intellectual progeny have been, albeit unintentionally, the
handmaidens of an expanded state power whose regulatory effects are more insidious
precisely because they are more informed by knowledge of the social world." (Sarat 1994,
563).
Constable's appropriation of Nietzsche is both provocative and suggestive. Such a
perspective is useful for my analysis of the nature of a realist discourse of expertise. Her
identification of an "actuarial" justice, as the product of a jurisprudence of risk and social
interest, is, in many ways, similar to my own emphasis on a realist discourse of socio-legal
uncertainty and doctrinal indeterminacy. It is a discourse that embodies new forms of
legal closure, while reconstituting the legitimation of expertise through which the legal
profession can articulate and justify the law of the modem state. The seeds of this
discourse can be discerned in the jurispmdential writings of that line of critical legal work,
from Holmes forward, which stands in apparent opposition to legal formalism. The
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'opposition' IS real. However, it is misleading to simply focus on its repeated tinfolding.
By doing so, we ignore the parallel development of this new (realist) discourse of
expertise. Subsumed within the rhetoric of realism is the simultaneous 'recognition' of
uncertainty and the production of new forms of legal knowledge to manage it. A central
thesis of this dissertation is that the authority of modern law, and its carriers, is largely
grounded in this conjunction.
To clarify these points, it is necessary to elaborate on what is meant by a realist
discourse of expertise. 1 will attempt to accomplish that task in the following chapters.
My analysis is motivated both by empirical and normative concerns and is well captured in
the seminal study from the 1930s on the professions by Carr-Saunders and Wilson. They
contend that "[tjhc association between scientific inquiry and the art of government has
become a prime necessity. Knowledge is power. Authority without knowledge is
powerless. Power dissociated from knowledge is a revolutionary force. Unless the
modern world works out a satisfactory relationship between expert knowledge and
popular control the days of democracy arc numbered." (Carr-Saunders and Wilson 1933,
485-86). In modern society, the professions''’ arc the principal sites for the production of
knowledge; consequently, they assume an ever greater importance to the state in terms of
its capacity to govern.'^ Carr-Saunders and Wilson go on to argue that against the
'‘‘Again, 1 include both the legal academy and practitioners, along with the judiciary, in my
definition of the legal profession..
'^This is a central concern of Terrence Halliday’s work. Beyond Monopoly: Lawyers,
State Crises, and Professional Empowerment (1987). One can also usefully compare here,
the recent work of Anthony Giddens; sec, in particular. The Consecptences ofModernity
( 1 990).
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professions, "stands the democracy in need of an expert. The establishment of a right
relationship between knowledge and power is the central problem of modem democracy."
The professions "are not the only repositories of knowledge, but they are the repositories
of a very special kind of knowledge; and the problem of the establishment of proper
relations between them and the democratic state is one of the urgent problems of the day."
(Carr-Saunders and Wilson 1933, 486).
The questions Carr-Saunders and Wilson confronted were, of course, not new. As
Stephen Esquith has noted, "Max Weber was the first" to grapple with "identifying the
central place of expert authority" in modem society. (Esquith 1994, 41). Esquith locates
his discussion of Weber's work in a larger examination of the modem problem of liberal
political education. For Esquith, this is a situation characterized by the attempt to go
"beyond the traditional problem of teaching private citizens to respect the rights of others
and do their duty; it has been one of creating an appropriate system of tmst and expert
authority." (Esquith 1994, 41). According to Esquith, Weber's importance, was to argue
that the dominant form of authority in modem liberal societies has become the
authority of those who have organized the production of scientific and technical
knowledge and have retained exclusive jurisdiction over its interpretation and
deployment. One of the keys to this enterprise has been the development of
specialized languages and methods-principles, laws, and rules. These abstractions
have become the coin of the realm. This is why Weber called modem expert
authority 'rational-legal' authority. According to Weber, it is through compliance
with the judgements of experts, rationally articulated in formal terms, that the
modem secular values of security, procedural fairness, and wealth have been better
realized. (Esquith 1994, 41).
Given the complexity of modem society, the problems of access to, and tmst in
expertise become all the more important for us to engage with. In this dissertation, I focus
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on the jurisprudential constructions of legal expertise; the response of legal theory to a
crisis for the legal profession as a whole. Delineating the characteristics of an important
component of legal professional knowledge - realism - is, then, a goal of this work. It is
motivated by the desire to democratize the space in which we provide answers to the
question: what is law?
Fovntcilisni und the C^oiistitutioii ofLegol A.utonomy
In his classic work. The Promise ofAmerican Life, Herbert Croly characterized
political power in the United States as "government by lawyers." (Croly 1909/1965, 131-
37). This certainly was not an observation new to Croly. More than seventy years earlier,
Alexis de Tocqueville identified the central role of the legal profession to American social
and political life. Indeed, Tocqueville described a popular reverence for the virtues of
legalism that inevitably elevated its professional carriers to a place of prominence as well:
"So in the United States there is no numerous and perpetually turbulent crowd regarding
the law as a natural enemy to fear and suspect. On the contrary, one is bound to notice
that all classes show great confidence in their country's legislation, feeling a sort of
paternal love for it." (Tocqueville 1966/1988, 241).
From a somewhat different perspective, the contemporary sociologist of the
professions, Magali Larson, suggests that the primary aim of the legal profession is to
secure its position in the hierarchy of a given order, not to change this order in any
fundamental way. The livelihoods of lawyers, says Larson, "depend on the stability and
legitimacy of a given institutional and legal framework. In the wider sense of the word.
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the legal mind is therefore inherently conservative." (Larson 1977, 168). Lawyers’ stake in
stability, in turn, is a "powerful source of conformity with the existing social order."
(Larson 1977, 229). Larson is clear, however, to highlight the uniqueness of the modem
professions. She maintains that any suggestion of an historical "continuity of older
professions with their pre-industrial past [Tocqueville’s point of reference] is more
apparent than real." (Larson 1977, xvi). For Larson, the modem professions are relatively
recent social products whose emergence coincides with industrialization. Modem
professions, she explains, are quite different from their historical predecessors. The
modem legal profession arose in a social, economic, and cultural setting vastly different
from the one that sustained the traditional legal profession and its ideology of a
gentlemanly profession - the ‘lawyer-statesman’ that Anthony Kronman (1993) pines for.
The source of professional power in pre-industrial society derived not from training or
credentialling, but from social position and association with elite patrons. Yet, as social
conditions changed with the onset of industrial society, so too did the bases for
professional power: "From dependence upon the power and prestige of elite patrons or
upon the judgement of a tightly knit community, the modem professions came to depend
upon specific formal training and anonymous certificates." (Larson 1977, 4). Moreover,
while the modem legal profession undoubtedly incorporated some pre-industrial status
criteria and ideological orientations, it also faced the need to develop new sources of
professional authority.
Terence Halliday reminds us that "[t]he politics of expertise are contingent on an
authority that can be constmcted only through assiduous and persistent effort." (Halliday
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1987, 59). Beginning ,n the 1870s, the American legal profession once again turned to bar
associations as the central mechanism to assert its professional mandate and construct that
authority. This development followed over three decades in which lawyers as a group
were not active in pursuing professional goals collectively, and in which bar associations
fell into disrepute between the 1830s and 1870s - largely as a result of the egalitarian
pressures of the Jacksonian era. This period has been characterized by Roscoe Pound and
Others as an era of professional "decadence." (Pound 1953, 223).
But bar associations were not the only institutional source of professional power.
In fact, by the mid-nineteenth century, bar associations had been eclipsed in many respects
by the development of the modem law school. As part of their efforts to elevate
professional status and authority, bar associations had quite consciously drawn on an
earlier ideological model of gentlemanly status and authority. Through bar associations,
the legal profession modeled legal education in a manner befitting such gentlemanly status.
This often consisted of a requirement for a 'liberal' education followed by training in a
system of apprenticeship monitored by the associations themselves. Yet, some segments
of the profession realized that there was considerable power to be derived from viewing
law as a scientific system rather than a disjointed set of mles, and they attempted to
constmct the institutional base appropriate for reshaping legal education along these lines:
the university-affiliated law school.'*'
'^For a history of the development of American legal education, see: Anthony Chase
(1979), Robert Stevens (1983), and William LaPiana (1994).
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The emergence of the law school, of a university-based legal education, was the
product of the legal profession's desire for intellectual legitimacy. Vying with the other
professions for cultural authority, the legal profession had grown uncomfortably familiar
with the inadequacies of the apprentice method. As Robert Stevens observed: "Legal
education had failed, m an earlier period, to produce the aristocracy that Tocqueville had
purported to see." (Stevens 1983, 41). On the other hand,
[t]he law schools were offering...a systematic, academic experience designed to
upgrade the intellectual quality of law and lawyers and thus enhance their
professional status. There had been, so it was claimed by the 1870s, a 'downward
tendency', and law had gone from 'a liberal science to a mechanical trade'. Yet 'the
science of law was the science of mankind', and lawyers were being urged to 'help
solve the moral problems upon which the progress of the law depends ' (Stevens
1983,24).
But, the effort to reconstruct the intellectual foundations of the law and the legal
profession was motivated by larger social and cultural concerns. Where Tocqueville had
observed a remarkable absence of 'fear' of the law in the 1830s (however correctly or
incorrectly), the leaders of the American bar, in the 1870s and 1880s, perceived a radically
different situation. Indeed, as James Foster suggests, lawyers during this period were
responding to what amounted to a legitimation crisis. (Foster 1986, 9-11). According to
Foster, "[djuring these years, the cumulative impact of a whole century's social trends and
economic transformations unleashed its considerable turmoil upon the nation. Far-
reaching modifications in the organization and ownership of production, in the character
of work, in the structure of income and wealth, and in the composition of society
occasioned fundamental tensions throughout American life." (Foster 1986, 10). Although
the influence and authority of the bar was certainly in question, in Foster's analysis, at
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issue was the legitimacy of capitalism itself: "Consequences Howing from the private
ownership of production for profit were causing growing numbers of people seriously to
question capitalism. Government by lawyers was being challenged." (Foster 1986, 52).
Foster argues that elite lawyers of both progressive and conservative perspectives,
responded to this crisis of capitalism by rearticulating their own versions of the ideology of
"apolitical politics."
Foster's underlying assumption is that the ideology of capitalism and the ideology
of legalism are synonymous; that a crisis of capitalism subsumes a crisis of legalism. The
notion that liberal legal ideology somehow supports the capitalist system is not a
provocative claim in and of itself, and Foster provides lengthy quotes from several leaders
of the bar to support his argument. Foster's claim that the late nineteenth and early
twentieth-century bar confronted a legitimation crisis is important and I want to pursue it;
however, I would suggest that his conflation of the ideologies of capitalism and legalism is
somewhat problematic. Most simply, for my concerns, it fails to explain the emergence
and continuing dominance of realism, both within the legal academy and the profession.
Moreover, I believe it more profitable to locate the profession's perception of a crisis
within the larger context of modernism - that the crisis was cultural and cognitive -
everything was in flux and the law provided no refuge. For example, in 1887, at the same
time that Christopher Columbus Langdell was delivering his "Harvard Celebration
Speech," the highly influential jurist, Thomas M. Cooley spoke to the Georgia Bar
Association on the "uncertainty of the law." Responding to the bar’s concerns that it was
becoming the object of ridicule due to the public’s perception that the law was uncertain.
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Cooley defiantly asserted: "I shall affi™ and endeavor to show by this paper that there ts
no substantial foundation whatever for these reproaches, these gibes and jeers. It is not
true in any sense that the law is uncertain; it is in fact so far from being true that, on the
contrary, the law will be found on investigation to have more elements of certainty about
it, and to be more worthy of trust than anything else." (Cooley 1887, 110).
Yet, as Wayne Hobson has observed:
To recognize that lawyers thought they faced such a crisis, however, is not the
same thing as saying that they were describing objective reality. Something was
happening to the public perception of law and lawyers in these years, but it may
have more to do with the general revolt against formalism in social thought and
with broad shifts in public culture from Victorian to modem than with a 'mere'
delegitimization of law and lawyers....There was no out-and-out attack on lawyers
and the rule of law. Rather, law suffered a major challenge to its position as the
leading profession in American life as the medical profession assumed that role. In
addition, the rise of the social sciences and the transformation of politics and
business generated new ideas and new cultural authorities in domains lawyers had
come to believe were their own. (Hobson 1987, 138).
My argument, then, is that the 'crisis' of legal modernism created a set ofperceived
dangers to which legal theorists responded because they perceived the continued
legitimacy of the profession was at stake. The sense of chaos and flux, the indeterminacy
of legal doctrine, threatened the authority of law and, by implication, the authority of a
legal profession whose prestige, power, and wealth, depended upon the claim to a
legitimate monopoly over a determinate and autonomous body of law. Formalism,
particularly in its Langdellian mode, initially provided an appealing response to the chaos
and uncertainty: transcendence through an appeal to a body of neutral, objective and
scientific legal principles, uniquely discoverable by a professionally trained class of
experts. But, it was only one response, one that would ultimately prove incapable of
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explaining the processes of legal development in the wake of external social and
intellectual developments.
Accordingly, I would argue as well, that the role of lawyers cannot be adequately
grasped without a concurrent study of the law and legal theory that characterize a given
economic and political order. For example, as Alan Norrie has suggested, intellectual and
social developments are inextricably intertwined; the production of theory is already a
'social process', because "it occurs within a tradition provided by a community of
intellectuals." (Norrie 1993, 1-2). The 'intellectual' is 'social' because "the production of
ideas occurs within given socioeconomic conditions, at two different but connected
levels;" Norrie writes:
One the one hand, the movements of legal theory respond to the inner logic of
earlier positions within [a] field. Theory orients itself, or rather is oriented, within
an already established set of intellectual practices and paradigms, which it works to
repeat or change. Theory responds to what already exists, revealing, with the
benefit of hindsight, an inherent logic, whether of continuity or discontinuity....At
the most fundamental level, the basic ideas of a tradition are historical products
emerging out of a particular social period.. ..At a more specific level, the ideas of a
period are social and historical in that the basic intellectual structures, which are
handed down from the past and engaged with in the present, are mediated and
redirected according to the preoccupations of the here and now. History provides
the structure and the color of theory, but it is the intellectual who works on the
material and produces the accomplished product. (Norrie 1993, 2).
Students of the legal profession sometimes underestimate the impact of legal ideas
on the practices of lawyers (whereas jurists and legal historians sometimes describe the
changes in legal thought as struggles of ideas). The history of lawyers and the
organization of the legal profession should not be studied independently of the history of
legal thought. Law is not only a system of abstract ideas 'out there', but also a concrete
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mechanism of social closure. According to Roger Cotterrell, when viewed sociologically,
"legal closure can be treated primarily as a means by which various forms of legal or
political practice attempt to enhance their own legitimacy." (Cotterrell 1993, 175).
The classic Weberian notion of social closure, says Frank Parkin, refers to "the
process by which social collectivities seek to maximize rewards by restricting access to
resources and opportunities to a limited circle of eligibles." (Parkin 1979, 44). While
traditional principles of social closure are class, race, religion, and nationality, the claim of
specialized knowledge and expertise is the principle by which professionals secure their
own market advantages. In the case of lawyers, the language of law constitutes the
knowledge base of the profession. The claim of lawyers to have a specialized expertise in
the law allows them to restrict entry to the profession and to insist on a right of self-
regulation. A monopoly of expertise enhances the social status of lawyers, increases the
dependency of clients on their services, and allows them to control the pace and scope of
legal development. In Cotterrell's view, "professional claims of special expertise are
significantly underpinned by the idea that there is a distinctive, autonomous legal
knowledge; or a special logic of law to be understood only through specialised training
and experience; or, more broadly, that there is a certain indefinable style of thought, a
manner of marshalling and of working with ideas, which constitutes 'thinking like a
lawyer'." (Cotterrell 1993, 176).
Law, however, is not simply another currency of professional closure but also the
principal 'language of the state'. Lawyers' use and treatment of legal principles have
immediate bearing on social, economic, and political issues at large, and seems to situate
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lawyers in a potentially powerful social position. Recognition of this fact compels us to
determine what the collective role of lawyers has been in the exercise and distribution of
power in the United States. Certainly, to some extent at least, this teiritory has already
been covered in classical social thought; for example, Weber considered the role of legal
experts in the development of 'formal-rational' law. He argued that the development of
capitalism, the bureaucratic state, and the legal system, were interdependent processes of
mutual affirmation and consolidation. A capitalist market 'needed' a particular type of legal
order to satisfy its demands for predictable and calculable economic transactions in an
impersonal system of production and exchange. The bureaucratic state apparatus, as a
distinct type of political authority, 'needed' an institutionalized and centralized system of
law in order to satisfy its interest in an orderly normative control of fragmented and
geographically dispersed social and economic units. In both cases, law served not only as
a normative system of regulation, but also as a legitimation mechanism that objectified
economic and political relations of domination and rationalized them by invoking an
'impartial' logic of rules and doctrines.
In Weber's scheme, the role of legal experts, as a group that could assert at least
some independence from political and economic groups, was crucial for the development
of law as a heuristically consistent and self-referential system: "The increased need for
specialized legal knowledge created the professional lawyer," Weber argued, and lawyers,
in turn, had considerable influence on the "formation of law through legal invention."
(Weber 1978, 775).
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An important aspect of both the Weberian and Marxian traditions of socio-legal
studies has concentrated, respectively, on law as a legit,mation mechanism, and on law as
an ideological system. In particular, the study of law as ideology has produced a rich
literature whose main purpose has been to "explore the connection between ideas,
attitudes, and beliefs, on the one hand, and economic and political interests, on the other."
(Hunt IQS.S, 13). From this perspective, law as an ideology has the function of
"cementing together the social formation under the aegis of the dominant class."
(Poulantzas 1978, 88).
Within this tradition, the main object of studying the law is to unmask the
seemingly autonomous, neutral, and class-free nature of law, and to unravel the
mechanisms by which law becomes a vehicle in the legitimation and reproduction of a
given social order. Depending on the particular object of study, law is critiqued either as a
system of rules which directly reflects capitalist interests and protects the privileges of the
capitalist class, or, in more sophisticated versions, as a system of rules whose form, if not
content, reconstruets capitalist interests as universal values and protects the ability of the
economically and politically powerful to defend the status-quo. (Hunt 1985). In both the
crude and sophisticated legitimation argument, the idea of autonomous law is taken
seriously. While there is an ongoing effort to unravel the correspondence between
autonomous law and a given social order, there is also the acknowledgment that it is
preeisely this appearance of autonomy that enables law to legitimize a given social order.
As Cotterrell observes:
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legal closure refers to the multifaceted but ubiquitous idea that law ,s in someay, radically autonomous, self-reproducing or self-validating in relation to anenvironment defined as extralegar....To adopt an idea of legafZurTistochim
that law IS self-standing and imeducible or has an independent integrity which isnomally unproblematic, natural or self-generated, not dependent on cLtingentlinks with an extralegal environment ofknowledge or practice. (Cotterrell 1993,
A crucial question, therefore, is how such autonomous law is produced and
sustained? Who are the actual producers of law, and how, and why, do they insist on its
autonomy? Obviously, this is not a function that is directly carried out by capitalists or
State managers, but by a specialized class of experts in the law. When the role of legal
experts is considered, critical students of law (e.g., realism and CLS) tend to focus on the
judiciary. Yet, it seems that, traditionally, little attention has been given to the role of
lawyers in private practice, and to the relationship between practitioners discursive
constructions of the law and dominant theoretical representations of the legal system..
Moreover, little attention has been given to the fact that courts are merely a part, albeit a
highly important part, of the legal profession. One might suggest that courts are reactive
institutions that only act after a concrete 'case' is brought before them. The construction
of disputes m legal terms and the channeling of certain types of cases to the judicial arena,
therefore, are tasks that are performed by lawyers. Thus, by transforming social and
economic issues into a discreet legal language, lawyers would seem to play an important
role in the construction of law as an autonomous and 'neutral' system of specialized
'^For example, James Herget locates the source of this perspective in Holmes’ work:
"[Holmes’] early leadership placed a tilt on American jurisprudence from which it has not
altogether recovered, that is, the limitation of legal theory to a theory ofjudicial decision-
making." (Herget 1990, 46).
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expertise. This would tend to explain the appeal of formalism; however it offers little to
explain the emergence of realism in legal thought, its ultimate assimilation mto the legal
academy, or the deployment of realist tropes in actual practice.
Professional Knowledge and the Problem of Closure
In Stanley Fish's memorable phrase, "[t]he law wishes to have a formal existence."
(Fish 1994, 141). What he means by this is "that the law does not wish to be absorbed by,
or declared subordinate to, some other
-nonlegal- structure of concern; the law wishes,
in a word, to be distinct, not something else." (Fish 1994, 141). It means as well that "the
law wishes m its distinctness to be perspicuous; that is, it desires that the components of
its autonomous existence be self-declaring and not be in need of piecing out by some
supplementary discourse." (Fish 1994, 141). What Fish is describing here is the law’s (or,
more concretely, the legal profession's) desire to achieve closure. I have suggested that
the social conditions which constituted legal modernism compelled the legal profession to
seek closure in a variety of ways — principally through the jurisprudential regimes of
formalism and realism. Borrowing an analytical distinction from Roger Cotterrell,'* I will
argue that formalism attempted a type of normative closure, whereas realism attempted a
type of discursive closure. (Cotterrell 1993, 178-185). In the remainder of this chapter, I
‘^Cotterrell equates "normative closure" with a type of positivism that emphasizes a sharp
distinction between the legal and the non-legal. "Discursive closure," on the other hand,
is "a conception of law as a distinct discourse, possessing its own integrity, its own
criteria of significance and validation, its own means ofcognition and ofconstituting the
objects ofwhich it speaks." (Cotterrell 1993, 183 emphasis added).
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will elaborate on the former; I will discuss the contours of the latter in the chapters to
follow.
In The System ofProfessions (1988), the sociologist Andrew Abbott provides a
helpful analytical framework from which to theorize the link between professional
knowledge and legal closure. Abbott's discussion of professional work revolves around its
relative ability to assert 'jurisdiction'. According to Abbott, in order to make a successful
jurisdictional claim, a profession must situate its practices within an overall system of
knowledge which provides a profession with a special type of legitimacy. Hence the
importance given by Abbott to forms of professional knowledge which are governed by
academics:
Academic knowledge legitimizes professional work by clarifying its foundations
and tracing them to major cultural values. In most modem professions, these have
been the values of rationality, logic, and science. Academic professionals
demonstrate the rigor, the clarity, and the scientifically logical character of
professional work, thereby legitimating that work in the context of larger values.
(Abbott 1988, 54).
For Abbott, the prestige of academic knowledge is derived from the compelling
legitimacy science as a manifestation of rational activity geared towards the solution of
human problems through the systematic reduction of uncertainty.'^ The more professional
work may be attributed to science, the greater its ability to hold to its jurisdiction and to
assert its autonomy. According to Abbott, the scientific producers that generate the
profession's abstract knowledge are assigned with two main responsibilities: First, they are
responsible for "the generation of new diagnoses, treatments, and inference methods."
'‘'For an interesting history of the concept of legal science, see M.H. Hoeflich (1986).
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(Abbott 1988, 55). The institutional location of academics, away from practice, leaves
them free to engage in the 'purely' rational activity of systematization and abstraction of
incoming information. Second, academies are responsible for the selection and training of
new professionals. Besides the important task of producing the profession's practitioners,
this function creates the symbolic bond between practical work and scientific abstraction.
The profession's scientific knowledge, therefore, constitutes the heart of a profession's
jurisdiction and its ability to defend it. The stakes in the construction of a 'scientific'
foundation for professional knowledge are, then, obviously quite high.
In the case of law and legal work, the rise of 'scientific' legal thought and its
accompanying professional jurisdiction came about with the appearance of what Weber
called 'formal-rational' law. (Weber 1978, 656). Weber described the essential properties
of formal-rational law as consisting of five basic postulates:
First, that every concrete legal decision be the 'application' of an abstract legal
proposition to a concrete fact situation'^ second, that if must be possible in every
concrete case to derive the decision from abstract legal propositions by means of
legal logic; third, that the law must actually or virtually constitute a 'gapless'
system of legal propositions, or must, at least, be treated as if it were such a
gapless system; fourth, that whatever cannot be 'construed' rationally in legal terms
is also legally irrelevant; and fifth, that every social action ofhuman beings must
always be visualized as either an 'application' or 'execution' of legal propositions, or
as an 'infringement' thereof, since the 'gaplessness' of the legal system must result
in a gapless 'legal ordering' of all social conduct. (Weber 1978, 657).
The idea that the legal order represented a 'gapless' system suggested that there
was a legal solution to every problem and that the method at arriving at the 'correct'
solution was determined by a distinct mode of legal reasoning. This did not mean that the
solution to every legal problem could be known beforehand, but it at least ensured that the
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method' by which legal decisions were reached was predetemimed. This was particularly
evident m the procedural, rather than the substantive, aspects of law. According to Nonet
and Seiznick, the rise of autonomous law, therefore, was strongly associated with the
maxim that "procedure is the heart of law" - "regularity and fairness, not substantive
justice, are the first ends and the main competence of the legal order." (Nonet and
Seiznick 1978, 54).
Weber associated the development of a formal-rational legal system with the civil
law system of continental Europe. It was in civil law countries (most notably Germany),
that formal-rationahty developed as a result of the formal separation between legal
practice and academic legal training. For Weber, it was the particular nature of academic
legal thought that facilitated the development of formal-rationality: "The legal concepts
produced by academic law-teaching bear the character of abstract norms, which, at least in
principle, are formed and distinguished from one another by a rigorously formal and
rational legal interpretation of meaning." (Weber 1978, 789). Where legal apprenticeship
produced "law as a craft," academic training produced "law as a science." (Weber 1978,
787). Thus, Weber thought of the Anglo-American law as an "empirical art" which was
based on precedents, analogies and distinctions. (Weber 1978, 890). It was essentially less
rational than continental European law and could not develop into a more rational system
as long as legal education had been in the hands of practitioners. (Weber 1978, 787).
For Weber, who was interested in the relationship between formal-rationality and
capitalism, the irrationality of English law created the "English problem," since formal-
rationality was part of a system that responded to and facilitated the capitalist market
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demand for consistency, certainty and predictability. Nonetheless, Weber recognized that
England saw the emergence of a full capitalistic system and explained himself'ouf of the
problem by arguing that capitalism developed ’in spite of the absence of formal-rational
law.
Weber’s emphasis on the idea of ’’appheation of ’legal propositions’ logieally
derived from statutory texts” may have caused him to underestimate the degree to which
Anglo-American law, through different means, gradually evolved towards a similar
rationalized system. In fact, American law moved in the same direction that Weber
conceived as possible only in the civil law world. As Alan Hunt suggests, Weber’s own
analysis implied that a process of ’internal rationalization’ took place within the common
law system as well. ’Empirical’ fact finding evolved into a rational system consisting of
abstract and general rules and principles: ”So great has been this process of internal
rationalization that English jurists in the modem period have been able to conceive of
English law in terms of pure law’, of it consisting of a gapless, rigorously deductive
system of abstract rules which Weber would have considered possible only in a codified
system.” (Hunt 1978, 124).
The Weberian notion of formal-rationality is practically identical with the
jurisprudential concept, autonomy oflaw. The autonomy of law rests on the claim that
law is separated not only from other systems of knowledge but, in particular, from the
nomiative influence of politics. The autonomous qualities of legal thought and practice
are based on the assertion that legal thought is scientific, in the sense that it is internally
consistent, abstract, systematic, and 'a political’.
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In order to develop and maintain their position of cultural and political authority,
American lawyers have traditionally asserted the existence of, and monopoly over, an
abstract system of knowledge, which served as the foundation of their exclusive expertise.
The construction of autonomous law ensured the status of lawyers as impartial experts,
allowed them to speak authoritatively about the law, and, ultimately, enabled lawyers to
use legal knowledge as a principle of normative closure.
Legal Autonomy and Normative Closure
The idea of autonomous law developed in the United States in the second half of
the 1 9th century with the emergence of what is often referred to as Classical Legal
Thought.^® The rise of Classical Legal Thought marked the development of concepts that
became key values m both American jurisprudence and the American political culture: the
rule of law, the autonomy of law, and law as a 'science'. The main effort of legal thinkers
and practitioners was to portray the legal system as distinct from the pulls and pressures of
politics on the one hand and the economic market on the other. As Ronen Shamir has
observed, [t]he rise of classical legal thought was marked by an effort to portray the legal
system as an autonomous and scientific system." (Shamir 1993, 51). This was done by
shifting the focus from the substantive aspects of law to its purelyformal qualities. That
is, law was portrayed as a systematic elaboration of concepts, rules, and norms that
determined legal results independently of the surrounding social context.
^°See, for example, Duncan Kennedy (1980), and Morton Horwitz (1977, 1992).
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According to Horwitz, the emergence of an autonomous system of law marked a
transformation m its social functions as well. Rather than being an 'instrumenf ,n the
hands of groups who used the law to mold social relations in light of their self-interests,
the transformation of the law objectified these relations and cloaked them in a neutral,
class-free, and formal discourse, that provided a rational justification for the existing social
order. The formalization of law, says Horwitz, meant that capitalist interests could not be
automatically assured ofjudicial protection. The 'price' capitalists had to pay, however,
was worth paying. The occasional cases in which the legal system failed to meet capitalist
demands were far outweighed by the fact that key legal propositions and doctrines were
formalized in a particular point in time where "the legal system had been reshaped to the
advantage of men of commerce and industry at the expense of farmers, workers,
consumers, and other less powerful groups within the society." (Horwitz 1977, 254).
Further, as Horwitz and others have suggested, it is possible that cases in which capitalist
expectations were disappointed by the law only served to highlight the law’s autonomous
nature and ensured its overall legitimizing capacity.
A classic example that is often given to demonstrate the manner in which fomial
law secured capitalist interests is the way courts interpreted the concept of 'freedom of
contract.' In the case of Coppage v. Kansas, the Supreme Court invalidated state
legislation that outlawed yellow-dog contracts. The State of Kansas defended its
enactment by arguing that yellow-dog contracts were entered under conditions of coercion
because the weak market position of employees prevented them from refusing to enter
into such contracts. Thus, the defense of the law was based on the argument that yellow-
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dog contracts should not have enjoyed the protection of the Treedom of contract' doctrine.
The Supreme Court rejected these arguments.
The important point about this ruling was that it was decided on grounds of rigidly
formalistic reasoning. The court found that the common law excused nonperformance of
contracts m cases where they were entered under conditions of duress, but it ruled that the
definition of duress did not include economic pressure. Arguments concerning the
coercive nature of yellow-dog contracts, therefore, could not be accepted. Thus, as
Elizabeth Mensch has observed, the result was reached, not because the court failed to
acknowledge the substantive economic inequality between employers and employees, but
because legal reasoning 'compelled' it to apply formal legal criteria. (Mensch 1990, 13-37).
The court took the side of employers not because it was substantively biased against
employees; such a view of the court, says Mensch, "trivializes the underlying power of the
classical conceptual scheme." Rather, the court adopted an 'objective' position which was
derived from its commitment to the form of law, and not to its substantive content.
It is precisely because of the distinct features of such legal reasoning that law
became a legitimating vehicle for existing economic relations. Discussing the economic
consequences of formal-rational law, Weber noted that "the parties interested in power in
the market thus are also interested in such a legal order." (Weber 1978, 730). Similarly,
Morton Horwitz observed that: "If a flexible, instrumental conception of law was
necessary to promote the transformation of the post-revolutionary American legal system,
it was no longer needed once the major beneficiaries of that transformation had obtained
the bulk of their objectives. Indeed, once successful, those groups could only benefit if
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both the recent origins and the foundations in policy and group self-interest of all newly
established legal doctrines could be disguised." (Horwitz 1977, 254)
Kennedy, Horwitz and others maintain that the appearance of an autonomous and
scientific legal system provided the most powerful 'disguise' with which to veil the self-
interested origins of the prevailing judicial doctrines of the day. Moreover, capitalist
groups were not the only beneficiaries from the emergence of autonomous law. No less
important was the formal separation between law and politics. Again, Weber's theory of
law established the crucial link between law and political authority in the modem state.
The rise of an autonomous legal system was enhanced by, and in turn affected, the
emergence of the modem bureaucratic state. While previous modes of authority,
according to Weber (i.e., charismatic and traditional), rested on the belief in the legitimacy
of a particular law-giver, the rational bureaucratic state referred to the belief in the
legality of enacted mles and the right of those elevated to authority under such mles to
issue commands," as the source for its legitimacy. (Weber 1978, 215).
In Weber s analysis, the ability of political authority to derive its legitimacy from
the legal order depended on two essential conditions. First, that the legal system was
formal and rational and hence capable of demonstrating its internal consistency and
procedural autonomy. Second, in conformity with the first condition, that the level of
abstraction and generality of legal mles ensured that "the typical person in authority, the
'superior', was himself subject to an impersonal order by orienting his actions to it in his
own dispositions and commands." (Weber 1978, 217).
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It is clear, therefore, that in order for the legal system to legttimize authority, it had
to be clearly distinguished from political power. Further, if we aecept the basic Weberian
postulate that every system of authority "attempts to establish and to cultivate the belief in
its legitimacy" (Weber 1978, 213) we can understand why the establishment of the 'rule of
law' was especially important in the "building of the new American state." (Skowronck
1 982). According to Stephen Skowronek, in comparison to the European states, the
American governmental structure in the mid-nineteenth century was "so peculiar that
many have refused to consider it a state at all." (1982, 5). Early America, says
Skowronek, was a "state of parties and courts" which were the only nationally integrated
institutional systems. Further, according to Skowronek, while American parties came to
represent different social agendas, the perceived legitimacy of court decisions provided
some measure of coherence to the national system: "The only institutions that could stand,
at least partially, outside direct party domination and claim to complement the parties in
the performance of., basic constituent tasks were the courts," writes Skowronek; and they
have done so by "binding the legal apparatus of government," shaping the boundaries of
"intergovernmental relations," defining relations between state and society, and, in general,
by filling "a governmental vacuum left by abortive experiments in the administrative
promotion of economic development." (1982, 27).
The autonomy of law thus became a principle of legitimation which provided
credibility to political and economic forces in search of stability during a period of rapid
industrial and administrative expansion. The search by capitalist groups for an order that
would 'freeze' their economic advantages (Horwitz's emphasis), and the search by state
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managers in the progressive era for a legi,i„u,cy ofe.perlise (Skowronek's enrphasis),
were highly eondueivc to ideas that rested the foundations of law on ll,e values of seienee
and formal impartiality. In faet, the elaborate legal proeedures that aceonrpanied legal
autonomy have led Nonet and Seizniek to argue that the autonomy of law rested on a
'histone bargain': "Legal institutions purchase procedural autonomy at the price of
substantive subordination." (1978, 58).
The idea of autonomous law, however, also legitimated the efforts of lawyers to
secure their own claims to professional authority. Certainly, as Horwitz has argued, the
transformation of American law had to do, in large part, with the fact that the instrumental
approach to law had exhausted itself as far as commercial and industrial groups were
concerned. Yet, the instrumental approach to law also led to ideas that undermined the
authority of courts and the cognitive foundation of the common law and its principal
‘guardians’ - lawyers.
The overthrow of the old order after the American revolution was accompanied by
the popular perception that the legitimacy of law was not derived from the natural order of
things but from the conscious will of a sovereign that represented the will and power of
the people. In the first decades that followed the revolution, this perception led jurists to
insist that the common law expressed the popular will; a perception that in fact facilitated
the instrumental approach to law that characterized the legal system in the first half of the
century. In the 1820s and 1830s, however, the conception of law in terms of will and
power led to a codification movement that sought to replace the court-centered common
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law with formal legislation.^' The codification movement posed a direct threat to the
prerogatives of courts and jurists because "any special claims of the profession to
determine the nature and scope of legal development [were] undermined." (Horwitz 1977,
257).
The more laws are formally articulated and presented as concrete 'packages' of
rules and stipulations, the more law can be commented upon and interpreted by people
who are not trained in the law, the lesser the ability of professionals to engage in
‘mystification’ practices that create a social distance between professionals and their
chents.^^ It was the threat of legislation as an alternative source of law that gave a
decisive push to the idea of law as a science. The emphasis on the scientific nature of law,
in turn, allowed jurists to advance towards full professionalization. A scientific law, they
argued, could only be grounded in a judge-made law which was based on distinct modes
of legal-scientific reasoning. Thus, in response to the codification movement, the
"underlying conviction held by all nineteenth century legal thinkers [was] that the course
of American legal change should, if possible, be developed by courts and not by
legislatures." (Horwitz 1977, 256).
In applying abstract principles to concrete cases, and in drawing distinctions
between pre-established legal categories, judges were to apply strict rules of legal
reasoning that de-contextualized the cases on which they were to pass judgment. The
^'For an extensive discussion of this period, see Charles Cook (1981).
^^Peter Goodrich (1986) provides a fascinating discussion of the nature and problems of
legal writing and reading.
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application of a distinct formal legal reasoning, therefore, was an integral part of the
general assertion that the legal system has evolved into an autonomous system whose
-closedness’ had been daily demonstrated m the application of legal rules to particular
cases. Legislation, on the other hand, was portrayed as a flow of arbitrary acts of power
that exposed the law to an uneven development and unpredictable and abrupt changes.
Law had to be separated from politics, and this separation could only be assumed by a
judiciary that disengaged itself from other systems of knowledge.
According to this view, legislation threatened to blur the fragile line that separated
law from politics, while the judicial process ensured this separation. With the growing
emphasis on the formal aspects of law, therefore, came a strong anti-legislative trend and
an "upsurge injudicial review of legislation." (Horwitz 1977, 259). In short, the idea of
law as a science was linked to the insistence on the unchallenged supremacy of the courts
to articulate legal doctrines; the preservation of this judicial supremacy, and the
accompanying fear of legislation constituted the primary orientation of the legal profession
in years to come.
The separation between law and politics and the assertion of the autonomy of law
would seem to converge with the professional concerns of lawyers. To a greater extent
than perhaps any other profession, lawyers' basic interest are to establish mechanisms that
will distinguish them from, on the one hand, other systems of ideas, and, on the other
hand, from their clients. The inherent nature of law, more than other systems of
knowledge that solve 'human problems', is that it purports to solve problems that are in
themselves subjectively construed by the legal system. This is particularly evident in the
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difficulty of separating law and politics, a separation that is essential for the legal
profession's ability to ground its claims to professional authority in an expertise that
denves from a neutral and objective production of knowledge. Importantly, then, the
vulnerability of law to external interference (i.e„ ‘politics’), results in the legal profession's
unstable 'cognitive basis', and in a constant search for transcendent values that will
legitimize the profession’s authority. A system of law that could be convincingly described
as a scientific system demonstrated the transcendent aspects of law as an unbiased and
objective system of knowledge.
The sense of chaos and uncertainty brought about by rapid socio-economic
change, and the corresponding cultural and intellectual developments characterized as
'modernist', with their attendant dangers for the continuing authority of the legal
profession because of the apparent threat to undermine its claims to expertise — the
condition of legal modernism - argued for the paramount importance of the construction
of a scientific and autonomous law. Peter Goodrich describes the situation well:
The intellectual and cultural climate of the late nineteenth century was. ..strongly
imbued with the atmosphere of radical transition. The Industrial Revolution had,
with unprecedented speed, begun to destroy the traditional agriculturally based
communities and customary orders. ...The widespread cultural sense of
dispossession, disinheritance and disorder received striking expression in the
political philosophies of the period. The radical, rapid and uncontrolled economic
and social change threw up the mildly apocalyptic sense that everything was
possible, that the world would soon be either lost or gained, destroyed or saved.
(Goodrich 1986, 210).
The task of transcending this chaos, of finding refuge in the certainty of legal
principle by advancing the idea of law as a science, was initially assumed by academic
scholars and found its earliest expression in the effort to arrange legal materials in
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treatises. Whereas Blackstone's Commentaries were practically the only such source at
the beginning of the century, a number of legal scholars contributed to the systematization
of law towards its end. Numerous treatises sought to rearrange the law along functional
lines or, more boldly, to offer general theories of particular areas of the law. Lawrence
Friedman estimates that 1,000 treatises were published between 1850 and 1900.
(Friedman 1973, 541-46). The treatises covered the important legal subjects of the day:
torts, evidence, contracts, and so forth. Others were less ambitious and dealt with more
discreet areas of the law. Nevertheless, the declared purpose of most treatises was to
restate the common law in a systematic manner and in ways that would help the practicing
lawyer. Beyond their functional purpose, however, lay the deeper conviction that the
systematization of law reflected its self-contained nature and demonstrated the certainty of
law. In contrast to statutes that threatened to undermine the certainty and continuity of
law, the gradual development of law on a case-by-case basis ensured its consistency and
predictability. The systematic arrangement of these cases, and the formalization of legal
categories ensured that the method by which legal decisions were reached were scientific.
The treatises, therefore, shared common ground in their attempt to render the law more
certain, generalized, formal and, ultimately, scientific.
It was not coincidental that the emphasis on the scientific nature of law
corresponded to the rise of the modem law school as an alternative to legal
apprenticeship. As law became more 'scientific', its study required a more systematic
approach than the one that could be offered by a law office. In 1 800, fourteen of the
nineteen jurisdictions in America required apprenticeship to enter the bar. By 1860, only
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nine out of thirty nine jurisdictions required it. On the other hand, "starting about the
middle of the nineteenth century, law schools began to proliferate [and] the number of law
schools doubled in the twenty years between 1889-90 and 1909-10, while the number of
law students increased more than fourfold." (Abel 1989, 41).
The link between science and the rise of academic legal education was explicitly
articulated by Christopher Columbus Langdell in his "Harvard Celebration Speech," where
he sought to justify the law school's place within the newly emergent university.
Langdell's statement merits quoting at length:
[I]t was indispensable to establish at least two things— that law is a science, and
that all the available materials of that science are contained in printed books. If law
be not a science, a university will consult its own dignity in declining to teach it. If
it be not a science, it is a species of handicraft, and may best be learned by serving
an apprenticeship to one who practises it. If it be a science, it will scarcely be
disputed that it is one of the creates and most difficult of sciences, and that it needs
all the light that the most enlightened seat of learning can throw upon it. Again,
law can only be learned and taught in a university by means of printed books. ...But
if printed books are the ultimate sources of all legal knowledge,—if every student
who would obtain any mastery of law as a science must resort to these ultimate
sources, and if the only assistance which it is possible for the learner to receive is
such as can be afforded by teachers who have traveled the same road before him,-
then a university, and a university alone, can afford every possible facility for
teaching and learning law.. ..We have also constantly inculcated the idea that the
library is the proper workshop of professors and students alike; that it is to us all
that the laboratories of the university are to the chemists and physicists, all that the
museum of natural history is to the zoologists, all that the botanical garden is to
the botanists. (Langdell 1887, 124).
Langdell's efforts on behalf of a new science of law must be understood within a
"broader crisis of Western culture and society" (Ross 1995, 1), the crisis of knowledge
and authority — modernism — against which, formalism responded. Historians such as
Kennedy and Horwitz offer compelling indictments of formalism, or Classical Legal
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Thought. But, to focus on fotmalism as little more than a 'disguise', under which a newly
emergent capitalist class could conceal its prior instrumental approach to the legal system,
and thereby stabilize its current position, still seems to miss an important element of this
period. As the histonan Dorothy Ross observes, the "new uncertainty" which modernism
produced (or responded to), "led to efforts to reconstruct knowledge, value, and
representation." (Ross 1995, 1). For the legal profession, at least, formalism seemed to
offer a way out of the chaos ofmodem times; it presented the means by which to
transcend it. And, Langdell provided an early and enthusiastic, albeit tmncated, defense of
the formalist understanding of law as science; however confused he ultimately may have
been. In this regard, Langdell's efforts to enable the 'scientific' discovery of legal
principles were, in some ways, as much a denial of legal uncertainty, as a desire to
transcend it.
The rise of academic legal education was coupled with the development of the
case-method as the embodiment of a scientific method of legal thought and education.^^
^^Langdell has been universally criticized for holding an oudated and/or simpleminded
conception of science. (See, e.g., Stevens 1983, 52-53). For my interests, however,
whether or not Langdell understood scientific method is largely beside the point. Rather,
what is important is how Langdell constructed a response to a perceived crisis - how he
perceived that crisis, and why that response was important to considerations of profession-
al expertise and authority.
^^Whether Langdell’s peculiar understanding of law as science and the case method are
one and the same is contested territory. For example, Paul Carrington (1995) argues that
we can, and should, preserve the latter but that we must get rid of the former. But,
William LaPiana (1995) maintains that the two are far more intertwined, and rightfully so.
Indeed, LaPiana does not seek to apologize for the simplicities of Langdell’s ‘legal
science’, but finds much to admire in it. In his own time, Langdell’s early disciples seemed
to opt for Carrington’s strategy. That is, they found Langdell’s understanding of science
to be, at best, anachronistic; and, at worst, reactionary and misguided. Yet, they saw real
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The case-method was based on the perception of law as a unique science which contained
certain principles and doctrines that could be discovered through a systematic analysis of
appellate court decisions. It developed and matured during the terms of Langdell and
Ames, from 1870 to 1910. According to this view, which came to dominate American
legal thought and education, law was a science - and materials of this science were
appellate court decisions. The bound and published appellate reports, the materials
necessary to fully engage this science, could be found in the law library. Thus, the
apparent chaotic mass ofjudicial opinions could be rendered certain, their underlying
principles expertly drawn out. For Langdell, "[t]o have such a mastery of these
[principles] as to be able to apply them with constant facility and certainty to the ever-
tangled skein of human affairs, is what constitutes a true lawyer." (Langdell 1871, vi).
The idea of autonomous law, then, was developed and advanced by legal
academics, but at the same time the reliance on judicial cases strengthened the centrality of
courts as the principal producers of legal knowledge. Accordingly, an important element
of this new scientific system was to insist that judges did not make laws, they only found
and applied existing laws that were implicit in previous precedents; they discovered the
law. The distinction between law-finding and law-making was fundamental because it was
only the former view that could legitimize the idea of law as a science, whereas the latter
exposed its potentially arbitrary nature. Indeed, legal rules were produced by judges in the
value in the case method. Thus, they sought to liberate the case method from Langdellian
legal science. One would no longer use the case method to scientifically discover univer-
sal legal principles. Instead, in experienced hands, the case method was a valuable heur-
istic to teach law students how to think like a lawyer. (See, e.g.. Keener 1888, iii-iv; and
Ames 1907, 1012-1027).
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course of the judicial decision-making process, yet over time, with the compelling force of
time immemorial and tradition, these rules had become objectified, as if they had always
been 'out there', and subsequently constrained the ability ofjudges to shape the law simply
as they pleased.
The claim that law was a science and that it had to be treated as an autonomous
system was based on the centrality of the court in producing and developing legal
knowledge. Courts, and not the academy, were the source from which the profession
derived its legitimacy. For Langdell, the academy was a mere adjunct, albeit an extremely
important and influential one. Its function was to find a rational conceptual structure
inherent m the law that would make it possible forjudges to be transmitters of a content
already contained in the law.
The courts, and especially appellate courts, according to this legal structure, were
the undisputed center of legal authority and the principal site for the production of new
legal knowledge. The ideology of Langdellian formalism thus, not only portrayed law as a
science, but also situated the judiciary as the producers of this scientific knowledge. The
idea ofjudgeship as an authoritative symbol, says Stephen Botein, "loomed large in the
process by which lawyers articulated ideology to establish their professional authority in
modem American society." (Botein 1983, 49). Yet, by focusing on appellate opinions as
he did, Langdell exposed a problem inherent in the very ‘writteness’ of law and, thereby,
ultimately threatened to undermine the status of law. As Susan Stewart has observed, in
another context, such a focus points to "the irreducible fact that law is written and hence
to the consequent fact that the law is subject to temporality and interpretation." (Stewart
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1991, 3). That IS, Langdell called attention to, but could not solve the core problem for
modernist jurisprudence: indeterminaey arises because the [written] law requires
application, and application requires judicial interpretation. Although the problem seemed
inherent to the very fact of law, Langdell apparently believed if could be solved mtlun the
law as well - through an appeal to the transcendent nature of legal writing. However,
Langdell s contemporary. Holmes, did not share this faith in law’s ability to solve its own
problems. Finding no real solution to the problem of indeterminacy in the law itself.
Holmes (and his intellectual heirs) turned instead to the observable facts ofjudicial power.
Thus, the aspirational ideas of transcendence and legal certainty comprise the core
of the formalist response to the crisis of legal modernism. Autonomous law through a
process of normative closure was the goal that was sought. This can be contrasted with
the realist response. An approach, I will argue, that emphasizes immanence^^ - the
attempt to manage legal uncertainty and its effects, rather than striving for transcendence
through the discovery of legal principle. And, instead of attempting to produce legal
autonomy, a type of heteronomy would prevail. The result was the development of new
strategies of intellectual and professional closure: a discursive, or experientially mediated
system of closure.
am using this in a fairly underdeveloped way, and it should not be confused with the
concept of ‘immanent critique’ associated with the Frankfurt School of critical theory.
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CHAPTER 3
HOLMES, INDETERMINACY, AND THE LOGIC OF EXPERIENCE
Holmes- contemporary, Christopher Columbus Langdell thought that the judicial
opinions of a common law system could provide the basis for a scientific approach to the
study and practice of law. Holmes found Langdell’s approach ultimately appealing on
pedagogical grounds, recalling his own legal education as consisting of a "ragbag of
details", but, as he would with Austin, Holmes disagreed with Langdell's essentially
formalist approach to legal reasoning. Langdell, who Holmes would describe as our
greatest living "legal theologian", located the source and authority of the law within the
textual artifacts ofjudicial decision-making
- published appellate opinions. The key to
resolving confusion in the law was to isolate and identify the fundamental legal principles
by properly ordering and structuring these texts.
For Holmes, on the other hand, the source of the law would ultimately prove to be
non-textual, resolution of uncertainty was to be achieved by strategies of containment
external to the text and identified with the lawyer's perspective. Nevertheless, Holmes'
early scholarly efforts appeared to come from the same conceptualistic motivations as had
Langdell s work. Yet, his conceptualism and his sympathetic reading of Austin's analytical
jurisprudence existed in an uneasy tension with an importantly different perspective.
David Luban characterizes Holmes as a "case study of the modernist predicament in law;"
and for Luban, the core of modernism "consists in using the characteristic methods of a
discipline to criticize the discipline itself" (Luban 1 994, 38-39). In his first major
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substantive piece of legal scholarship, "Codes, and the Arrangement of the Law,”
(1870/1995) and an important book notice published two years later (1872/1995), Holmes
critically interrogated Austinian analytical legal theory and initially tested the concept of
prediction as a theoretical corrective. Just where Holmes stood on Austin is a matter of
some dispute among Holmes scholars,^ the details of which are beyond the scope of this
work. Rather, I am interested in identifying his earliest approximations ofwhat today is
understood as legal indeterminacy. 1 wish to then suggest a link between this notion and
Holmes' critique of Austin's "command theory of law" and the development of
prediction" as a response. From this, 1 suggest we can glimpse the outlines of a new
discourse of professional authority.
Holmes choice of a title for his first major article is revealing. It expresses his
initial predisposition toward the importance of conceptual clarity and a rigorous
philosophical analysis of the law. Although critical of Austin’s analytical jurisprudence,
Holmes was, to some extent, working within an Austinian framework. Indeed, Holmes
does not abandon his admiration for the Austinian analytical project without reluctance,
despite the seriousness of his criticisms. It seems that his original motivation was to
amend the Austinian model, not to undermine it. Nonetheless, all of his criticisms, in one
form or another, take Austin s approach to task for being philosophically too narrow. And
the underlying tensions between the two thinkers are soon enough revealed. In other
words. Holmes merely flirts with the attraction of a philosophically sophisticated
^^See, for example, H.L. Pohlman (1984), who seems to suggest that, with some minor
differences. Holmes was essentially carrying out an Austinian program.
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arrangement ofthe law - albeit one based on a common law model. Nonetheless, he
always gives the impression that this is all rather beside the point.
What attracts Holmes to codes is that they are supposed to be based on a
philosophical arrangement that would make a ’'corpusJuris possible." "The perfect
lawyer," says Holmes, "is he who commands all the ties between a given case and all
others. But, few lawyers are perfect, and all have to learn their business." The virtue of a
"well-arranged body of law" is its heuristic benellts and its expediency: Such a code
"would not only train the mind of the student to a sound legal habit of thought, but would
remove obstacles from his path which he now only overcomes after years of experience
and reflection." (Holmes 1870/1995, 214). Experience is subsumed under doctrinal
arrangement.
This, however, appears to Holmes, ultimately, to be a rather unrealistic goal for
both legal education and legal practice. Holmes therefore strives to come up with a more
flexible and less philosophically inclusive and compartmentalized "method of
arrangement." The problem is that however well arranged the code, it ultimately and
inevitably creates new obstacles. Excessive reliance on the arrangements fixed in the past
leads to the neglect of new experience. The arrangements can become so rigid that even if
they originally were structured by experience, they function, in fact, as if their boundaries
were set independently of experience.
In endorsing a common law model of classification. Holmes hoped to avoid the
constraints imposed by civil law systems and domestic codification proposals. Quite apart
from the obvious benefits to be derived from adopting as one's model, the outlines of a
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system already m plaee, he favors the common law for more substantive reasons. Holmes
begins his 1 870 article with the statement that, "[i]t is the merit of the common law that it
decides the case first and determines the principle afterwards." (Holmes 1870/1995, 212).
In resisting the attraction of codes. Holmes betrays his predilection for theorizing from the
practicing lawyer's point of view.- Practicing lawyers are content to decide what to do
with a given fact pattern "without being very clear as to the ratio decidendi." (Holmes
1 870/1 995, 2 1 2). It is not uncommon for them to decide on a particular course of action
even if the principle does not speak to the facts of the case. Holmes cites the familiar
authority of Lord Mansfield to bear witness to this phenomenon. The Mansfield quote
refers to a neophyte judge who acts prudently if he states his conclusions without giving
his reasons; his intuition will probably be right while his reasons wrong — testifying to the
fact that we correctly rely on extrarational or extralegal factors in the decision-making
process. That is experience is required to correlate the facts with the rules of law.
Questioning "whether Austin did not exaggerate the importance of the distinctions
he drew," Holmes complained of the narrowness of Austin's definition of the law, since,
curiously, it "seems to be of practical rather than philosophical value." (Holmes
1870/1995, 215). If Holmes' identification of "distinctions" refers to an analytical
ordering of a complex host of legal, moral, and political notions, their respective meanings
and interrelationships, what does he mean by "practical" value, when its philosophical
structure is what was supposed to recommend it in the first place? By practical, it seems
^^See Holmes’ 1885 speech before the Suffolk Bar Association, where he asked, "[w]hat
a court would be, unaided? The law is made by the Bar, even more than by the Bench."
(1885/1920, 25).
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I lolmos
.ncans ,ha, i, served ,l,e purposes of, he working lawyer, who needs (o pay
atlenhon to the lael that a "dellnilc political superior", the Auslinian "sovereign" which is
the source of law, controls human conduct hy the threat of lorce or sanctions, enjoining or
permuting certain classes ofaclions. Does this simply represent a riindamcntal tension in
I ittimes' thotight hetween his desire for a philosophically superior approach to legal
analysis aiul his adoption of the practit.oticr's perspective? Perhaps, hut, I wotild stiggest
that sottiething tnore is at work here; a dissatislactioti with the Atisiiniati conccpttial
categories, as well as the stiggcstioti of a need lor a revitalized discottrsc olcvcry.lay
praclicc. Attstin's dditiilion may he consistent with the way lawyers cttrrctilly approach
the law, though not enotigh "stihstatilial distinctiotis" have been drawn to make it
attalylically stgttilicaiU. h'or I lohnes, it is too general, and legal activity in theory and
practice is complicated in a concrete way: too much legal subtlety falls between the
analytical cracks, fbe weaknesses surface precisely at the point where these distinctions
are drawn, and the worry is that the outcome will show the analytical arrangement to be
empty of content.
Ratber than the problem ol codes in and of themselves, however. Holmes is much
more troubled by Austin's supposition that the validity of the law is a function of political
authority. Under Austin s command theory", the law is what the sovereign says it is.
Livery legal pronouncement is backed up by the threat offeree originating, at least in
theory, in the commands o( the sovereign, who empowers others to enforce his will.
1 lolmcs directs his criticism to the concept of a sanctioning authority, the individual or
body o( individuals who qualify as the sovereign power, fhc problem, for Holmes, is the
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difficulty of locating the force behind the law; determ,ning where and with whom the
power resides. His claim is that any attempt to identify the locus of sovereign power
reveals the conceptual shortcomings of Austin’s definition of the law. It is a difficult, if
not impossible, task to pinpoint jnst who has the power to impose sanctions and compel
obedience, and to determine precisely the source of this power, for "who has the sovereign
power, and whether such a power exists at all, are questions of fact and degree." (Holmes
1 870/ 1 995, 2 1 5). Holmes resists Austin's attempt to locate the source of the law in a
determinate political superior; rather, he implies here, and would emphasize later in the
Book Notice" of 1872, the role of indeterminate sources of power.
This IS more than a simple form of legal pluralism. Rather, Holmes' point is that it
IS not at all clear what the law is and who enforces it. To make such a determination
involves a knowledge and understanding of the gray, penumbral areas of the law. What is
clear is "the definiteness of its expression and the certainty of its being enforced," which
seems to suggest, that it is not as important to know who enforces the law, but that it is
enforced. (Holmes 1870/1995, 215). And, here. Holmes explicitly situates lawyers,
theorizing law from the lawyer’s perspective, at the eenter of his reeonfiguration of
Austin's basic jurisprudential question: What is law? Glossing Austin, Holmes notes that.
[a] sovereign or political superior secures obedience to his commands by his
courts. But how is this material, except as enhancing the likelihood that they will
be obeyed? Courts, however, give rise to lawyers, whose only coneem is with such
rules as the courts enforce. Rules not enforced by them, although equally
imperative, are the study of no profession. It is on this aceount that the province
ofjurisprudence has to be so carefully determined. (1870/1995, 215).
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As Herget observes, Holmes' expression of indeterminacy, although somewhat
"incomplete," was not surprising for one steeped m a common law tradition that
recognized and accepted as authoritative, the proposition that judges make law." (Herget
1995, 64). However, to know those rules which will be enforced, and those which will
not be enforced, is knowledge generally unavailable to the layman; rather, it becomes a
new site (beyond the rules themselves) for the development and promulgation of
professional expertise through a new language of power. Holmes suggests, then, that
within the legal spectrum, rules serve their regulative function without necessarily coming
from a uniquely determinate source of power. Instead, we must look at the purpose of a
rule of law, for some less definite modes of regulating conduct are more effective than
others that are more definite and official.
This leads Holmes to introduce the idea of "prediction" as it relates to the law in
general and judicial decision-making in particular. Returning to a discussion of Austin in
his book notice of 1872 (a summary of lectures on jurisprudence given at Harvard Law
School), Holmes clarifies his position on the nature and sources of law. He notes that,
[i]t must be remembered... in a civilized state it is not the will of the sovereign that
makes lawyers' law, even when that is its source, but what a body of subjects,
namely, the judges, by whom it is enforced, say is his will. The judges have other
motives for decision, outside their own arbitrary will, beside the commands of their
sovereign. And whether those other motives are, or are not, equally compulsory, is
immaterial, if they are sufficiently likely to prevail to afford a ground for
prediction. The only question for the lawyer is, how will the judges act?
(1872/1995,295).
It is important to note here that, unlike the position of some of his later "realist"
heirs. Holmes is thinking about something more than a crude judicial behaviorism.
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Instead, he is careful to draw the distinction between motives which cannot be relied upon
as a ground for prediction because of the extent of their arbitrariness and those which can
because of their generality. The lawyer's task, the construction of professional legal
knowledge, requires a higher level of analysis: "Any motive for [a judge's] action, be it
constitution, statute, custom, or precedent, which can be relied upon as likely in the
generality ofcases to prevail, is worthy of consideration as one of the sources of law....
Singular motives, like the blandishments of the emperor's wife, are not a ground of
prediction, and are therefore not considered." (Holmes 1872/1995, 295)
The target of Holmes' growing skepticism revolved around Austin's formalism (as
did his complaints with Langdell), the attempt to enlist a monolithic theoretical structure
to justify the classification of legal concepts and relations in a self-consistent, deductively
necessary, pre-determined way. Although he endorsed efforts to bring law within the orbit
of scientific authority, he did so on the condition that the techniques employed did not
force legal facts to fit within a fixed categorical framework or scheme to which they did
not belong. Legal codes, new or old, did not, in the long run, satisfy this condition. For
that matter, neither did the common law, when judges failed to exercise their power of
review to meet changing social conditions and needs, inflexibly following, and further
entrenching, established precedent for no other reason than its status as precedent.
Holmes attempt to shift the emphasis within legal theory and legal discourse, from a
purely analytical ‘method of arrangement’ - the logic of the law - to an approach that
privileges the language of experience was already evident in his first major jurisprudential
work in 1870, however tentative the analysis.
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Holmes and the Logic ofLegal Experience: The Gvotrih ofthe Common Lan,
In the Preface to The Common Law, Holmes describes the long intellectual
gestation that would ultimately give birth to this most important document in the
emergence of a distinctly new jurisprudence:
This book IS written in pursuance of a plan which I have long had in mind I had
bulTsho W h hI" in the American Law Reviewt I uld hardly have attempted the task of writing a connected treatise at thepresen time had it not been for the invitation to deliver a course of Lectures at the
iheT
in Boston I have made such use as I thought fit ofmy articles inthe Law Review, but much of what has been taken from that source has been
li cv
rewritten, and enlarged, and the greater part of the work is new
( 1 651 / 1963
,
3 ).
Indeed, throughout the book. Holmes interpolates and integrates material from his
previously published articles. However, if we examine the text as a whole, we can
discover a unifying thread which suggests that a general standard of liability, based on
objective or external tests, has emerged from the stream of legal experience. This, itself, is
a particular form of human experience which cuts across the traditional boundaries of
substantive law, deploying both analytical and historical methods, with the ultimate goal of
arriving at the same conclusions. To say that the stream of legal experience is a species of
the stream of human experience neither means that the former is reducible to the latter nor
that it is a compartmentalized aspect of it. In the interest of providing formal guidelines
for human conduct and relations, all that is meant is that legal experience draws, to
varying degrees, on the wellsprings of human experience, for the law is as much a product
of extrarational and extralegal considerations as it is of distinctively legal considerations.
Legal experience is constitutive of human experience.
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Only when these extralegal considerations make their way into the law do lawyers
and judges take heed, and, even then, seldom are they fully aware of the many fontts and
disguises these seemingly unavoidable undercurrents take. Legal notions petmeate the
law, building layer upon layer of meanings that impede the search for understanding.
Recognizing that the stuff of the law is a shifting connguration of meanings. Holmes'
principal aim, in the first chapter, is to bring these undercurrents to the surface, to
distinguish the extralegal from the legal, and to show how the evolution of the law and
legal concepts have as their origin some of the constants of human nature and experience,
constants which may change, but not so much that they are unrecognizable, in the face of
changing conditions, circumstances, or situations.
Holmes focuses on the idea of vengeance as his interpretive device precisely
because it is, according to him, one of the constants of human nature and conduct -
lurking m transmuted form, as the motivation behind the relations between human beings
and other beings and objects. In response to suffering injury of one sort or another,
human beings do what comes naturally, seeking relief in the form of the satisfaction of
basic human desires. Their desire to seek relief is motivated at bottom by vengeance in
one form or another, sometimes appearing as naked rage, and sometimes overlaid with
cold, yet strangely comforting fictions. Holmes argues that an examination of the
historical and anthropological sources will reveal that vengeance and not compensation or
security is the determining factor in affixing the limits of liability.
A superficial reading of the first Lecture might leave the misleading impression
that, as a whole, this will be a work of legal history, with a modest dose of general theory
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thrown in for good measure. However. Holmes uses tins 'history more as the canvas on
wh.ch he would paint hisjurisprudential vision. Specif,cally. he is interested in how legal
forms and concepts change and develop, perish and survive, are relegated to the dustbin of
history, yet continue to operate under another name, retaining only traces of their past
stature. These relics of the past are preserved, long after their original motivation has
receded into the multilayered historical background, because they are convenient, legally,
politically, morally, theologically, economically, metaphysically, and/or socially.
According to Holmes, they often are paraded as a palatable smokescreen for the 'real'
reasons and motivations behind the preservation or transformation of a legal concept or
rule of law; legal justifications and explanations function as the legal tip of the extralegal
iceberg.
The ringing opening lines of The Common Law are informed by a history not
revealed in the text itself This subtext is produced by Holmes' misgivings about Dean
Langdell's thought - already by 1881, assuming a dominant position within American
legal edueation and the profession as a whole. Shortly after the publication of The
Common Law in 1881, in a letter to Sir Frederick Pollock, Holmes characterized
Langdellian legal science as representing "the powers of darkness." (1961, 16-17). As
early as 1872, Holmes had suggested Langdell's 'case method' lacked sufficient intellectual
breadth; however, such misgivings did not ultimately foreclose Holmes' own adoption of
the Langdellian approach. In his 'Harvard Celebration Speech' of 1886, Holmes
acknowledged its superiority as a pedagogical technique. Nevertheless, Holmes' final
position on Langdellianism was something less than charitable. In particular, he
72
challenged Langdell's understanding of law as 'scienee' - a seience based on the relentless
analytical effort to organize the principles underlying law in terms of that which is
discovered in books (i.e., case reports).
One year before the publication of The Common Law, Holmes published an
unsigned review of the second edition of Langdell's casebook on contracts, where Holmes
tdentifies Langdell as our "greatest living theologian." (1880, 233-234). This accusation
rested on Holmes' belief that Langdell's system represented an updated and secularized
version of a familiar stoty - natural law theory masquerading as legal science. It is this
feature of Langdellian formalism that incurred Holmes' biting irony, not the attempt to
raise law to the level of general theory, and to argue that it could be scientific in a
systematic way. More specifically, Holmes objected to the Langdellian notion of legal
closure — the self-sufficient, hermetic, deductively necessary system that it implied.
Holmes urged a new approach to the problem of closure, opting for an open-ended system
of law and a theory of adjudication that converged on an external standard of liability
grounded in experience, one that respected the primacy of 'law in action* over 'law in
books', without demanding that either be converted into, or reduced to the other.
According to Holmes, Langdellian formalism tended to make relevant matters
irrelevant, and irrelevant matters relevant. What mattered for Langdell was the internal
consistency of the postulated system, with a mass of details caught up in an unyielding
logical embrace, and not that a closer look might show that this often leads to absurd and
unjust results. Holmes did not reject the very idea of consistency; rather, he resisted the
formalist notion that consistency must be had at all costs. On the contrary, according to
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Holmes, a legal syslem, in insliimionalizing eertain aspects of social expenence, may
survive and even nourish whtle nirting with eertain logical inconsistencies. This is because
the law, as Holmes made clear, is not predoininaittly a logical affair, btit an evolving
human produchon in which consistency ultimately tnay be gained throtigh professional
experience.
Langdcll’s attempt to reduce the concrete facts ofthe existing system to logical
axioms, Irom which certain consequences easily may he deduced, was, according to
Holmes, nothing more than the unfortunate example in which the champion of legal
science was in danger of becoming decidedly unscientific, "and of leading to a
misapprehension ofthe nature of the problem and the data." (1880, 234). Holmes did not
elaborate on this point, but the idea seems to be that the scientific method ofthe formalist
was limited to analytical pronouncements, through which the integrity ofthe closed system
could be saved, the consequence being that it turned up empty when confronted with the
hard facts of experience which actually constituted the existing system. In other words,
this sort of legal science had no empirical basis, no matter how analytically robust it may
be. For Holmes, the poverty of Langdellian formalism stemmed from its failure to account
for the richness and open-endedness of experienee, its aversion to uncertainty and
inconsistency, and its urge to cover up error and control the legal process through the
invention of fictions found by expert readings of appellate opinions..
Holmes' critique of Langdellian formalism may be reduced to the fact that the latter
did not do justice to the life ofthe law, the feelings, intuitions, desires, needs, and felt
necessities, articulate and inarticulate, shaping the substance of the law, that, in a general
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sense, give it its form. This explains Holmes' emphasis on the experiential side of the
methodological and explanatory equation, and putative failure to give logic its proper due.
Clearly, Holmes does not completely disavow the role of logic, yet, he seems not to have
thought through the precise relation between logic and experience. Did he intend to give
them equal billing or should logic take a back seat to experience, and if so, to what extent?
What exactly would this 'logic' look like? Did he mean to reserve a place, with an
independent base of operation, for the sort of logic generally characterized by
demonstrative reasoning, namely, the logic of pure analysis or the method of deduction?
Or, did he only mean to admit logic into his experiential framework as a supplemental tool
at the disposal of the logic of experience or the historical method? Or is the only
acceptable logic a logic reconstituted by the logic of experience? Which of these
alternatives, then, best characterizes the view articulated in the famous first paragraph of
The Common Law, where he announced;
The object of this book is to present a general view of the Common Law. To
accomplish this task, other tools are needed besides logic. It is something to show
that the consistency of a system requires a particular result, but it is not all. The life
of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The felt necessities of the
time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed
or unconscious, even the prejudices judges share with their fellow-men, have had a
good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men
should be governed. The law embodies the story of a nation's development through
many centuries, and it cannot be dealt with as if it contained only the axioms and
corollaries of a book of mathematics. In order to know what it is, we must know
what it has been, and what it tends to become. (1881/1963, 5).
The two sentences preceding the famous 'life of the law' phrase make perfectly
clear that Holmes left some room for logic, even if they only tell us that some "other tools
besides logic" are needed to "present a general view," a philosophically and historically
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grounded view of the eommon law. Yet, Holmes was eareful to mark off the histoneal
erram he wished to cover. He maintained that sometimes common sense is sufficient to
account for a particular rule, while others can only be understood by reference to their
pnmitive antecedents. For example, he indicates that he "shall use the history of our law
so far as it is necessary to explain a conception or to interpret a rule, but no further."
(1881/1963, 5). He points to two errors which the study of history will help prevent.
First, the supposition that "because an idea seems very familiar and natural to us, that it
has always been so." (1881/1963, 5). And, second, the supposition that history supplies
us with very little information, the result being that we assume too much about human
nature in lieu of providing an account, a sort of fallacy of both history and psychology. It
IS at this point that he launches into his examination of the general grounds of liability, civil
and criminal, both of which are seen as "very much a study of tendencies." (1881/1963, 5).
The lesson Holmes draws from this historical analysis is that the doctrine of liability
without fault originates in the natural tendency of human beings to attach blame, or
liability, to the offending object, whether it be a physical object, an animal, or a human
being. Human nature ultimately cannot be separated from the history of human affairs,
from the assorted markings left by legal forms in the channeling of the stream of legal
experience.
After a lengthy historical analysis of the early forms of liability. Holmes picks up
where he left off after the opening paragraph, and concludes that historical analysis "well
illustrates the paradox of form and substance in the development of the law" of which "the
merely logical point of view" is guilty. (1881/1963, 31). Legal forms seem to develop in a
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logical way. From the outs.de at least, the law looks as if it follows a logical pattern, but
appearances are deceptive, according to Holmes, as the law is not merely logical. He
explains:
The official theory ,s that each new decision follows syllogistically from the
xis mg precedents. But just as the elavicle in the cat only tells of the existence ofsome earlier creature to which a collar-bone was useful, precedents survive in thelaw long after the use they once served is at an end and the reason for them hasbeen forgotten. The result of following them must often be failure and confusionirom the merely logical point of view. (1881/1963, 5).
Holmes does not maintain that the logical point of view must always fail. Rather,
he suggests that through historical analysis, we can probe beneath the surface of the law
and locate a legal form m relation to the substantive law undergirding, revealing it as the
mere 'survivor' it has become. The law obeys the logic of its own internal development, a
logic in large measure shaped by external forces or extralegal considerations.
The other side of the paradox, according to Holmes, is that "in substance the
growth of the law is legislative." (1881/1963, 31). The courts' usual explanation of what
the law is revolves around its logical form, but the 'deeper sense,' its normative thrust,
involves its legislative grounds.
The very considerations which judges most rarely mention, and always with an
apology, are the secret root from which the law draws all the juices of life. I mean,
of course, considerations of what is expedient for the community concerned. Every
important principle which is developed by litigation is in fact and at bottom the
result of more or less definitely understood views of public policy^ most generally,
to be sure, under our practice and traditions, the unconscious result of instinctive
preferences and inarticulate convictions, but none the less traceable to views of
public policy in the last analysis. And as the law is administered by able and
experienced men, who know too much to sacrifice good sense to a syllogism, it
will be found that, when ancient rules maintain themselves in the way that has been
and will be shown in this book, new reasons more fitted to the time have been
found for them, and that they gradually receive a new content, and at last a new
form, from the grounds to which they are transplanted. (1881/1963, 31-32).
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Holmes’ appeal to public policy is another way of stating the specific substantive
functton the external standard of liability represents. Public policy is a reflection ofwhat
the community, through its official representatives, thinks is in its best interests. As a
practical matter, expenenced officials are reluctant to reconstruct a whole legal system or
area of law because the facts do not comport with the received explanation for a particular
decision. Instead, they find or invent new reasons more accurately reflecting the times,
and generally they are not so novel as to require anything more than constructive
abandonment and revision. Change is more continuous than discontinuous. Gradual
transformation of old forms into new ones takes place when new content is introduced.
Form, m effect, follows content and function. The process is a function of both articulate
and inarticulate tendencies, tendencies which translate into both judicial and legislative
function, meaning that they both, in their own way, make the law.
The purpose of Holmes' historical inquiry into the nature and growth of the law is
to gam the knowledge required for the revision of the law, not knowledge for the sake of
knowledge but for the sake of satisfying some more or less definite social need. "The
history of what the law has been is necessary to the knowledge of what the law is."
Investigation into the grounds of policy often reveals that rules are justified by policies
which are products of invention, fictions invented "to account for what are in fact
survivals from more primitive times." (1881/1963, 33). In a compelling set of passages
that illuminate his pragmatic epistemological tendencies. Holmes writes:
The truth is, that the law is always approaching, and never reaching, consistency. It
is forever adopting new principles from life at one end, and it always retains old
ones from history at the other, which have not yet been absorbed or sloughed off
It will become entirely consistent only when it ceases to grow.. ..If truth were not
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often suggested by error, if old implements could not be adjusted to new uses0™ 96Tr2-33r
In part, the object of Holmes’ investigation into the roots of modem law was to
show that the various forms of liability spring "from the common ground of revenge;" but.
It also was to show that the determination of liability was a legal matter, the object of
which was to adjudicate conflicts according to a developing ‘objective’ (read professional)
or external standard that distinguished legal from extralegal considerations, even though,
as Holmes would concede, the law has a moral basis. The result is that,
while the terminology of morals is still retained, and while the law does still and
always, m a certain sense, measure legal liability by moral standards, it
nevertheless, by the very necessity of its nature, is continually transmuting those
moral standards into external or objective ones, from which the actual guilt of the
party concerned is wholly eliminated. (1881/1963, 33).
In Its preoccupation with the relation between language, law, morality, and meaning, this
passage serves as a bridge to Holmes' most important work, "The Path of the Law" - the
source for Holmes' fullest statement of the predictive theory of the law, and the foundation
for an actuarial Jurisprudence which informs the discourse of legal modernism.
Holmes' landmark essay, "The Path of the Law," the fullest expression of his
predictive theory of law, served as the primary source for that peculiarly American
jurisprudence - legal realism - that was articulated from within the elite law schools
during the 1920s and 1930s. Along with The Common Law, "The Path of the Law"
remains the high water mark of Holmes' contribution to American legal thought. Defining
the law in terms oiprediction was, in some sense, another way of stating what Holmes
had been saying all along about coming up with an external standard of liability that would
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adequately account for the growth and development of the law and legal concepts.
Prediction as such was not tntended as a comprehensive theory of law but as u defining
characteristic of the legal process, an explanatory touchstone of the perspectival process
leading to the resolution of legal disputes, which, according to Holmes, was the main
purpose of the law to begin with. Although Holmes would time and again invoke the
notion of prediction in terms of how the public force was brought to bear through the
instrumentality of the courts, the epistemological underpinnings of prediction are often
overshadowed by his preoccupation with the search for an external standard anchored m
legal practice.
Holmes delivered the address at Boston University in honor of the dedication of its
new law building. It is probably fair to say that the occasion for the speech had
considerable bearing on its style, organization, and content. The context offered Holmes
the opportunity to situate many of his remarks in terms of the nature and problems of legal
edueation, and the close proximity to his alma mater, allowed Holmes to focus his critical
gaze across the river toward Langdell's Harvard. Holmes' preoccupation with legal
education owed less to any lingering objections he might have had to Langdell's case
method, than to the jurisprudence such a curriculum seemed to entail. Indeed, Holmes
went to great lengths to make it clear that his acceptance of Langdell's case method in no
way implied an endorsement of its underlying jurisprudential framework. As the most
visible feature of Langdell's program of educational reform. Holmes' worry was that it
unnaturally limited the reach of legal education at the same time that it raised the flag of a
bogus legal science in the hope of creating the impression of the existence of a necessary
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connection between legal education and legal philosophy. According to Holmes, the reach
of Langdell's method was limited by its neglect of history as a way of understanding the
law, and the supposition that the law could be reduced to a few ahistorical principles that
paid little heed to its formal methodological presuppositions.
From the first line to the last, in its structure and its arguments, the underlying
concern of "The Path of the Law" is with the theoretical and practical aspects of legal
education in the United States.'** Like Langdell, Holmes perceived certain threats to the
legitimacy of the legal profession's authority; and, like Langdell, Holmes saw the important
role of legal education m responding to this legitimation crisis. Unlike Langdell, however.
Holmes understood legal knowledge and expertise as being grounded not in abstract
principles, but professional experience.
The essay'^ may be understood as composed of two principal parts: the first part
can be described as the 'limits of the law' argument, while the second concerns the forces
which determine the growth and content of the law. We can think of the second part as
being concerned with method because it deals with the law — on the negative side — in
terms of the failure of logical method, or what Holmes refers to as the "fallacy of logical
forms;" (1897/1920, 184), and - on the positive side - in terms of the fruitfulness of the
historical method. (1897/1920, 184-198). The first part of the essay is devoted to an
'^For a good discussion of this point, see William Twining (1973).
''^The recent centennial anniversary of the address has produced a number of excellent
interpretations. See: David Seipp (1997), and the individual contributions to "The Path of
the Law After One Hundred Years" {Harvard Law Review 1997), and "The Path of the
Law 100 Years Later" {Brooklyn Law Review 1997).
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analysis of the first fallacy': the confounding of morality with law. The first part of the
essay also include Holmes' fullest articulation of the predictive theo^ and the had n.an
argument. The second part of the essay contains Holmes' views on judging and policy,
legal history and legal education in their theoretical aspects, and, the 'life-in-the-law'
theme. Read in this way, the essay serves as a demonstration of Holmes' perspectival
understanding of the law.
The predictive theory and the bad man argument are analytical instruments Holmes
deploys to construct theoretical space for the external standard, a standard that has its
roots m human nature and conduct. This standard is, in some sense ahistorical; but, unlike
Langdell s ahistoncism, it is ahistorical not in the sense that it ignores social and moral
values as contributing to the law and legal concepts and their development, but in the
sense that morality and law should be distinguished. That is, they should, as far as
possible, be kept distinct in matters of actionability and adjudication. When a case is
brought, the action is taken with the expectation that the decision will rest on the relevant
legal considerations and not on nonlegal or extralegal factors that may have something to
do with shaping the law, but are not relevant in a purely legal sense. That morality is
embedded in the law, that law's development is best illuminated against its social
background, that the descriptive inevitably contains a normative element, does not mean,
for Holmes, that a decision should be rendered by appealing to anything but narrowly legal
considerations. Is this simply an example of a latent formalism emerging within Holmes'
jurisprudence? Is this merely a more sophisticated rendering of Langdell's understanding
that legal science, properly named, analytically separate the purely legal from extra-legal
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considerations? Holmes' concerns are heuristic, and are developed with sensitivity to the
importance of perspeetive. Again, his context is framed by pedagogical and professional
concerns, and their interrelationship. Holmes' claim is that moral and legal considerations
should not be confounded or confused; it is not a claim that they can be kept separate in
any ultimate sense. That is, he is not arguing for a strict separation, but for the importance
of maintaining distinctions for heuristic and analytical purposes.
The Logic ofLegal Experience
I would like to begin my discussion of "The Path of the Law" by first turning to the
second half of the essay. In an important passage, Holmes notes:
You may assume, with Hobbes and Bentham and Austin, that all law emanates
from the sovereign, even when the first human beings to enunciate it are the
j udges, or you may think that law is the voice of the Zeitgeist, or what you like. It
is all one to my present purpose. Even if every decision required the sanction of an
emperor with despotic power and a whimsical turn of mind, we should be
interested none the less, still with a view to prediction, in discovering some order,
some rational explanation, and some principle of growth for the rules which he laid
down. In every system there are such explanations and principles to be found
( 1897/1920 , 179 ).
Holmes' fidelity to predictive theory and the claim that so far as the growth and content of
the law are concerned, it makes no difference what the force behind the law is (i.e., who is
empowered to determine legal validity), does not mean that the brand of sanctioning
authority one subscribes to has no bearing on the shape of the law in all its aspects; rather,
it means only that it has no particular bearing with respect to discovering some 'principle
of growth.'
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To explain how rules actually develop in light of the method of prediction is to
affirm a rational method grounded in experience, rather than one grounded in
‘transcendent’ authorities. The place of logic in the law is a familiar story, but one worth
retelling. Indeed, Holmes is quick to point out that the logical fallacy refers to "the notion
that the only force at work in the development of law is logic." (1897/1920, 180. My
emphasis). The crucial qualification ’only’ leaves room for logic of a certain kind, meaning
not only the logic experience but the logic that answers a rather global description, the
sort of processes human beings display in reasoning, explanation, and inquiry, where a
principle of order is assumed.
What Holmes objects to is the supposition that the law is an axiomatic system,
from which judges unerringly can deduce the correct judgment once the facts and issues
are identified. The law is not susceptible to such a logically exclusive analysis in which
decisions are the logical outcome of predetermined rules of conduct. Holmes fondly
recites the story of a judge who would not reach a judgment until he was certain it was
right. Generalizing this strategy makes judicial reasoning a matter of simple calculation —
a Euclidean geometry. This is based on the familiar formalist notion that there is exactly
one right answer; and that, given the requisite ability and provided with sufficient
information, all the judge has to do is to persist and he eventually will reach the proper
disposition. As Holmes understood it, the training of the lawyer and judge lent itself to
this process: "the language ofjudicial decision is mainly the language of logic."
(1897/1920, 181).
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According to Holmes, logical form was deployed as a useful (or necessary) shroud
with which to conceal the actual reason on which a particular decision was based. Logical
form epitomized the constructed virtues of impartiality, disinterestedness, and detachment;
of treating all cases on their own merits, and like cases alike - a form which served to
deflect attention from the actual biases that drove the decision. Holmes explains as
follows:
ehmd the logical form lies a judgment as to the relative worth and importance of
competing legislative grounds, often an inarticulate and unconscious judgment it is
true, and yet the very root and nerve of the whole proceeding. You can give any
conclusion a logical form. You always can imply a condition in a contract But
why do you imply it? It is because of some belief as to the practice of the
'
community or of a class, or because of some opinion as to policy, or, in short,
because of some attitude of yours upon a matter not capable of exact logical
'
conclusions. Such matters really are battle grounds where the means do not exist
for determinations that shall be good for all time, and where the decision can do no
more than embody the preference of a given body in a given time and place. We do
not realize how large a part of our law is open to reconsideration upon a slight
change in the habit of the public mind. No concrete proposition is self evident, no
matter how ready we may be to accept it, not even Mr Herbert Spencer's 'Every
man has a right to do what he wills, provided he interferes not with a like right on
the part of his neighbors.' (1897/1920, 181-182).
This implies that the law belongs to a continuum of experience, where the "principles
governing other phenomena also govern the law." The desires, needs, interests,
preferences, fears, and goals which make up these considerations, the other phenomena.
shape the content of the law, giving the form its concrete, if at times seemingly arbitrary.
direction.
The public policy dimension of the legal system is a shorthand for saying that the
law must balance the preferences and needs of a community with the preferences and
needs of its individual members, some of which stray from the norm for any number of
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reasons; fiat, occupational hazard, and the like. Indeed, Holmes hmts here, as elsewhere,
that the law m general, and the ascnptmn of habdhy m partmular, may be modeled after
actuarial science. The idea behind this actuarial jurisprudence - what I have suggested
composes the discourse of legal modernism - is that certain segments of the community
assume greater nsk than other segments precisely because they have something to gam by
their actions or occupations. The assumption of these risks is permitted, sometimes even
encouraged, because they increase the likelihood that the community as a whole also
somehow will benefit. A cost-benefit analysis, marshaling available information resources,
provided by the technology of the sciences, including the social sciences, presumably will
be able to graph the relative risk incurred by pursuing a particular policy, job, or action;
and, whether the nsks outweigh the benefits or, whether the benefits outweigh the risks.
On one reading, our legal system is said to operate on the supposition that the
public good IS best served by free competition, politically, economically, and socially - a
state of affairs which Holmes seemed to endorse. The values ascribed to the judgments
formulated on the altar of the public good are relative and not absolute, but this does not
necessarily make them arbitrary or capricious, despite the fact that judges, juries, and
legislators may set the course of public policy on the basis of political or economic bias.
Indeed, such considerations have a large role in shaping public policy and setting legal
requirements. Logical form cannot presume to incorporate these competing tendencies
without the help of skillful lawyers and judges clothing their arguments and decisions in
the appropriate legal dress. So, on the one hand, we find judges instructing juries that the
only state of affairs in which an employer is justifiably liable for his employee's injury is if
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the employer is deemed negligent - a strict legal requirement for liability, where the
restrictions are limited, favoring the efftc.ent running of the free market system. On the
other hand, despite these instructions, juries nevertheless tend to find for the plaintiff, the
implication being that they presumably identify with the 'common’ person, an individual
member of the community such as themselves. According to Holmes, such a tension
exists,
because the traditional policy of our law is to confine liability to cases where aprudent man might have foreseen the injury, or at least the danger, while the
inclination of a very large part of the community is to make certain classes ofpersons insure the safety of those with whom they deal. (1897/1920, 182)
The rationale behind these actions is that the community as a whole, in allowing
dangerous or reasonably dangerous activities to proceed, will benefit, and that, from their
perspective, the standard of negligence does not hold the employer (or other potential
tortfeasor) sufficiently liable. Holmes’ solution was to combine the traditional policy with
the community's 'inclination'. That is, he was well aware that the standards of tort liability
had changed from their primitive origins where the wrong attached to a particular
offending object, and damages were assessed in an 'ungeneralized' way, to modem more
inclusive versions, where a felt need to insist on a direct connection between tortfeasor
and injured party was less likely to exist; especially since the former may now be an
impersonal corporation, such as a factory or railroad, responsible for the tortious injury.
For Holmes, the analysis revolved around the calculation of social, economic,
political and legal 'costs';
The liability for them is estimated, and sooner or later goes into the price paid by
the public. The public really pays the damages, and the question of liability, if
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pressed far enough, is really the question how far it is desirable ^ ur
should insure the safety of those whose work it uses. (1897/1920, 183).
Saddled with disproportionate economic burdens. one segment of the community might
recommend one policy and another segment a different policy. At bottom, according to
Holmes, what was at stake was the price the public was willing to pay for the benefits they
derived from a particular policy.
Holmes- ’exposure’ of the logical fallacy gives way to an examination of the present
state of the law ’’and the ideal toward which it tends,” though he never loses sight of the
fact that It IS a ’’philosophical reaction” to logical form. His topic is the path of the law,
and the ’path’ he traces has an organic and teleological cast. For example:
We still are far from the point of view which I desire to see reached. No one has
reached it or can reach it as yet. We are only at the beginning of a philosophical
reaction, and of a reconsideration of the worth of doctrine which for the most part
still are taken for granted without any deliberate, conscious, and systematic
questioning of their grounds. The development of our law has gone on for nearly a
thousand years, like the development of a plant, each generation taking the
inevitable next step, mind, like matter, simply obeying a law of spontaneous
growth. It is perfectly natural and right that it should be so. (1897/1920, 185).
The inevitability of growth is not a matter of causal necessity, but a function of the law’s
dynamic character, that there must be a next step, whatever it may be. The teleology is
evolutionary, relative to time and place, moving at a particular, if variable, rate. Progress
is not decreed as a matter of form. A legal concept may be analyzed at any given moment
in its development, but such an analysis by no means tells the whole story unless it is
compared to other moments in its development within the context of its evolving uses and
abuses, a task for historical analysis. As Holmes notes:
[A] body of law is more rational and more civilized when every rule it contains is
referred articulately and definitely to an end which it subserves, and when the
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For Holmes, histoncal analysis allows us to discover why we have the rules we do. Our
ability to identify reasons is a precondition for making evaluative or normative claims
about those rules. That is, skepticism promotes reevaluation. Moreover, the future offers
the possibility of a more sophisticated methodological arsenal in which the social sciences
will supplement logical and historical analysis: "For the rational study of the law the black-
letter man may be the man of the present, but the man of the future is the man ofstatistics
and the master of economics." (1897/1920, 187).
According to Holmes, we are unlikely to replace or refine laws that are at variance
with perceived public needs if we blindly accept what is handed down to us. The law will
be unresponsive
- pressing problems cannot be addressed and appropriate remedies found
without at least some sense of the force of these problems, where they come from and
where they might be headed. Obedient acceptance of legal precedent does not serve a
principal function of the law, its responsiveness to social problems. Holmes is clear on
this point:
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that it was laid down
in the time of Henry IV . It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was
laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind
imitation of the past. (1897/1920, 187).
A rule of law seldom serves the exact social end for which it originally was articulated,
owing its formal existence at least in part to the accretions of history. In recognition of
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this, Holmes urges us to be aware of the inevitable judicial smokescreen offered in
justification of these historical relics, which serve to cover important shifts in legal policy.
Nevertheless, Holmes also warns us against being too consumed by legal history.
He does not valorize historical acumen for its own sake, but for the sake of understanding
the law and making it more responsive to social needs and goals. To this end. Holmes
cautions us to "beware of the pitfall of antiquarianism" and reminds us that "for our
purposes the only interest in the past is for the light it throws on the present." To that
end, Holmes looks "forward to the day when the part played by history in the explanation
of dogma shall be very small, and instead of ingenious research we shall spend our energy
on a study of the ends sought to be attained and the reasons for desiring them."
(1897/1920, 195).
Near the end of the address. Holmes makes what, initially at least, seem to be some
rather puzzling remarks, given his emphasis on the importance of practical experience. He
notes that:
We have too little theory in the law rather than too much....Theory is my subject,
not practical details....Theory is the most important part of the dogma of the law,
as the architect is the most important man who takes part in the building of a
house. (1897/1920, 198,200).
Yet, for Holmes, the theoretical focus seems to be on the study of legal history; again, its
not for the sake of historical knowledge in itself, but because he thinks the minutiae of
history, the "practical details," reveal some larger point about the evolution of legal
concepts. Amidst the trees we have trouble seeing the forest; above the forest we have
trouble seeing the individual trees. For Holmes, legal thickets are much like the trees in
the forest - virtually impenetrable to all but the expert, and even the expert often loses his
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way, sometimes as the result of his own cleverness. In the law, this confusion takes the
form of excessive distinction-drawing, the production of fictions, and the like, which are
often bom of practical necessity. The aim of theory is to unearth these legal d.stinctions
and fictions in all their myriad forms in the attempt to divine a more coherent
understanding of the law: ''Jurisprudence," Holmes asserts, "is simply law in its most
generalized part." (1897/1920, 195).
Meaning and Legal Discourse: Looking at the 'Bad Man
'
An emphasis on ’theory’ also animates the first part of the address. I wish now to
turn my attention to Holmes’ discussion there of the relationship between law and
morality. In so doing, I am interested in exploring the principal target of the ’limits of the
law argument - the relationship between legal discourse and its meaning as interpreted by
legal experts working within the judicial process. In taking a perspectival approach to
understanding how the law functions, and is perceived as functioning by the expert.
Holmes searches for an external or objective standard of conduct where the test for
evidential adequacy rests on a criterion of relevance determined by professional
experience. This serves as the backdrop for the development of the predictive theory of
law and the heuristic of the had man. It is important to note that the bad man argument is
not a necessary condition for the predictive theory, but may instead be better understood
as a dramatic illustration of it. Although there is no necessary connection between them,
they are related parts of the same story marking off the limits of the law by supposing
theory is anchored in concrete practice and experience.
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In the absence of limits, we cannot fathom where one thing begins and another
ends. On the limits argument, the danger of confusing law and morality, of not strictly
delimiting one from the other, of not adequately distinguish.ng between our beliefs about
what the law is from our beliefs about what it ought to be, is due to a failure of inquiry.
On order to overcome this failure, lawyers (and legal theorists), must hone their
investigatory skills by identifying the proper subject of investigation, which Holmes
conceived generally as distinguishing the legal from the extralegal. At their disposal are
not only the traditional means of investigating the law, but techniques imported from
history and the social sciences, political economy and statistics in particular.
This provides a clear demonstration of Holmes' focus on the legal profession - the
topic on which the address begins and ends. In the justly famous opening paragraph.
Holmes notes:
When we study law we are not studying a mystery but a well-known profession.
We are studying what we shall want in order to appear before judges, or to advise
people in such a way as to keep them out of court. The reason why it is a
profession, why people will pay lawyers to argue for them or to advice them, is
that in societies like ours the command of the public force is intrusted to the judges
in certain cases, and the whole power of the state will be put forth, if necessary, to
carry out their judgments and decrees. People want to know under what
circumstances and how far they will run the risk of coming against what is so much
stronger than themselves, and hence it becomes a business to find out when this
danger is to be feared. The object of our study, then, is prediction, the prediction
of the incidence of the public force through the instrumentality of the courts
( 1897/1920 , 167 ).
Here, although the bad man has not yet been mentioned, we can anticipate his arrival,
suggesting the role of prediction by showing how the legal profession views the force
behind the law in light of the legitimating function of the courts.
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The assumption is that lawyers, informed by their professional experience and
expertise, understand the nature ofjudicial behavior; that is, based on their training, they
can make an informed estimate of the way judges think and decide. Potential litigants can
confidently mine this knowledge to their own advantage in order to prevent some court-
sanctioned harm from coming their way. Lawyers, in their capacity as legal advisors, are
not necessarily the mediators of the public force, but they are supposed to be attuned to
the sorts of responses the courts might make.
It IS fair to assume as well that most of those in need of legal advice care little or
nothing about various theories of adjudication, or the court’s place within the legal system;
but, they do care how the law will affect them. Yet, this does not really seem to be
Holmes focus. Rather, he seems more interested to generalize the lawyer's role as legal
advisor prior to an action being brought or a trial conducted, and to link it, in as
convincing a way as possible, with the bad man argument. Indeed, if he had set forth the
prediction theory explicitly in terms ofjudicial behavior at trials, as Jerome Frank was to
do more than thirty years later, then he would have had a much harder time in dramatizing
the idea of prediction.
Holmes does not pay much attention to the fact that the calculation ofjudicial
probabilities may not be an easy matter, with several obstacles to interfere with the
reliability of particular predictions, such as the great variations in lawyer effectiveness.
Even lawyers of comparable training and experience, with similar social backgrounds, will
not necessarily arrive at the same outcome or prediction even when confronted with the
same case, due to the use of different precedents, placing greater weight on certain facts.
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different inten,relation ofrulcs, and so forth. TIte legal realists of the 1920s and 1930s
emphasized this variability; Holmes' eoncern, however, was mainly eonf.ned to unraveling
the relation between law and morality, and the confusion which resulted from ignoring
what happens when llie two are confounded.
Some of Holmes' critics have mistakenly interpreted his prediction to focus on the
contingencies of what a particular judge will do in a particular case. (Sec, c.g., Luban
1988). Such a view is mistaken, however; rather. Holmes’ theory focuses on what courts
in general will do in that general type or class of cases, of which the particular is but an
instance. For Holmes, prediction is possible, not so much because particular judges decide
similar cases m predictable ways, but because judges, as a class, decide similar cases in
predictable ways. By prediction he does not mean to exclude the prediction of the judical
behavior of the individual judge, but to focus attention on how judges make decisions
ranging over a generalized class of cases of a particular type.^'*
For Holmes, the law at its core, then, is defined as the power of the courts to
channel the incidence of the public force in a reasonably authoritative and predictable way.
Moreover, describing the law in terms of prediction simplifies the analysis of legal
relations, encouraging legal theorists to ground their jurisprudence in actual legal practice:
The primary rights and duties with which jurisprudence busies itself again arc
nothing but prophecies. One of the many evil effects of the confusion between
legal and moral ideas.. .is that theory is apt to get the cart before the horse, and to
consider the right or the duty as something existing apart from and independent of
the consequences of its breach, to which certain sanctions are added afterward.
But, as 1 shall try to show, a legal duty so called is nothing but a prediction that if a
^‘’This was a point that Holmes had made more than two decades before; see Holmes
(1870).
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man does or omits certain things he will be made to suffer in this or that wav bvjudgment of the court; and so of a legal right. (1897/1920, 168-169).
^
In confusing morality and the law, moral responsibility becomes confused with
legal liability, the duty one person owes to another who has a justified claim on it.
According to Holmes, duties and rights do not possess independent ontological status.
Their standing is a function of the legal consequences they have or might bring into
existence. In other words, there are no such things as preexistent rights or duties. For
rights and duties to be valid, they must be defined in terms of the legal consequences
which will follow their breach. Grounded in experience, legal duties and rights are in
effect logically equivalent to the rulings of the courts m response to what individuals do
and do not do with respect to the duties they owe and the duties owed to them.
We may note here that Holmes does not insist on the correlativity of duties and
rights, instead, he takes each in turn. The idea, it would seem, is that it is the duty-relation
and the right-relation, as such, that invites attention from the law, and it is this around
which legal practice should and does turn. Further, we may understand Holmes'
preoccupation with duty over rights to stem from his overriding insistence on the need to
distinguish between law and morality. That is, for Holmes, to conceive the law in terms of
duty, was to conceive it at its most distinctive, to select that aspect of the law which was
both most concrete and generalizable. Rights, on the other hand, conjured up the specter
of elusive abstract entities, existing independently of factual experience. The duty-relation
provided, for Holmes, the analytical key to a theory of adjudication grounded in
experience.
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Does the lawyer, in his role as •prcdiclive Iheorisl', give good advice when he bases
his prediction on the distinctive legal requirements of a ease rather It,an court beltavior; or,
must he take both factors into account? Further, just how far can we go in defining the
law' in tenns of what judges say it is, when we cannot be sure titat the reasons titey give
for their dcctsions are what actually motivated them? It seems that, for Holmes at least,
prediclion, as a probabilistic method, was a reliable standard because it absorbed the
element of contingency - what was most arbitrary in predicting the probable legal
response - into a specifiable class of cases, whose identification could almost be taken for
granted. It provided an immanent approach to the containment ofjuridical contingency, as
opposed to the recourse to transcendent principles advocated by Langdcll and his
followers.^'
Holmes theory rests on the assumption that predictions, when generalized and
reduced to a system, consist of a manageable number; otherwise, there would be little
reason to suppose that they would have much predictive force, since on the behaviorist
view, due to the contingent nature of the decision-making process, the number of
predictions would be very large, and approximating that number would be very difficult.
This is compounded by the fact that the institutional signature of the system of predictions
A classic critique of this position was made by Henry M. Hart, who maintained that
Holmes’ theory was ultimately reducible to an "uncompromising behaviorism." Hart
insisted on conflating Holmes’ prediction with positivism, concluding that he (Holmes)
was unable to differentiate between the specifically legal requirements of a case, on
which judges are supposed to ground their decisions, and projected court behavior. This
is, however, an overly narrow understanding of Holmes’ prediction theory. (Hart 1951,
932).
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are constantly evolving. Precedent infonns the present but does not close the door to
change. From an analytieal perspective, according to Holmes:
m ,rr.h I? 1
S''?" course of a generation take up prettyuch the whole body of the law. and restate it from the present point of view Wecould reconstruct the corpus from them if all that went beforewL burned. 111^use ot earlier reports is mainly historical. (1897/1920, 169).
Rights and duties, then, are analyzable in terms of prediction because they are
reducible to strict legal requirements, unblemished by extralegal considerations for the
purposes of arriving at dispositions. As a consequence, we are able to "see how the
vague circumference of the notion of duty shrinks and at the same time grows more
precise when we wash it with cynical acid and expel everything except the object of our
study, the operations of the law." (1897/1920, 174). His object is to define the parameters
of the law, of rights and duties, in order to increase the accuracy of our predictions by
specifying what is permitted and prohibited, as well as the penalties that may be expected
in the event of noncompliance. The domain of considerations having to do with duties is
wider than the domain of legal duties as such. What Holmes seems to set out to do with
the limits argument, then, is to distinguish clearly the wider form the narrower domain.
Extralegal considerations lurking behind the legal definition of duty are only irrelevant in a
narrowly legal sense: they should have dispository bearing on the instrumentalities of the
court, which is not to say that they do not make their presence felt, in some less articulate
way, in the law.
The confusions engendered by the failure to distinguish these domains are felt at
the level of general theory and practical detail. Such confusions may be attributed to the
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difficulty of making the appropriate distinctions, intellectual laziness, or simple inability
Holmes set out his priorities early in his argument;
e first thing for a busmess-hke understanding of the matter is to understand itsimits, and therefore I think it desirable at once to point out and dispel a confusionween inorahty and law, which sometimes rises to the height of conscious
eSg tteTornt rr acnmg n p i of consciousness. (1897/1920, 169-170)
One of the practical features of the limits argument, the one which held a special
attraction for the later legal realists, was the recognition that what lies below the surface
of the law may be just as motivationally efficacious or inefficacious as what lies above.
Preferences or ideals that we secretly covet may make their appearance in ways
unbeknownst to us. Since we do not know all the ways in which morality infiltrates the
law, we are better off, or so the argument runs, by eliminating - so far as it is within our
powers to do so - the distraction. In other words, we have enough trouble with
specifically legal issues, without having to worry about the role morality plays in the legal
process. Nevertheless, Holmes was equally wary of the dangers of taking this argument to
Its logical extreme, fixing limits in such a way that the law would be drained of every last
drop of moral content;
For my own part, I often doubt whether it would not be a gain if every work of
moral significance could be banished from the law altogether, and other words
adopted which should convey legal ideas uncolored by anything outside the law.
We should lose the fossil records of a good deal of history and the majesty got
from ethical associations, but by ridding ourselves of an unnecessary confusion we
should gain very much in clearness of our thought. (1897/1920, 179).
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To be sure, there would be advantages and disadvantages, but the clear implication is that
such a streamlined jurisprudence would leave the law in a scarcely recognizable state, and
perhaps even of less use than before.^^
Indeed, Holmes was well aware of the fact that the moral dimension of the law did
not vanish conveniently, even for the purposes of adjudicat.on. Holmes did not take the
route Karl Llewellyn later would take, when he urged judges to effect a temporary divorce
of the is and the ought. Although Holmes believed that for the putposes of adjudication
judges should not make express appeals to moral ideals, he did not thing the normative
could be taken out of the law, despite his insistence, on the one hand, that judges reach
thetr dectstons on the basis of the distinctive legal requirements of the case, and
recognitton of the realities ofjudicial legislation, on the other. The distinction between the
clatms that the normative can be removed from the law either permanently, temporarily,
or, in some sense, not at all, is subtle but important, and it rests on a careful tracing of the
various limits between law and morality.
It is more accurate to say that Holmes held a belief in the possibility, and utility, of
distinguishing between law and morals, rather than in the belief of a strict separation
between the two. It is a distinction that pointed to the linguistic and metaphysical
*^orifusions, the confusions of meaning, surrounding the relation between legal and moral
ideas or propositions. That is, in conceding the "practical importance of the distinction
between morality and law," Holmes does not actually call for their separation in any strong
^^The classic comparison here is to Karl Llewellyn (1931), where, following Holmes, he
makes a strong case, for purely analytical reasons, of the desirability of effecting a
separation of ‘is’ and ‘ought’.
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sense, but underscores the practical necessity of drawing the line for the purposes of
adjud,cation. (1897/1920. 170). He explains himself as follows:
When I emphasize the difference between law and morals I do so with reference toa single end, that of learning and understanding the law....I do not say that there isot a wider point of view from which the distinction between law and moralsbecomes of secondary or no importance, as all mathematical distinctions vanish inpresence of the innnite. But I do say that tha, distinction is of the first importance
r the object which we are here to consider - a right study and mastery of the law
"nes 0 8"9W1920 Tyt
^
Almost as if he anticipated being misinterpreted as an unrelenting positivist. Holmes
reaffirmed his position in no uncertain terms: "I take it for granted that no hearer of mine
will misinterpret what 1 have to say as the language of cynicism. The law is the witness
and external deposit of our moral life. Its history is the history of the moral development
of the race. The practice of it, in spite of popular jests, tends to make good citizens and
good men." (1897/1920, 170).
Holmes insistence on the practical and pedagogical benefits of separating law and
morality was rearticulated through the heuristic device of the 'bad man'. I believe we can
understand Holmes' introduction of the bad man argument as a reflection of his
perspectival and experience-oriented approach to the law and the relation between moral
and legal considerations. The argument served to represent the fundamental nature of the
intersection between citizens and their legal institutions. The bad man allowed Holmes to
dramatically represent the violence of the state as it could be brought to bear on its
citizens through the instrumentality of the courts - the channeling of the public force in
the form of legal sanctions.
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The bad man represents a type, a self-centered tndtv.dual whose primary concern is
to reach his objective with as little hassle as possible. Systems of moral,ty do no, disturb
the bad man's self-possession and desire to achieve his objectives without suffering
unpleasant consequences, but systems of law do. The bad man, through the advice of his
lawyer, picks out the characteristics of the law that concerns him. In a classic statement of
the argument. Holmes touches on both the practical and theoretical reasons for adopting
the bad man's point of view:
You can see very plainly that a bad man has as much reason as a good one for
wishing to avoid an encounter with the public force, and therefore you can see the
practical imponance of the distinction between morality and law. A man who cares
nothing for an ethical rule which is believed and practised by his neighbors is likely
nevertheless to care a good deal to avoid being made to pay money, and will keep
out ofjail if he can....If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look
at it as a bad man, who cares only for the material consequences which such
knowledge enables him to predict, not as a good one, who finds his reasons for
conduct, whether inside the law or outside of it, in the vaguer sanctions of
conscience. (1897/1920, 170-171).
The bad man does not care about morality because it does not figure in with his plans, and
cares only about the law to the extent it may affect him. All this is with a view towards
predicting the probable material consequences of the alternative courses of action open to
him. A course of action is to be recommended if and only if it will bring about
consequences favorable to the actor and avoid unfavorable ones so far as possible. A
course of action, then, is right because it is good.
The confusion between law and morality shows up in another way, forging a link
with the second fallacy which warns against the dangers of becoming embroiled in the
deductive, reason-based systems of traditional common law jurisprudence. In the same
passage Holmes manages to include the other crucial link between the bad man and
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prediction; he concludes with what amounts to the closest he ever
definition of law:
came to giving a
he confusion with which I am dealing besets confessedly legal conceptions Taket le fundamental question, What constitutes the law? You will find sonK text
writers telling you that it is something different from what is decided by the courtsof Massachusetts or England, that it is a system of reason, that it is a deductionfrom Pnncip les of ethics or admitted axioms or what not, which may or may not
si? n f H m
if™" '"k" ‘he view of our friend the bad min we
all find that he does not care two straws for the axioms or deductions, but thathe does want to know what the Massachusetts or English courts are likely to do infack 1 am much of his mind. The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact and
nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law. (1897/1920, 172-173)
'
Not only is the bad man indifferent to moral theory as such, but he also is unmoved
by the problems created by importing moral language into the law, for they are so many
empty phrases to him. Moral vocabulary permeates the law, yet, we often overlook its
presence. For Holmes, only ifwe keep the boundary between law and morality in plain
sight can we avoid the inevitable terminological confusions and ambiguities of meaning
stemming from uncritical acceptance of our working assumptions. This link between legal
language and legal meaning is an important, albeit often overlooked, themes of the essay.
Indeed, Holmes sets as his first order of business, the need to distinguish the moral from
the legal language:
The law is full of phraseology drawn from morals, and by the mere force of
language continually invites us to pass from one domain to the other without
perceiving it, as we are sure to do unless we have the boundary constantly before
our minds. The law talks about rights, and duties, and malice, and intent, and
negligence, and so forth, and nothing is easier, or, I may say, more common in
legal reasoning, than to take these words in their moral sense, at some stage of the
argument, and so to drop into fallacy. (1897/1920, 171).
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Moral language, for Holmes, prevents the law from being interpreted in a distinctively
legal way. However natural it may be for us to lapse into such language, it makes it that
much harder to judge a case on its legal merits and requirements.
Sensitivity to the importance of perspectivism in the legal process is one of the
mam lessons to be drawn from Holmes' bad man. The idea is that it pays, in both theory
and practice, to approach problems from different perspectives if the interested parties
wish to select the plan of action that will maximize the positive practical consequences
that reasonably can be expected to flow to them. We need not, however, resort to the
stark metaphor of the bad man, whose only concern is with how the law will affect him, to
appreciate the full impact of Holmes' perspectivism. The bad man is a way of dramatizing
a purely legal perspective, one where the only value in sight is self-interest in its most
naked form. Adopting the bad man's point of view makes it easier to identify law with the
idea of prediction, but this should not necessarily imply that the bad man argument is
identical with the predictive theory of law. Rather, the law is identified with prediction
because the actors in the legal system observe that the public force is levied through the
instrumentality of the courts. The predictive theory is not reducible to the litigants and
their legal counsel's ability and concern with how individual judges will behave. Instead, I
believe Holmes's argument is better understood to say that lawyers are concerned with
making generalized predictions as to how the courts will treat cases and issues of a certain
type; an approach ultimately determined by a belief that the real grounds for judicial
decisions are not the "hollow deductions from empty general propositions," but policy
decisions distilled from the give and take of experience. (1894/1920, 120).
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By characterizing his theory of law in terms of prediction. Holmes is, in some
sense, maintaining a eons.stent position vis-a-vis the common law. That is, for Holmes,
the development of the eommon law may be understood by the seareh for an external
standard of liability, a standard which appeals to the authonty of experience for its
grounding. The adjudication of liability becomes a function of an evolving standard
grounded in experience that ean be measured and foreseen, to a reliable degree, by
external signs observable only by the experts within the legal system.
An external standard of liability that raises experience to the level of general theory
benefits from a companson with actuarial science. As Marianne Constable (1994)
observed, when Holmes proclaimed that, "[f]or the rational study of the law the black-
letter man may be the man of the present, but the man of the future is the man of statistics
and the master of economics," he was not just engaging in wishful thinking about the
positive future effects social science might hold for the explanatory and predictive power
of the law. Rather, he was making a plea for a certain conception of liability that imposed
burdens according to how the distribution of risks was correlated to the public good; a
system in which "the rational study of the law" could be defined in terms of a probability
coefficient. In doing so. Holmes was providing the grounds for a reassertion of the status
and authority of the legal profession as a whole. That is, Holmes was marking the
contours for the future development of legal expertise, so that its professional carriers
could situate themselves in positions of power in order to facilitate emerging strategies of
governance through the management of risk. The distribution of risk is now understood
to constitute part of the very fabric of the law, finding its expression through the
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formulation of public policy within legal doctrine. The sphere of professional expertise
and authority expands commensurately. This expansion, I would argue, is intertwined
with Holmes’ more fundamental claims about the indeterminacy of law manifest in a
modernist legal space.
To help explain this, and why I think it is important to look at Holmes’ work from
this perspective, I would like to return to Tocqueville once more. Contrasting the
common law and France’s civilian codes, he observed; "The French codes are often
difficult to comprehend, but they can be read by everyone; nothing, on the other hand, can
be more obscure and strange to the uninitiated than [law] founded upon precedents....The
French lawyer is simply a man extensively acquainted with the statutes of his country; but
the Engitsh or American lawyer resembles the hierophants of Egypt, for like them he is the
sole interpreter of an occult science." (Tocqueville 1 969/1988, 264). It would be
unsurprising to suggest that such complexity works to the benefit of both the individual
lawyer and the legal profession as a whole, both in terms of preserving the legitimacy of
expert authority and social status. Understanding the historically contingent nature of this
constructed complexity is another matter however. In Tocqueville’s America, the
byzantine nature of the writ system was a principal contributing factor. In the modem era,
we need to look elsewhere. Holmes’ contributions in legal theory and its intimations of a
new legal discourse - with a vocabulary emerging from the concepts experience and
prediction - laid the foundation for much later work, work that would represent the
common law as complex, subtle, and ultimately unknowable on its own terms (at least to
the outsider).
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As I noted in Chapter Two, David Luban suggests that modernity ean be
understood by reference to the metaphor of the “Copernican Revolution." Copernicus,
Luban points out. "taught us to mistrust common sense, to view it as merely a belief
system resting on eritieizable presuppositions." (Luban 1994. 19). The implication of
'Copemicanism" for the legal mind (at least as understood by Luban) is that "[t]he truth
about legal structures must be radically different from the way they manifest themselves in
practice." (Luban 1994, 3). By emphasizing the importance of perspective, and
introducing a conception of indeterminacy, or uncertainty, to the law, Holmes, I would
suggest, best represents the early contours of legal modernism.
However, as informative of a style of legal reasoning and legal practice,
indeterminacy poses certain risks.^^ While seeming to open up the legal world to multiple
perspectives, ultimately, it privileges only one. That is, for indetemiinacy to be meaningful
in a given situation (for example, the lawyer/client relationship), it requires some external
constraint inducing regularity in the underlying referential structure so as to allow
probabilities to be assigned md prediction to have some efficacy. In other words, it
requires that these regularities should be either experienced and/or understood by a
knowing subject - the lawyer/expert.
As far as I know. Holmes was the first legal theorist to consciously develop a
jurisprudential focus from the perspective of the practicing lawyer. This allows him to
“Aside from those already detailed in the scholarly literature; that is, the dangers of
relativism or nihilism illuminated by ‘mainstream’ legal academics, as well as the danger-
ous implications in the undermining of the tradition of the rights-based discourse of
liberal theory that Critical Race Theorists have brought to our attention.
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radically challenge Austin’s answer to the fundamental question ofjunsprudence: w/,at
,
law? However, tn providing his own alternative, Holmes elides the implications of the
more important question: who can say?
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CHAPTER 4
from individual to social JUSTirp.POUND AND THE VALORIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW
In his important work on American legal realism, William Twining identified the
basic problems which have dominated modem American jurisprudential thought:
preserving the unity of the common law in the face of the multiplicity ofjurisdictions;
modernization of the law in the wake of the social and economic changes brought about
by the development of industrial capitalism after the Civil War; and "simplification of the
sources of law, as the legal profession and the courts became more and more swamped by
the prodigious output of legislation, regulations and reported cases." (Twining 1973, 3-4)
Concern with these problems, however, does not necessarily lead to systematic
legal reform. One of the unique features of the common law is that, in its day-to-day
workings, the legal system undergoes constant change. Each published opinion of an
appellate court, every interpretation and application by a trial court, contributes, however
modestly, to the modification of the law. Over time, gradual evolution may lead to
important change in legal doctrine. (See, e.g., Cotterrell 1989, 21-32). Indeed, one of the
often-cited virtues of the common law system is its capacity to accommodate change and
thereby alleviate the need for sudden and wholesale change. The concept of externally-
imposed legal reform, on the other hand, suggests a much more dramatic process.
Historically, the bar has viewed such mandates for legal reform as an unwarranted
imposition on the autonomy of the profession.
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As Twining po.ms out, however, the basic conditions of material life changed
dramatically after the Civ.l War. These soeio-eeonom.e developments, along w.th the
emergence of new technolog.es to meet a growing industrial society, brought new
challenges to the law as well as to other areas of society. (Twining 1973,4). Moreover,
according to Twining, no, only did these developments help to bring about baste structural
change in Amencan society, but they also transformed the way in which legal refo™ was
understood. (Twining 1973, 4).
The inHuence of industrial and technological change was indirect. First, certain
aspects of the law seemed to be out of step with the concrete reality in which average
Americans lived and worked. And, second, the social and structural changes challenged
the self-image of the legal profession in ways which helped to shape the sort of legal
reform the profession put forward in an attempt to respond to the perceived disjuncture
between social reality and legal doctrine.
The changes in American life brought about by the innovations Twining mentioned
did not, of course, go unnoticed by those who lived through them. The facts of daily life
had indeed changed and many self-conscious attempts were made to bring American
society and government into line with the changed material conditions of life. The history
of these attempts at change cannot be easily summarized, but are part of what is
commonly referred to as the Progressive era, or as the historian Richard Hofstadter (1955)
has called it, the "age of reform." It is also common, when referring to this penod, to
work from the assumption that the legal profession, or at least the elite segment of the bar,
as well as the legal system as a whole, was to a great degree out of step with the
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Progressive movement. Or. perhaps more strongly, the legal profession has been
characterized as putting up obstacles to the most broadly accepted goal of Progress, vis,n -
— social justice.
Part of the quest for social justice in the Progressive era involved improving the
situation of the common working person, hnding expression in state statutes limitmg the
hours of work, improving working conditions, and in the creation of worker's
compensation schemes to provide monetary remedies for workplace injuries. However,
such laws met with severe opposition from both the elite segments of the bar, as well as
from appellate judges who came from within its ranks.
Resistance was justified m the name of 'freedom of contract'. The growth of the
doctrine of freedom of contract and its incorporation through the Fourteenth Amendment
IS by now a well-known story. One of its more infamous chapters includes the United
States Supreme Court's deeision in Lochner v. New York. (1905). The case involved a
New York statute which ordered that "No employee shall be required or permitted to
work in a biscuit, bread or cake bakery or confectionary establishment more than sixty
hours in any one week, or more than ten hours in any one day...." (1905, 46). Writing for
the majority, Justice Peckham held that.
It is manifest to us that the limitation of the hours of labor as provided for in this
section of the statute under which the indictment was found, and the plaintiff in
error convicted, has no such direct relation to and no such substantial effect upon
the health of the employee, as to justify us in regarding the section as really a
health law. It seems to us that the real object and purpose were simply to regulate
the hours of labor between the master and his employees (all being sui juris), in a
private business, not dangerous in any degree to morals or in any real and
substantive degree, to the health of the employees. Under such circumstances the
freedom of master and employee to contract with each other in relation to their
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or interfered with,
Against this alleged expansion of the liberty provision of the Fourteenth
,
Justice Holmes articulated one of his most memorable judicial lines: "Th,
Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics." Accor
the case was "decided upon an economic theory which a large part of the
ding to Holmes,
; he Fourteenth
Amendment,
country does not
entertain." (1905, 64).
Lochner was only one of many clashes between the judiciary and the legislature
during the Progressive era. Throughout this period, statutes designed to further
Progressive reform were adamantly opposed by significant elements of the organized bar
and the judiciary. (See, e.g., Paul 1969, 19-38). I do not wish to pursue here an
examination of the reasons for this divergence between judiciary and legislature or its
implications.^'* Rather, I wish only to note that its existence posed certain problems for the
bar, the self-appointed guardian of American legal culture and the principles ofjustiee,
grounded m the rule of law. For many who were dedicated to reform in the name of social
justice, the repeated failure of specific reforms in the courts, such as the legislation
involved in Lochner, was to be blamed on the newly dominant element within the
organized bar - the corporate lawyer - those who argued for wealthy clients' interests at
the expense of the common working man. Even those who were otherwise friendly to the
elite bar saw cause for concern in the increasing subjugation of influential elements of the
^'‘For an excellent discussion of this topic, which suggests that the issue is much more
complicated than simply the reactionary measures of a conservative bench, see Gillman
(1993).
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legal profession to co^rorate wealth. This was viewed as detnmental to the profession's
tradttional claims to autonomy which were grounded in its cla.m to being a "public-
profession which owed primary allegiance to the general interests of society over the
particular interests of the individual client. This assertion of neutrality was quickly being
pushed aside by the image of the "hired gun", linked to specific political and economic
interests. The legitimacy of the legal profession's claim to guardianship of the law was
threatened by these developments within the practice of law which challenged one of the
cornerstones of the bar's claim of professionalism, autonomy. This was viewed as being
detrimental to the profession’s traditional independence bom of a mastery of the intricacies
of the "science of the law." As Holmes said in "The Path of the Law," ”[t]o an
imagination of any scope, the most far-reaching form of power is not money, it is the
command of ideas." (1897/1920).
If these developments within the legal profession were not disquieting enough, an
explosion m the reported opinions of appellate courts threatened to challenge the other
cornerstone of the profession, mastery of a 'determinate' body of knowledge. Changes in
society as a whole only exacerbated the problem. Moreover, the Progressive era was a
time when the concept and role of the professional acquired new importance. (Wiebe
1 967, 1 1 3- 1 2 1 ). As the social stmcture changed and America became a national society,
mastery over a politically neutral body of 'scientific knowledge' became an important way
to make one s place in society respectable and secure. The politically charged atmosphere
of the Progressive era and the legal profession's apparent complicity in resisting social
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reforn, efforts, combined w.,h
.he growing percept,on of doc.rinul indetemhnacy, n.ade
claims to 'scientific neutrality' highly problematic.
In February 1923, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote to Harold Laski:
Some of the virtuous under the call of Elihu Root and William Draper Lewis meeihere [m Washington.D.C.] next week to talk of restatement of the law (Ie eve).... I wtll tiy to [look in on them] but I will take no hand and won’t believe
...I they produce the goods. You can't evoke genius by announcing a^
That meeting and the resulting institution - the American Law Institute (ALI) - were the
outgrowth of forces which had been working for legal reform throughout the preceding
two decades. As legal historian N.E.H. Hull has noted, "[t]he origins of the ALI lay in
the vision of a group of 'progressive-pragmatic' legal academics, who wished to reform
law and promote the influence of law professors in the wider world of legal practice."
(Hull 1990, 56). This was accomplished through joining with powerful members of the
organized bar m response to a perceived crisis in the adjudication of the common law.
Citing to Roscoe Pound, the most influential jurist of the era, Hull notes:
Pound articulated what many of his generation had begun to recognize: that the
classical-formalist paradigm of how the law was applied in the courts-how judges
discovered law- had lost its explanatory power under the accumulation of
contradictory data. The explosion in published reports of cases by the West Law
Book Publishing Company had graphically illustrated inconsistencies between, and
even within, jurisdictions. Complaints about the confusion of the law and the
multiplicity of cases in the last decade or so of the nineteenth century was the
manifestation of the cognitive dissonance of a generation groping with this
increasing contradiction between data and paradigm. Older formalists futilely tried
to ignore the contradiction by either attempting to reconcile cases or perfecting
their schemas for legal classification. The progressive-pragmatist generation,
through their spokesman. Pound, was the first to identify what the new case data
was telling them, that the classical-formalist paradigm did not describe or explain
the reality of what was happening in the courts. (1990, 57).
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In 1906, Roscoe Pound had emerged at the eenter of national attent.on with.., the
egal profession as a cnt.c of the reactionary role then being played by the United States
Supreme Court, and by the judiciary and bar more generally, with respect to the pressing
social issues of the time. In that year he delivered an address to the national convention of
the American Bar Association entitled "The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the
Administration of Justice," in which he laid a long list of grievances at the doorstep of the
judiciary and the legal profession. Somewhat surprisingly (at least to the contemporary
observer). Pound was, as a result, bitterly denounced in conservative legal circles as a
'radical'.
This imputation was, of course, unfounded. Indeed, the essence of Pound's work
throughout his active life was, I will argue, quite conservatively single-minded. While he
advocated considerable innovation in all aspects of the American legal system, he did so
only for the sake of preserving those components of the system which provided the legal
profession with its most powerful privileges - especially the common law technique and
ideology which entails a peculiarly dominant role for the judiciary. His clashes with
conservative forces early in his career are best understood as exhortations by him to a
recalcitrant, parochial and backwards profession to adapt themselves to the changing
social conditions of the early twentieth century, so as to avoid irrevocable 'damage' in
terms of the loss of power and professional authority.
When Pound voiced his criticisms of the American legal system in 1906, his
critical tone reflected a groundswell of popular animosity against the legal profession.
Lochner had been decided only months before, aggravating the already considerable public
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resernmen, of the courts' pers.sten, intervention into polittcal controversies on behalfof
.he giant monopoly corporattons. The LocUner case was the culmination of a long hne of
ant,
-labor decisions handed down by the United States Supreme Court over the two
decades which preceded 1905. The doctrine of 'freedom of contract' articulated in these
cases was the product of an ideological and discursive framework from which both state
and federal courts acted to nullify or ,nvert the punrose of the post-Civil War, anti-slavery
constitutional amendments. Under the rubric of 'substantive due process', the courts
construed the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment so as to protect primarily
the liberties and property of the giant corporations from regulation by the government,
rather than for the purpose for whieh they were enacted, namely, to protect the newly
enfranchised African-Americans against discriminatory governmental actions.
The perception of anti-labor partisanship on the part of the state and federal courts
evoked a deep and bitter popular reaction which was rcHected in the political documents
and statements of the Lochner era. The decade prior to 1 905 was marked by repeated
conflicts between capital and labor, and the side on which the courts had allied themselves
in those eonflicts seemed 'obvious' to many. Arnold Paul has depicted the era in the
following manner:
The deepening of the depression in 1894 and early 1895 had intensified the
grievances of Southern and Midwestern farmers, labor unionists, the unemployed
and partially employed, and thousands of bankrupt and failing businessmen.
President Cleveland's handling of the financial panic of 1893- 1895. ..and his
vigorous suppression of the Pullman strike had alienated a large section of the
Democratic party. While the silver miners flooded the country with free-silver
propaganda...both the Populists and the left-wing Democrats gained strength, the
latter preparing to capture the Democracy for silver and thoroughgoing
antimonopolism in 1896. Into this seething political scene was thrown the E.C.
Knight opinion emasculating the anti-trust act, the income tax decision, and the
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Debs ruling. A surge of resentment swept through the nrolostino r
receiverships and other judicial devices intcrrcriiig with stale rceiil il'i™,
^.rc the Supreme Court itself had sticctimhcd to the plutocracy And llli’noir
n,rp“Tr’
'’“‘i hiltcrly denounced Cleveland’s intervention in
list of nr'l
"govcmmcnl by injunction," added the Supreme Court to thepeop e s oppressors and "lackeys of capitalism " Ho soon hoo., !
the most powerful figure in the Democratic intraparty connict. (1%9 224425)"
The popular resentment aroused by the /.oc/»,«-era decisions was not limited to
the judiciary, but extended to the entire legal profession. Speaking at Harvard University
in 1905, President Roosevelt rclleclcd the public's attitude toward lawyers: "Many of the
most mllucntial and most highly remunerated members of the bar in every center of wealth
make it their special task to work out bold and ingenious schemes by which their very
wealthy clients, individual or corporate, can evade the laws which arc made to regulate in
the interest of the public the use of great wealth." Such lawyers, he suggcsicd, were
producing "a spirit of dumb anger against all laws and of disbelief in their efficacy."
(Quoted in Auerbach 1976, 32-33).
Louis Brandcis also was moved to criticize the social role being played by the legal
profession. Speaking to Yale law students in 1905, he predicted "a revolt of the people" if
the bar did not take stock of the new social realities:
For nearly a generation the leaders of the bar with few exceptions have not only
failed to take part in any constructive legislation designed to solve in the interest of
the people our great social, economic and industrial problems, they have failed
likewise to oppose legislation prompted by selfish interests.. ..The leaders of the
bar.. .have, with rare exceptions, been ranged on the side of the corporations, and
the people have been represented in the main by men of very meager legal
ability.. ..The immense corporate wealth will necessarily develop a hostility from
which much trouble will come to us unless the excesses of capital arc
curbed. ...There will come a revolt of the people against the capitalists unless the
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aspirations of the people are given some adequate legal expression. (1905, 559-
By the turn of the eentury, the public had succeeded in identifying the leaders of
the legal profession as the proponents - or 'lackeys' - of the large corporal,ons. Indeed,
this situation provided the organizing theme for Jerold Auerbach's inlluemial study of the
American legal profession in which he observed that,
[ojnee *e corporation became the object of public scrutiny and then the target ofpublic hosti hty, as it increasingly did after the turn of the century, the newpro essional elite was vulnerable. The private corporation, a legal person entitled
not to be deprived of its liberty or property without due process of law, owed itslegal existence...to the innovative skills of lawyers and judges. (1976, 32).
Thorstein Veblen stated bluntly in 1899 that the legal profession was
-'immediately
subservient to ownership and financiering...." (1899/1934, 231). And Woodrow Wilson
seemed to be merely renecting popular sentiment when he remarked before the American
Bar Association m 1910 that "lawyers...have been sucked into the maelstrom of the new
business system of the country," and that they had been "intimate counsel in all that has
been going on. The country distrusts every 'corporation lawyer'." (1910/1983, 174).
Public sentiment against the monopolies and the law was not only manifested in
growing reform legislation, but also in what Pound perceived as a more direct threat to the
legal profession: an increasing movement toward the establishment of administrative
agencies. These were legislatively-created bureaus and agencies, run by the executive
branch of state or federal governments, which sought to regulate some of the greater
abuses of the monopolies. As the executive branch was immediately responsible for the
enforcement of the policies and regulations of these agencies and commissions, the effect
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was ,0 by-pass the courts’ usual role in enforcenten, and adjud,cation of v.olat.ons of law.
Much to Pound's concern, this arrangement generally met with public favor.
Shortly before the Lochner decision was announced. Pound wrote "Do We Need a
Philosophy of Law?" (1905) ,n which he extolled what he considered the glorious history
of many centuries of Anglo-American common law. Pound argued that despite opposition
and struggle, the common law system had succeeded in driving out from the United States
practically every vestige of the colonialist French and Spanish civil law systems, even
entrenching itself in the contents of all state and federal constitutions. Indeed, Pound went
so far in his zealous advocacy of the common law as to suggest that the United States
Constitution contained little that would have been new to Lord Coke, the prominent
English common law judge of the early seventeenth century.
Pound did go on to express certain fears, however, or concerns about the present
status of the common law. In a rather strange bit of historical analysis. Pound contrasted
the current hostility towards the law with its popularity when Coke had attempted to curb
the power of King James I by proclaiming the king’s authority to be "under God and
[common] law." Pound noted that,
[t]oday,/or thefirst time, the common law finds itself arrayed against the people;
for the first time, instead of securing for them what they most prize, they know it'
chiefly as something that continually stands between them and what they desire. It
cannot be denied that there is a growing popular dissatisfaction with the legal
system. (1905, 344).
That he could sincerely state that this was the first time in Anglo-American history
that the common law was unpopular betrays much of Pound's excessive partisanship for
the common law system and for the legal profession. But, there was perhaps another
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reason for Pound’s excessive zeal. That
.s. Pound secnrs >o have at.cnp.ed to reach an
understanding of the nature of the eontetnporar. Cash of forces. To large segnrents of the
population, a connict between capital and labor, or corporations and the general public,
was apparent. And, it was also the ease - or so ,t scented - that the legal profession,
both bench and bar, was largely alligned with the fonner and against the latter. Pound
however, sought to restate the conllicl as a clash between the public and the conunon law.
In other words. Pound attempted to recharacterize the nature of the increasing public
animosity toward the legal system. He portrayed the legal profession, not as a
handmaiden to corporate wealth, but as independent professionals whose only allegiance
was to the common law. In so doing. Pound sought to discover those factors within the
common law tradition which might explain the fact that,/o/- ihefirst time, the common
law had incurred the wrath of the general public.
In the 1905 article, Pound presented the hypothesis that the current deficiency
causing the common law's unpopularity was its proclivity for attending to rights of
individuals at the expense of those of soeiety. This theme of a conHict between things
individual and things 'social' was to become one of the fundamental elements of his
critique of the existing legal system, and also another way of restating the basic conflicts
of his era in non-political and non-cconomic fashion. In this early statement of the
problem, he wrote: "No amount of admiration for our traditional system should blind us to
the obvious fact that it exhibits too great a respect for the individual.. .and too little respect
for the needs of society, when they come in conflict with the individual, to be in touch
with the present age." (1905, 344). To illustrate his point Pound referred directly to the
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rash of cases in which state and federal courts, pursuant to their powers of 'judicial
review, had struck down and nullified pro-labor legislative enactments. Alluding to
freedom of contract' and similar doctrines he wrote;
are common-law doctrines. And this means that a struggle is n p oLts^soetety and the common law; for the judicial power over unconstitutaal
gislation IS m the nght line of common law ideas. It is a plain consequence of thedoctnne of the supremacy of law, and has developed from a line of precedents thatrun back to Magna Carta. (1905, 345).
a ma
However, it seems that what lay behind Pound's defense of the common law was
not simply pride m Anglo-Saxon traditions, but a concern for, and loyalty to the
extraordinary privileges and powers which the common law system maintained in the
hands of the legal profession. Therefore, Pound consistently advocated the ability of the
common law to correct its own imbalance in favor of individualism. He believed that the
fiexibility of the common law would allow it to liberalize its own doctrines from within. In
this regard. Pound observed that the common law's "cardinal doctrine is that law is reason
and reason is the law," meaning that the law would inevitably adapt itself to the reasonable
position. Pound hoped that this movement toward the 'rational' could be helped along
through the enlightenment of a new generation of lawyers, coming from progressively-
oriented law schools, who would lead the common law to "a more even balance between
individualism and soeialism."
Three points from the foregoing deserve special note as they mark the contours of
Pound s basic position, first. Pound's devotion to the 'traditions' of the common law and to
the legal profession, whose privileges it justified; second, his concerns for the present state
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of the contnton law denved fro™ h.s percephon of the struggles of the t.nres as involv.ng
confliet between common law traditions and the legislative enactments favored by the
public at large; third, Pound's confidence that the bulk of the common law privileges could
be maintained if. through the law schools, the legal profession could be re-educated to
take a more flexible and 'rational' approach to the popular social reform legislation.
In the following year, in the midst of the furor over the Lochner decision, Pound
delivered his. now famous, address before the national convention of the American Bar
Association. When placed in the context of the pervasive acrimony of the times, his
observations and conclusions seem rather moderate m tone: "we must not be
deceived...into overlooking or underrating the real and serious dissatisfaction with the
courts and lack of respect for law which exists in the United States today....Courts are
distrusted, and executive boards and commissions with summary and plenary powers,
freed, so far as constitutions will permit, from judicial review, have become the fashion."
( 1906 , 730).
This much was hardly deniable; nevertheless. Pound incurred the enmity ofmany
conservatives within the profession by placing the blame for the situation largely on the
courts and the judicial process. To support his position. Pound cited sixteen separate
causes for the unpopularity of the legal system. Of these, several were to become staple
themes thi-oughout his long career: the transition to an 'age of legislation'; the mechanical
operation of rules of law; the unduly individualist bias of the common law; the common
law's proclivity for contentious procedure; the common law doctrine of the supremacy of
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law;
.he lack of general ,deas and of legal philosophy, which ,s "so characteristic of Anglo-
American law; and the defects of case-made law." (1906, 731-749).
The ftrst point was reflected in Pound's fear of the encroachment of administrative
agencies on the courts' prerogatives. The second point was an expression of Pound's vtew
that one of the inevitable drawbacks to uniform application of rules of law was a
mechanical mode of decision which could "never entirely avoid eliminating factors which
will be more or less material in some particular controversy." The remaining five points all
were identified by Pound as long-standing attributes of the Anglo-American common law.
Certainly, it was not Pound's intention to attempt to discredit or weaken the common law
system m favor of continental civil law, or any other system. On the contrary, the essence
of his entire career could be summarized as the search for means to preserve as much as
possible of the common law prerogatives in the face of threats to it from the legislature
and from the burgeoning number of quasi-judicial administrative agencies. These points,
then, were those Pound felt most in need of attention in order for the common law to
withstand the tide of popular resentment against the courts. Several had appeared in his
article from the previous year, yet, because of their perceived importance, were reiterated
and elaborated upon here.
In regard to the final point noted above, the defects of a case-law system. Pound
was able to appreciate how its shortcomings appeared to the public:
Suffice it to say that the want of certainty, confusion, and incompleteness inherent
in all case-law, and the waste of labor entailed by the prodigious bulk to which
ours has attained, appeal strongly to the layman. The compensating advantages of
this system, as seen by the lawyer.. .are not apparent to him. What he sees is
another phase of the great game; a citation match between counsel, with a
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certainly that diligence can rake up a decision somewhere in support ofauvconceivable proposition. (1906, 741. Emphasis in original).
Interestingly, however. Pound seemed amenable to some forms ofeodincation as a
means of aiding the courts out of their self-created morass of eonllietmg, overlapping and
obscure 'precedents-. While he eschewed codiDcation of the civil law type which deprives
the judiciary of the power to create new law, he lauded the efforts at statutory
systemization of law then current in the United States as a means, first, of ridding the
common law of the grosser anachronisms and inconsistencies it inevitably develops within
Itself and, second, of providing "fresh starting-points" from which judges and lawyers
could begin to create entire new bodies of ease-law.
Pound closed his 1906 address with an exhortation to the bar associations to throw
off their "yoke of commercialism" and to revive faith and pride in their professionalism and
in the scientific accomplishments of American law schools. In the context of the great rifts
in society between the monopolies on the one hand and the factory workers and farmers
on the other, Pound urged the bar to adopt an air of independent professionalism, deriving
pride from the "spirit of the common law." Perhaps it was for this reason he was
considered by many conservatives as a radical critic. But, as suggested above, the essence
of his work was to seek only those changes in the common law system as were necessary
to enable the judiciary and bar to maintain the great privileges and powers they exercised
by means of it.
Pound urged continued faith in eommon law traditions and renewed efforts by the
legal profession and the law schools as the means of deliverance from social crisis
impending upon the legal system. He repeatedly stressed his belief that the key to a
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permanent resolution of the connict with the pubhc lay in re-educat,„g the next generation
of lawyers in a new legal philosophy and improved judieial methods.
What, then, did Pound propose to offer in the way of new ideas and materials for
the profession? Initially, two things: first, the introduction of concepts and techniques
which had recently been developed by jurists of the civil law countries to meet similar
problems; and, second, the benefit of the insights and ideas of the social sciences and of
social philosophy which Pound perceived to be in advance of the jurists in their
understanding of the conditions of the twentieth century. While certainly familiar with
their leading conceptions, Pound's knowledge of the social sciences does not appear to
have had any direct impact on his philosophy of law, save perhaps to lead him to embrace
pragmatism. Rather, Pound's real distinction lay in his extraordinarily broad knowledge of
the history of law and legal philosophy, not only of England and the United States, but of
the European continent as well. The great advantage he held over his contemporaries was
due to his grasp of the entire history of Anglo-American law, not only in itself, but in the
context of the parallel history of the eivil law. From this perspective. Pound could see in
what respects the American system might benefit from the use of ideas, methods and
practices of the continent.
By 1908, however, Pound had become a strong proponent of 'sociological
jurisprudence', and by 1912 he had advanced a version of 'interest theory' as the basis for
understanding law as a type of 'social engineering'. Indeed, it would seem that Pound
understood his life's work to be the refashioning of these various sources into instruments
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for the use of the Anrericau legal profession to enhance the delivery ofjustiee within the
legal system and thereby preserve the bar’s status and authority.
In his early work. Pound identified the key problem of the common law as its
nievitable tendency to construe legal controversies as questions of v,V/,m/ rights and
liberties, rather than as social problems. To correct this troublesome bias. Pound urged
the "socialization of the common law." Indeed, throughout his early work. Pound
displayed a recognition of the fact that American jurisprudence lagged behind philosophy
and the social sciences in that ,t had no. reformulated its premises in accordance with the
general shift from the individual to the social as the focus of theoretical inquiry and
explanation. These new developments in the social sciences led to an attack on the natural
law explanations which had deduced social standards from axioms developed through
consideration of hypothetical, abstract individuals supposed to live prior to, or outside of
actual societies - that is, social contract theory. Pound recognized philosophic
pragmatism as part of this general movement and praised its proposal to focus on actual
human conduct rather than on abstract first principles. To this end, he observed that,
[t]he sociological movement in jurisprudence is a movement for pragmatism as a
philosophy of law; for the adjustment of principles and doctrines to the human
conditions they are to govern rather than to assumed first principles; for putting
the human factor m the central place and relegating logic to its true position as an
instrument. (1908a, 609-610).
Along these same lines, Pound condemned the "liberty of contract" doctrine and
other such rationales used by the courts against labor legislation as the unfortunate result
of a jurisprudence of abstractions." Criticizing their strained rationales for pro-business
decisions. Pound borrowed the phrase 'mechanical jurisprudence' from Rudolph von
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Jhenng. ,he German
.heons, of sociologica. jurisprudence. Pound ridiculed wha, he called
the 'philosophical' approach to junsprudence wh.ch "divorced
.he juris, from
.he ac.ual life
of today, and that entertained an image of the ideal judge as one who was translated to a
heaven ofjuristic conceptions and seated before a machine which brought out of each
conception its nine hundred and ninety-nine thousand nine hundred and ninety-nine logical
results...." (1921a, 205). Pound observed that "[s]uch jurists have their counterparts in
American judges of the end of the last century who insisted upon a legal theoty of equality
of rights and liberty of contract in the face of notorious social and economic facts. On the
other hand, the conception of law as a means towards social ends, the doctrine that law
exists to secure interests requires the jurist to keep in touch with life." (1921a, 205).
Borrowing heavily from Rudolf von Jhering, Pound theorized that the starting
point for reasoning on legal problems should be shifted from 'abstract' doctrines on the
nghts and freedoms of individuals, to the 'concrete' interests of society at stake in the
problem. That is. Pound saw Jhering's concept of the social interest as the means by
which discussion of legal controversies could be brought down to the concrete, human
level demanded by sociological jurisprudence.
For Pound, interests were to be defined as demands, or wants, or claims.
Individual interests are demands made by individuals, and social interests are demands
made by, or by virtue of involvement in, society. Much of Pound's work, it would seem.
was devoted to presenting an interpretation of legal history as the interplay of interests
competing for recognition and satisfaction under the guise of various legal doctrines.
I am content to think of law as a social institution to satisfy social wants — the
claims and demands and expectations involved in the existence of civilized society
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— hy giving cl Icct 1o as much as we imiy with llic least s'icri Hr,* i;
l’cc'^'“inr'uur«^^
iiUiot, It, himtat, enjoyment of the goods ofexislenee - in shotl, a eonlinu-dlvmoic cdicacioiis social engineering. ( 1922/1955, 47).
’
' ^
The esse, tee, then, ofl-onturs tnlellcelnal career can he ntulersloo.l as an alletnpl
to reinroree the peculiar conunnn law law-making role ofthe judge with theory,
Icchnitptes and materials that wonl.l make the judiciary strong enough to eoulinne to
perlorm its tasks. Ilis theory orinleresis was part ol his attempt to provide the Amencan
legal prolession will, a new concept of the workings oflhe jutlicial process, taking into
accoiinl, lirsl ol all, the activity and responsihilily ol llie common law judge lor
l'<>nmiltiling policy; and secondly, emphasi/ing that the judge nuisl consider social Taels if
he is lo make policy edeelively and conseienlioiisly.
Pound Iheorized dial a balancing or weighing ofeonnicting inlerests was usually
(he underlying dynamic orjudicial decision, even when the judge was unaware ofit: "1
suhmK (hat wlial courls do suhconsciously, wlien (liey are al their best, is to generalize the
claims ofthe parlies as individual human claims, to subsume the claims so generalized
under generalized claims involved in life in civilized society in the time and place, and
endeavor lo Irame a precept or state a principle that will secure the most of those social
interests that wc may with the least sacrillce." (1923, 955).
I\)und proposed that the judge Irankly acknowledge his law-making capacity and
that ideally he should address himselfto the underlying interests in a Idur-step process of
decision.
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cTned
(I) the interests which the law may be
recognized and to what extent, (3) the means by which the law may secure tire
(191 ^763)'^
"
''mi'ations upon effective legal action.
That is. Pound believed that interests were discovered by the judge or Jurist, not created
by them. The existence of interests was taken by Pound as the objective starting point for
thejudicial process. The jurist simply •catalogued’ the interest he found; the judge simply
rccogntzed' which interest were competing in the case then before him. Ironically, in this
respect. Pound's theoty was not all that dissimilar from that of the classical theorists he
criticized, those who understood thejudicial role as discovering a pre-existing law or
source of law.
In 191 1 and 1912, Pound published a series of articles in the Harvard Law Review,
entitled "The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence." In these articles, he
praised Jhering for his contribution to the development of a sociological school of legal
philosophy by being the first to conceive of legal developments and institutions as the
products of social rather than individualistic forces. The articles also reviewed the history
of sociological-philosophical theories generally from their inception under August Comte
to the date of Pound's writing. Pound identified "mechanistic," "biological," "economic,"
and "psychological" stages of the development of sociological theories. What these
sociological philosophies had in common was that, as distinguished from the classical
philosophies which had centered on individualist conceptions, they attributed the leading
role in explaining and justifying history and social institutions to various forms of social
forces or social causes.
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In 1921. addressing himself ,o professional sociologists. Pound observed:
This address identified a turn in Pound's thought that had begun some years before; a tun,
from social psychology, instincts and the behaviorial sciences generally, and toward a
reconceptualized notion of social interests. The turn was prompted, in large part it would
seem, by the influence of American pragmatism, and the work of William James in
particular. By 191 3, Pound had published his first statement of this view of the foundation
of law as "interests" defined as 'demands' or 'claims'.
[UJsmg interest to mean a claim which a human being or a group ofhuman beingsmay make ,t is convenient to speak of individual interests, public interests, that is
interests of the state as a juristic person, and social interests, that is interests of the
community at large. (1913, 755).
Yet, Pound was not always clear whether social interests were to be construed
literally; that is, as demands 'made by' society, as though society possessed a certain
agency. Indeed, in later years he would qualify and reformulate this conception. A
characteristically ambivalent formulation appeared in his 1921 article; there, he suggested
that the interests which the legal order secures may be claims or wants or demands of
individual human beings immediately as such [individual interests]. ..or of the whole social
group as such [social interests]." (1921b, 241). And, just as clearly, his formulation of a
theory of social interests, at this time, was heavily indebted to the work of William James.
Pound attempted to distinguish himself from the nineteenth century schools of
jurisprudence by denouncing their rigid, "mechanical" conceptualism. Rather, he
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advocated a jurisprudence whose principal commitment would be to the justness of the
concrete results achieved rather than to the logical rigor of the form of decision. In
announcing a shift in priorities to the concrete', the 'human', the results of 'actual
experiences', and away from the 'logical', the '.deal', and the 'abstract individual', Pound
echoed the themes of his contemporaries in the philosophical world - the pragmatists.
Indeed, in his 1908 article, "Mechanical Jurisprudence," Pound announced that "[t]he
sociological movement in jurisprudence is a movement for pragmatism as a philosophy of
law." (1908a, 609).
Although Pound had attempted to give his theory of interests a strong
philosophical grounding by borrowing heavily from James' work, there were, nevertheless
senous conceptual weaknesses. For example, Pound's understanding of interests lacked
any significant analysis or discussion of the concrete interrelations among interests. One
sees m Pound the presumption that regardless of their objects, all claims are to be equally
taken into account. The 'weight' assigned to an interest depends not on the nature of its
object, but on the extent to which that objective would be affected by alternative
dispositions of the case at hand. Only as it must be decided for the particularities of the
case at hand is there consideration of the concrete interrelations of the posited interests.
Pound did give some historical analysis of the origin and evolution of various social
interests, in his theory of the stages of legal development. However, it seems clear that
Pound consistently failed to take an identifiable position as to what social forces, groups,
or interests are fundamental to legal and social development. In fact. Pound criticized the
'philosophical jurists' for attempting to assign intrinsic value to various interests in order to
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clUummc which were the more imporlanl. Instead, I>ouiul argued (hat any such absolute
weighing „r interests was in.txxssible because ofthe continually tluCuating urgency of
interests, and tluelualion of,he received ideals' accord, ng which they were weighed.
I•n.ther, l-„uncfs tendency was towards eoneeptnal isolation ofin,crests Iron, one
attothe,-, as opposed to nnifying ,|,e,n as pa,-,s of an overall strueUue of society, liaeh
interest was assigned its individual eompanment and called ro,tl, IVon, i|,a| eompartinent
only when
.ecognized by the j.nisl as having applicability to the ease a, bar. Yet, for tbe
tnost part, the contents of each compartment were treated as scpai ate but equal, at least
equal in the sense that each was equally legitimate as a possible gmund of evaluation. As
an extension of this, for l•ound, there seemed to be a bias in favor of ex/.vh,,^, interests.
That is, there was no provision for evaluating what interests shonht be promoted or
tavored. Any interest, so long as it existed, was credited with value in its favor, regardless
of how unworthy its ohjeetives may have been. As a consequence, although Pound was
deeply critical ol legal |,hilosophies ba.sed on 'absirael concepts', or on the abstract rights
ol abstract men, he made the analogous mistake of founding jnrispriidence on abstract,
atomized claims or interests.
Pound's Interest Theory as Apologyfor Jndieial Lan'-Makinf>
Beyond the signilieant induenee of William .lames' work, Roseoc Pound was also
heavily inllucneed by the work ofthe German jurist Rudolf von .Ihering. Pound was
especially indebted to .Ihcring's view ol law as a scll-eonscious human product; a view
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that, in Pound's eyes, distinguished Jhering from the historical school of law and from
what Pound characterized as "Nineteenth Century Jurisprudence."
Nevertheless, Pound was critical of Jhering's emphasis on legislation and on
legislatively-created administrative agencies as the definitive forms of law-making and the
administration ofjustice. This tendeney in Jhering conllicted with Pound's desire to
preserve and strengthen the law-making powers which the courts and legal profession of
the United States had seized early in the nineteenth century. Accordingly, Pound assisted
m redirecting the course of interest theory into a justification of a plenary, quasi-legislative
power of the common law courts. Pound's purpose was, in effect, to adapt interest theory
into a generalized theory of law-making in which the courts were placed as virtually co-
equal partners with legislatures in their authoritative, law-making capacities.
American courts had made law, with some enthusiasm, throughout the 1 800s,
despite sporadic popular efforts to do away with the British inheritance of common law
and to institute various forms of legislative codification. The historical school, however,
worked to conceal the fact ofjudicial legislation, by recourse to the fiction that judges
merely discover and apply a pre-existing, albeit unwritten, law. Pound, on the other hand,
contended that such dissimulation was no longer possible in light of the public's reaction to
the Lochner line of decisions. The political, partisan, law-making activity of the courts
had become obvious to broad sectors of an increasingly hostile public. As Pound
observed,
we have a great deal oifreie rechtsfmdung in America, while disclaiming it in
theory, and that too in a way that is unhappily destructive of certainty and
uniformity. Not only do lawyers and law-writers perceive this situation, but it is
coming to be understood, in an age of publicity, by the public at large. Necessary
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.he endeavor
.o secure in pracice a freeJorn^fluTcTaTIcl’^n^ZZc^L^d iT'theory, is a prime cause. (1908b, 407).
ii^eacu m
Of course Pound did not wish to strip or limit the court's powers. On the contrary,
he wished to foster and popularize the "spirit of the common law." Therefore, Pound fell
that for this puipose, the best course was to forthrightly acknowledge to the public that
the courts were making laws, and to go on to defend and justify that activity as though it
were more or less normal and universally accepted. Thus, for example, even in his earliest
writings. Pound insisted that throughout history, systems of law have contained alongside
of the "imperative" (legislative) element, an equally essential "traditional” element which
consists of a heritage of customary practices and accepted concepts passed down from
one generation to another of the specially trained legal professionals; that is, the judges
and lawyers. (1915, 353). This is but one example of many theoretical constructs in
Pound's work which seek to establish judicial law-making as a nomi. Pound recognized
that if American jurists did not acknowledge and seek to justify the great powers judges
were wielding, the public might come to feel that the courts had suddenly usurped the law-
making powers which properly belonged to the people’s elected representatives in the
legislatures. (1915, 358).
The legal profession, by and large, eventually agreed with Pound's assessment of
public sentiment and began acknowledging and rationalizing the extraordinary powers
wielded by American judges. But, there was little agreement as to what theory could
justify such powers. Indeed, this theoretical problem has remained a continuing source of
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crisis (actual or potential), for the jud.ciary and legal profess,on. From Pound's t,me to the
present day, American jurisprudence has focused its attention quite disproportionately on
attempting to ra.ional.^e the role of the judge.” Pound attempted to accomplish the task
ofjustification ofjudicial power through recourse to his interest theory of law.
According to Pound, the first task of the judge in deciding a case is to identify the
interests competing therein and to decide which ofthem merit recognition. At this
preliminary stage, Pound believed the judge should have at his disposal a complete listing
(as reasonably possible) of all the various interests that have been recognized in prior
decisions, statutes and other legal authorities, that have warranted legal protection.
While this manner of identifying interests - that is. by culling from actual decisions
of courts, statute books, legal authorities, and so forth - seems highlyjuristic and non-
sociological. Pound believed he was justified and perhaps compelled to resort to this
method because of the lack of agreement among social scientists as to the nature of
'instincts' or any of the other 'social forces' that were being proposed as explanations of
social institutions and arrangements. His argument was, as follows:
There remains a method, less pretentious [than basing interests on instincts], that
may yet yield more enduring results. Legal phenomena are social
phenomena....Why should not the lawyer make a survey of legal systems in order
to ascertain just what claims or wants or demands have pressed or are now
pressing for recognition and satisfaction and how far they have been or are
recognized or secured? This is precisely what has been done in the case of
individual interests, although the process has been concealed by a pretentious
fabric of logical deduction. The same method may be applied to social interests.
For example, H.L.A. Hart has observed that, "I confess I find myself strongly inclined
...to characterize American jurisprudence...by telling you in unqualified terms that it is
marked by a concentration, almost to the point of obsession, on the judicial process "
(Hart 1983, 123).
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jnuyim stoulcl be clone conseiously...wilhonl any cover of melaphysies or logie.
OCconrse, iflhc interests, which were to serve as the p, in,ary determinants ofevalnation,
were derived exelnsively Iron, past or present law, the,e was an inherent prejndiee ,n
evaluation toward maintaining tlic status quo.^^’
I'onnd classilled interests into llnec categories ordemands: pnhlic, social and
individual. The llrsl of these, public interests, involved interests of the stale as an entity;
lor example, laws for collecting taxes and against the hrihing of pnhlic ofllcials. Individiia
interests were those "demands or desires involved immediately in the individual hfc and
asserted in title oflhat life." (l-ound Ih43, 2). As for social interests, the most sign.llcant
category. Pound held that there were basically six, with several sub-headings under each.
Pound's riillcsl discussion came in his 1921 article, "A Theory of,Social Interests," in
which he identified the lundamental social interests to he: in the general security, in the
security of social mslilulions, in Ihc general morals, in Ihc conservation of .social
resources, in general progress, and in the individual life. (1921b, 243-245).
I laving determined what interests are at play and competing in the case, and which
are important for recognition, the judge must next decide how to halance the interests,
one against the other. I hat is, the Judge must decide what principle to apply in order to
dcteimine their relative weights, and which should give way in case ofconllict. On this
point. Pound criticized the efforts of his predecessors: "Social utilitarians would say,
weigh the several interests in terms of the end of law. But have we any given to us
36
This was a point made early on by ITlwin Patterson (1947, 566-567).
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absolutely?" (1922/1954, 46). Rather, Pound had observed that philosophical and juristic
ideas of the purposes of law had varied widely from place to place, and from one era to
the next. Therefore, he rejected the attempt to ’pre-value' interests as an unwarranted
reversion to the absolutism of natural law theories. Instead, Pound maintained that there
must be a new valuation, or weighing, from case to case. In an article from 1913, Pound
observed that "[p]hilosophical jurists have labored to reduce some method of getting at
the intrinsic importance of various interests. They have sought for some absolute formula
whereby we may be assured that the weightier interest intrinsically should prevail. 1 do
not believe in such attempts for a moment." (1913, 765). Nevertheless, Pound did
advance two principles that should be followed in the evaluation process:
The first is that individual interests are to be secured by law only because and to
the extent that they are social interests. There is a social interest in securing
in ividual interests so far as securing them conduces to general security, the
security of social institutions, and the individual moral and social life. Hence while
individual interests are one thing and social interests are another, the law, as I have
said, secures individual interests because of a social interest in so doing. No
individual, therefore, may claim to be secured in an interest that conflicts with any
social interest unless he can show some countervailing social interest in so securing
him-some social interest to outweigh that with which his individual interest
conflicts. The second principle is, secure at all times the greatest number of
interests possible, with the least possible sacrifice of other interests. Interests
change in their incidents, in their intensity, and even in their very nature. Hence
such a principle recognizes that there can be no final work on any point of the law.
The legal system must be kept flexible and law-making must accommodate itself
perennially to shiftings in the quantity and quality of the interest it has to meet
(1913,755-756).
Finally, according to Pound, the three categories of interests were not mutually
exclusive. That is. Pound's view was that any public and any individual interest could be
restated in the form of a social interest. In some sense, he considered social interests to be
simply generalized statements of individual interest. For example, an individual's personal
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.nteres, ,n his property could also be looked at from the standpo.nt of the soc.al mterest in
the security of acquisitions. Moreover, Pound urged that, in most cases, individual
interests should only be protected if restated as social interests. And, Pound warned that
the intrinsic preference of the legal system for social interests over individual ones was
such that m the weighing or balancing of interests in a given case, we must be careful to
compare against each other only interests in the same category: "If we put one as an
individual interest and the other as a soc.al interest we may decide the question in advance
by our very way of putting it." (1921b, 2).
Pound's theory ofjudicial decision as consisting in a free balancing of interests
seemed to serve well two of his highest priorities: It explained the failures of the
absolutistic theones to be adequate to the task of coping with the conflicting forces that
the contemporary courts were ever more compelled to handle; and, it contained an
acknowledgment to the public of what many already knew - that the courts were actively
and consciously making laws.
However, Pound's theory simultaneously created a dilemma which has
continuously plagued modem American jurisprudence. That is, if the ultimate ground of
decision is not strictly legal rules or rights, but the interests which the judge supposes to
lie behind those mles, how can one know whether one's legal rights will be respected?
Moreover, how can one anticipate what interests a judge will deem to lie behind any given
statute, precedent or right,
;
how strongly he will evaluate them; or, to what extent he will
deem them to be involved and in need of protection under the circumstances of the given
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case? Indeed, the whole nc.on of a 'rule of laW seems threatened by Pound’s theory of
interests.
Further. Pound's list of interests was highly speculative; in fact, he periodieally
revised it. And, it was clear that the catalog of interests was only hts opinion as to what
were the most important interests represented and protected in the thousands upon
thousands of volumes of decistons, statutes and commentaries from which he abstracted
them. One of Pound's harshest critics on this point was Karl Llewellyn, who observed:
To be sure, we do not know what interests are. Hence, behind substantive
rights we now have interests [which] we need not check against anything at alland about whose presence, extent, nature and importance, whether the interests betaken absolutely or taken relatively to one another, no two of us seem able to
agree. (1930, 435).
Llewellyn concluded sarcastically, "[t]he scientific advance should.. .be obvious. Complete
subjectivity has been achieved." (1930, 435).
While Llewellyn’s criticisms were sharp and to the point, he was hardly alone in his
negative assessment of Pound's reliance on a theory of interests as the ground for judicial
decision. Many of the charges are familiar ones, yet still have resonance for those who
distrust judicial activism: what justification does a judge have in assuming the authority to
reformulate legal rules according to a purely subjective interpretation of the interests
claimed to lie behind the rules? What control does the public have over the enormous
freedom of the judges to 'reinterpret' the law? And so on. Walter Kennedy, a
conservative Catholic jurist was quick to assail Pound's work, noting that "[i]t does not
suffice to shuffle the mass of wants and claims into a confused pile and then give effect to
as many as we can in so far as harmony will permit." (Kennedy 1925, 71). Nor could
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Pound find theoretical refuge among friends; William James' theory of interests as
demands seemed to provide no basis for ranking one abstract demand above another - all
demands were equally valuable. Pound's attempt to depan from the trad.t.ona, view of the
judge's function as the impartial discovety and application of existing law created the basis
for what H.L.A. Hart would characterize as the "nightmare" of American jurisprudence:
that the traditional image of the politically neutral and objective judge, as distinguished
from the highly politicized legislator, was little more than "an illusion, and that the
expectations which it incites are doomed to disappointment...always...[or] very
frequently.- (Hart 1983, 126). For Hart, this judicial arrogation of legislative powers
suggested "a cynical interpretation of de Toequeville's observation that political questions
in the United States sooner or later become judicial questions." (1983, 126).
Nonetheless, Pound was himself well aware of the inadequacies of this early
attempts at interest balancing. Therefore, we find in Pound's work supplemental
conceptions with which he proposed as theoretical limitations to the extreme expansion of
judicial powers suggested by his conception of interests. Turning from James' neo-
Kantian approach to the evaluation of desires. Pound ultimately advanced a neo-Hegelian
notion that the judge is guided and restrained by certain "jural postulates" of his society or
civilization, and by "received ideals" of the legal profession. The jural postulates of the
time and place, a conception Pound borrowed directly from Josef Kohler, served to play a
stabilizing role for Pound's theory ofjudicial decision by helping to explain how the judge
IS guided by legal standards in his empirical search for new rules of law, even though he
may not base the decision directly on established rules of law. Following Kohler, Pound
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attempted to show that adjudication was not merely a matter of arb.trary or idiosyncrat.c
personal construction. In a passage from Kohler that Pound often referred to, the former
makes this point more clear.
WWl!™’''
*e sociological signifteance of
g. lie we had come to the conviction that it was not the individualwho made history but the totality of the peoples, in law-making we recognized asfficient only the person of the law-maker. We overlooked completely that theaw-maker is the man of his time, thoroughly saturated with the thoughts of histime, thoroughly filled with the culture that surrounds him, that he works with theviews and conceptions which are drawn from his sphere of culture, that he speaks
r nr'ii! history behind them and whose meanings wereIhe sociological process of a thousand years oflinguistic development, and
no hrough the personality of the individuaI....Hence the principle; rules of law are
not to be interpreted according to the thought and will of the law-maker, but are tobe interpreted sociologically, they are to be interpreted as products of the whole
people, whose organ the law-maker has become. (Kohler 1921, 187-189).
Jural postulates, then, were certain general underlying presuppositions which were
unstated, unformulated and perhaps quite unconsciously entertained by a society's legal
system. Although they were unformulated until brought to light by the perceptive jurist,
they were firmly embedded, in fact presupposed, in the theory and practice of a given
society's system of law. According to Pound, the purpose in formulating the jural
postulates was "to formulate what was presupposed by the law as to possession, as to
property, as to legal transactions and resulting relations, and as to wrongs." (1942, 113).
As distinguished from the absolute principles set forth by various natural law theories.
Pound characterized jural postulates as being temporally and culturally contingent, varying
from one society to another and also from one era to another within a given society. Yet,
because the changes in jural postulates would develop gradually, they served to provide a
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desirable blend of stability and eont,nutty. As a eonsequence, they provided the method by
which a judge could value conflict,ng interests and decide whieh to reeogntze.
Another means by which Pound sought to assuage fears of radical judicial
subjectivity was through his identification of the "received ideals" of a given legal order.
(Pound 1923, 953). According to Pound, received ideals were idealized pictures that
judges have in mind regarding the general nature and puqioses of the legal system or of
principles and standards of law. In part, the received ideals are coincident with legal
philosophy, so that, for example, adherents of the "nineteenth century school" of
jurisprudence entertained received ideals of the purpose of law as consisting in the
maximization of liberties of individual human beings considered in the abstract. They
entertained ideals of the nature of the judicial function as a purely passive 'discovering' of
pre-existing precepts. But, according to Pound, received ideals undergo development just
as any other part of the legal system, and he hoped to supplant the now outdated
nineteenth century notions with the new ideals represented by sociological jurisprudence,
wherein the judge is no longer engaged in passive discovery, but becomes a 'social
engineer who actively develops new rules to help govern modem society.
For Pound, the received ideals were part of the law itself, not merely adjuncts to it,
and should be consciously used in the process of decision. He noted that, ”[w]hen such
ideals have acquired a certain fixity in the judicial and professional tradition they are part
of the law quite as much as legal precepts. Indeed, they give the latter their living content
and in all difficult cases are the ultimate basis of ..decision." (1923, 654). Moreover, like
jural postulates, the received ideals change from era to era, and from place to place.
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depending on the peculiar social experiences of the t.me. But, according to Pound,
received ideals are occasionally altered wuhin a given era; hence, they are not to be
understood as static conceptions like those of the 'nineteenth century school' or natural
law theory. Rather, they anse from within legal experience itself, and are not external to
It. Nevertheless, they provide a necessary measure of stability in that they remain
,
for the
most part, constant within a given era. Thus, by means of the concept of 'received ideals'.
Pound hoped to explain how stability and reliability could be maintained simultaneously
with the nexibihty for experimentation and growth that his activist interest theory seemed
to give to the judge.
By introducing jural postulates and received ideals, Pound extended his reliance on
this view in an attempt to bolster his account ofjudicial decision. That is, having
articulated an activist model of adjudication - one of social engineering through judicial
decision - Pound recognized the need to reinvigorate the traditional image of the judge as
impartial discoverer and interpreter of pre-established laws. In explaining that the judge is
m part constrained by such postulates and professional traditions or ideals, constant within
a given era of a society, Pound hoped to reach an acceptable compromise between two
functions of the judge which he thought equally indispensable: One of upholding and
applying the existing system of legality; the other actively to foster developments in the
law. The need for the latter had been clearly evidenced by the Lochnef line of decisions.
The mistake of the courts in those cases, and of their academic allies, was in their one-
sided insistence on the stabilizing function of the courts and of legal doctrine, thereby
ignoring the equally fundamental need for development of the law.
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Pursuing this line of thought to its logical conclusions. Pound eventually attempted
to universalize his conception of the conflicting needs of change and stability in law, and
presented it as the fundamental element of all legal philosophy. He suggested that the
varying balances struck by societies between the dual needs of stability and growth
undergirded and explained the distinct aspects of the five stages of legal history.
Consequently, Pound viewed legal histoiy as a dialectic, propelled forward by alternating
socio-legal concerns for stability and consolidation on the one hand, and growth, change
and reform on the other. The jurists of late nineteenth century America, for example, had
clearly emphasized stability at the expense of growth and reform. According to Pound,
this emphasis had been appropriate to the era of economic consolidation following the
Civil War. But, historical developments of the early twentieth century demanded change
and growth in the laws; a development stifled by various attempts of the courts and jurists
to persist in methods of analysis appropriate to an earlier period in time.
Further, he suggested that it is the "social interest in the general security" which is
responsible for the alternations between the great eras of legal history. The waxing of
society's interest in security, he argued, brought on periods; while the waning of that
interest corresponded to periods of growth and reform. For example, according to Pound,
the crisis of his own era was due to the conflicting pressures brought to bear on the legal
system to remain stable and consistent, on the one hand; and to accommodate new
interests and demands through reforms on the other. The nineteenth century schools
represented the former pressures, while 'sociological jurisprudence' represented the latter.
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Pound gave clear articulat.on ,o this v.ew in h.s lectures a, Cambndge University in the
early 1920s:
Law must be stable, and yet it cannot stand still. Hence all thinking about law hastruggied to reconcile the conflicting demands of the need of stabifity and the needange. The social interest in the general security has led men to seek someixed basis for an absolute ordering of human action whereby a firm and stablesocial order might be assured. But continual changes in the cLurtancefoIlLdemand continual new adjustments to the pressure of other social interests as wellas to new modes of endangering security. Thus the legal order must be flexible as
rdd
-A^ordingly the chiefproblem to which legal thinkers have
essed themselves has been how to reconcile the idea of a fixed body of law,
a ording no scope for individual wilfulness, with the idea of change and growth
and making ofnew law. (1922/1967, 1).
^
As we have seen, Pound early on argued that legal rules, principles and concepts
should not be "imported from an external source of reality beyond," as he alleged the
"nineteenth century schools" had done (that is, Langdell and his progeny). Legal rules
were not to be mechanically derived by deduction from pre-established religions or
idealistic conceptions. Rather, Pound contended that legal rules and concepts arise in the
course of legal experience: they arise in experience and, once formulated, are tested by
experience. Reworking some basic themes in American pragmatism. Pound contended
that the received ideals, as well as the jural postulates, though not so fixed as religious
dogma or idealist precepts, nevertheless did not "impair the certainty and predictability
which are demanded for the general security." On the contrary, "rightly used, the
recognition of these elements makes for a real as distinguished from an illusory, certainty."
(Pound 1936, 81).
For Pound, what was distinctive about both the notion of received ideals, and that
ofjural postulates, was that, while they provided for stability or certainty, such certainty
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was always relative; tha, ,s. i, was ultinra.ely subjeet ,o the changes of a given historical
era. It was stability mthin a gradual process of social and legal change. Both concepts
served as Pound's means of providing for what he saw as the inevitable need for a
compromise between the two. Through them, he believed he had solved, as well as
practically possible, the quest for certainty in the realm of law, without recourse to the
Illusory goal of the natural law and historical schools ofjurisprudence: discovery of
immutable legal principles.
It would seem, then, that Pound turned to the concepts of received ideals andjural
postulates in order to demonstrate that the freedom of the judge - a freedom implied in
Pound's earlier emphasis on a theory of interests - was only apparent, while in actuality
quite delimited. That is, the judge theoretically exercises some or all of his functions as
interest-balancer' (recognizing interests, weighing interests, delimiting interests, enforcing
interests), against a background of relatively stable standards and principles (jural
postulates and received ideals), established by a given civilization's legal system and, more
importantly, its legal profession. In this way, the general security is maintained despite the
inevitable changes brought about through judicial decision. This is the compromise
between the need for stability and the need for change. According to Pound,
[ijdeal pictures of the social order and of the end of law are means of directing and
organizing the growth of the law so as to maintain the general security... [and] are
guides to lead growth into definite channels and insure a reasonable continuity and
permanence in the development of rules and doctrines. ( 1923 , 657 ).
Yet, Pound clearly recognized that such received ideals could only serve their function of
stabilization if there was widespread agreement upon their content among the legal
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n. Thus, he urged his colleagues to "learn how to supply substantially the same
ideal picture to all our magistrates." (1923, 662)
What is implicit in Pound’s theory, however, is no, only an unquestroning
acceptance of an important role for the legal profession in the maintenance of social
stability and order, but a valorization of the judiciary as the focal point of legal certainty
and professional development. Clearly, the great powers or freedoms accorded to the
Judiciary have been a centuries-old characteristic of the common law system. But Pound
endeavored to enhance an already powerful position.
Much more explicit in Pound’s work was his struggle to achieve a theoretical
reconciliation of the conflict between judicial power and the democratic freedoms he
ostensibly championed m his critique of loc/me.-era decisions. Pound’s concern was not
with expanding the sphere of democratic accountability, however; rather, he was nearly
obsessive in his single-minded concern to preserve and enhance the status and authority of
the legal profession. Against the backdrop of the Supreme Court’s persistent nullification
of popularly supported progressive legislation, as in Lochner, Pound suggested an analysis
of the underlying problem as a conflict arising from the differing ideals of law held by the
people and by the legal profession. (Pound 1912, 227).
Pound suggested, on the other hand, that the people - standing on the classical
American ideals of democracy - held that the law of the land was what they willed it to be,
so long as that ‘will’ was duly expressed in a democratic and constitutional manner
through their state and federal legislatures. On the other hand, judges and lawyers, trained
in the history of the common law, viewed the premises and fundamental doctrines of
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const,tutional democracy as little more than restatements of pre-existing, eternal and
universal pnnc.ples ofjustice and right, which had long been recogn,^ed and protected by
various institutions and doctrines of the common law. Among these common law
principles were the classical conceptions associated with the rise of capitalism; freedom of
property, freedom of contract, and a number of political liberties and rights.
From the legal profession’s perspective, according to Pound, such principles were
so embedded in the legal traditions ofcommon law jurisdictions that even the United
States Constitution was to be considered as, in essence, a recapitulation of those principles
and corresponding nghls. Legislative enactments inconsistent with such fundamental
principles must, then, be set aside.” The courts, therefore, assumed it to be their duty to
discover such inconsistencies and nullify the offending statutes. According to Pound, both
sides - lay public and the legal profession - believed, in good faith, that they were acting
according to the law, and that the other was unjustifiably interfering with the exercise of
its lawful powers. ( 1912 , 227 ).
To suggest a way of reconciling this apparent conflict of legal ideals, Pound drew
an analogy from British political history; the struggle between Lord Coke and King James
I. Coke had been able to curb the powers of the monarch by proclaiming that the king’s
rule was not absolute, but subject to "God and the common law." Although James
objected that law was nothing more than reason, and he could perceive and deploy reason
as well as anyone, ultimately he was forced to concede that only the judiciary had the
^^This understanding was encapsulated in the familiar interpretive reference that statutes
in derogation of the common law were void.
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practiced wisdom to understand the intricac.es of the “artilicial reason" on which the
common law was based. In praettce. this meant that the king must defer to the judicial
detemrinahons of the courts. This, as Pound po.n.s out, marked the establishment of the
doctrine, integral to the common law, known as "supremacy of the law."
What is important about Pound’s retelling of this familiar piece of English legal
history is no. so much his reminder of the origins ofjudicial supremacy, but his analyt.eal
confiation of the two sovereigns. Specincally, Pound argued that, in disputing the court’s
common law powers, the contemporary public had adopted the same untenable position
taken by King James. Certainly, Pound’s historical analogy is objectionable on a number
of levels. What interests me here, however, is not the questionable character of such a
comparison m and of itself. Rather, I am more concerned to suggest that the very fact of
putting the question as such, and the lessons Pound then draws from his analogy, reveal a
good deal about his understanding of the role of legal expertise under conditions I have
described as those of legal modernism - conditions of uncertainty and complexity in the
law - and the corresponding threat such conditions posed for the continuing authority of
the legal profession.
Here, I would argue. Pound is explicit in his concern to justify and protect the
privileged position of the judiciary, and with that, to make a claim for the expertise and
status of the legal profession as a whole. Having succeeded to the king’s position of
sovereignty. Pound argued, the American public must bow, as did the king, to the special
expertise of the judges in interpreting the traditionally received principles of reason, justice
and liberty, which were supposed to inhere in the common law. Insofar as law, drawn by
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the judges from common law sources, conflicts with dentocratic law enacted by the will of
the people, i, is the latter. Pound contended, that must give way. He observed
.ha,
'[mjere will, as such, has never been able to maintain itself as law. The complaint of our
sovereign peoples that their will is disregarded must be put beside the querulous outburst
ofJames I, ‘Have I not reason as well as my judges?’" (1912, 231). Recognizing a
conflict between popular will and legal authority. Pound’s attempt at resolution seems
rather one-sided in favor of the privileged claims of expertise. His conclusions regarding
reconciliation of any such tensions lay not in favor of expanding the sphere of democratic
contestation over the meaning and application of law. Rather, for Pound, "the way out
hes in strong courts with full powers of doing justice, guided by the law-giver, but not
hampered by an infinity of rules, the full effect whereof in action no one can hope to
foresee." (1912, 231).
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CHAPTER 5
FREEDOM, CONSTRAINT, AND THE CREATIVE ROLE OF THE .IIJDCE-CARDOZO AND COMMON LAW ADJUDICATION
It often has been argued that the rule of law is essential to the preservation of
individual freedom and the maintenance of a viable and legitimate democratic political
order. Proponents of the rule of law ideal identity its principal virtue as the guarantee of
neutrality, uniformity, and predictability in the formulation and application of the law.
(See, e.g., Raz 1983, 210-229). In common law countries, the rule of law is often
associated with the concept ofs,an decisis, or the rule of precedent. Further, because the
Anglo-American legal system is, in its origins, a common law system, the role of the judge
-- m particular, the appellate judge - assumes a place of central importance.^* The
concept of the rule of law serves as an ordering principle for the legal system. In deciding
a case, judges must apply and rationally elaborate upon the appropriate pre-existing rules,
established precedent, and settled legal principles. Most adherents to the rule of law ideal
concede that this is not a mechanical process; yet, adjudication is nonetheless alleged to be
constrained under a process that is governed by the basic elements of neutrality,
objectivity and rationality. Consequently, legal determinations are understood to be
relatively determinate and free from the arbitrary exercise of power - judges apply the
law, they do not create it. The judiciary mediates the exercise of political power, but does
not initiate its deployment; power is thereby constrained and ultimately dissolved in law.
^*See Posner (1990, viii), where he identifies the appellate judge as "the central figure in
Anglo-American jurisprudence."
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However, since the emergence of the Realist movement in American legal thought,
if not before, the rebuttal to this ‘classical’ vision has remained fairly consistent: iudicial
decision-making is rationally determinate; there is no distinct mode of legal reasoning
that is separable from political tdeology; the theoretical d.stinction between the legal and
the political should be. and is, collapsed. Contemporary critical legal theorists who urge a
renewal of the Realist project, argue that the inherent indeterminacy of language in
general, and legal rules in particular, justifies doubts about the determinacy of any legal
system and the exercise of power legitimated through reference to such a system. The
basic argument is that, to the extent that a legal system rests on a foundation of
determinate rules and their application, it thus becomes necessary for that legal system to
rebut this form of rule-skepticism to claim legitimacy.
The claim that law is not an autonomous sphere of activity, separate from the
realm of politics, problematizes the traditional understanding of the judge as a neutral
arbiter of legal disputes, objectively identifying and applying the law to a given factual
situation. Rather, the rule of law, from such a skeptical perspective, seems little more than
an ideological cover for the arbitrary and unconstrained exercise of political power.
Indeed, contemporary champions of the rule of law ideal, such as Ronald Dworkin,
contend that legitimate government under law is impossible if the law is substantially
indeterminate. (Dworkin 1977, 84). Bringing the original Realist position into sharper
political focus, contemporary critical legal theorists maintain that legal indeterminacy or
uncertainty is evidence for their claim that the rule of law is little more than an elaborate
ruse, the pretense of legality masks the extent to which systematic bias and prejudice affect
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Judicial decisio„-„u,king. Ci.i.ens arc (hereby
.rrisicc, ahou,
,|,e aeu.al reaso.rs ,hr (hei,
oppression and are (hereCore r, nr,hie (dens (heir resis(anee and rescn„nen( npon (he real
cause of their suffering.
In a,nlM,ukrn SociCy (1976, 192). Rr,l,er(o Mangabeira linger idenrillerl (he
ccmral role legal analysis plays in any erilieal assessn.em ol lhe liberal (henry of (he rnle o
law: "A(, r(ndcrs(anding of liberal soeiely illnminales, arrd is illn,nina(ed by, ar, awareness
orihal society's legal order and legal ideals, l or (he rnle of law has been (rnly said (o he
(he soni of,he nrodern slate. Ihe stndy of (he legal sy.s(em lakes us straighi (o (he ceniral
problems faced by Ihe society Uself." Yet, according l„ linger, the very nainre of
conicmporary liberal .society "predisposes men lo struggle for the rule oflaw ideal al Ihe
same lime that it keeps them Irom fully achieving this ideal." ( 1976, 67-68). That is, on
the one hand, lear of uneonstrained governmental power and of our fellow citizens — the
desire lor individual freedom and politieal order - suggests the neeessity to struggle for
the rule ol law. While, on the other hand, the inherent subjectivity of adjudication
suggests the impossibility of achieving the ideal. In Unger’s analysis, the simultaneous
longing for both freedom and order, is characteristie of the modernist predicament. (See
Unger 1980). The recognition, indeed the obsession with, judicial subjectivity emerged as
well, as I have argued above, in the modernist era. fhis was, of eourse, part ol'a larger
shift in emphasis, Irom Ihe late nineteenth century on, to the aesthetie, ethical and political
ramilications of cognitive modernism (i.e., radical, or unconstrained, subjectivity).
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The Realist Backdrop to Cardozo’s Thought
The intellectual historian, H. Stuart Hughes, identified an ‘intellectual revolution'
which began in the 1890s, and set the terms of social thought for the twentieth century.
At the center of the revolution was the problem o{ consciommss. According to Hughes,
“tt was the period in which the subjective attitude of the observer of society first thrust
itself forward in peremptory fashion.” (Hughes 1961, 15). Subjectivity “presented an
essentially cognitive problem: the disparity between external reality and the internal
appreciation of that reality.” (Hughes 1961, 16).
In the legal field, the question of subjectivity emerged most prominently in the
form of the debate between formalists and their critics over the nature ofjudicial decsion-
making. American Legal Realists devoted much time and effort to an exposition and
understanding of legal doctrine as the product of an epistemologically-situated subject.^^
In short, the realist argument was that a given legal determination was authorized by
political power and was not the necessary product of an abstract, rational determination;
another judge, with another political position, may well have provided another legal
outcome. The realists urged a complete subordination of objective sources of law,
privileging the political ideology and personal idiosyncracies of the individual judge,
deciding the particular case then before him. The slogan, “law is what judges do in fact,”
became a legal shorthand for their ‘new’ recognition ofjudicial subjectivity. They rejected
the importance attached by previous legal theorists to rules and principles as actual
take this to be at the heart of the old claim, all law is politics', that is, doctrine does not
flow in some rational process from a neutral and objective judicial determination, but is
largely dependent on how the judge sees the world.
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determinants of deciston. For example, in a frequently cited arttcle, Joseph Btngham
observed that ‘•[a]!! the amb.tious attempts to define [,aw]...agree that it consists of a
system of rules and principles enforced by political authority. I believe that this idea is
fundamentally erroneous and that it is a bar to a scientific understanding of our law and its
particular problems.” (Bingham 1912, 3). And, in one of the founding documents of the
Realist movement, Karl Llewellyn contended that “the use of precepts, or rules...as the
center of reference in thinking about law, is a block to clear thinking about matters
legal....[R]ules of substantive law are of far less importance than most legal theorizers
have assumed.” (Llewellyn 1930, 431, 442). Or, in Jerome Frank’s view, the traditional
emphasis of American law and legal thought on rules and principles was due to a “childish
need” for an “unrealizable certainty.” (Frank 1930/1970, 21)
Thus, at the heart of the realist position was a thoroughgoing juristic subjectivism.
Expanding on Pound’s work, yet in many ways critical of it as well, the realists derogated
the importance of the objective sources of the law, while simultaneously elevating the
importance of the subjective role of the judge. Where Pound had urged a recognition of
the fact ofjudicial creativity, so too Frank contended that judges should openly
acknowledge their freedom and thereby take responsibility for the creative role they
inevitably play in the development of the law:
The pretense, the self-delusion, that when [judges] are creating they are
borrowing, when they are making something new they are merely applying the
commands given them by some external authority, cannot but diminish their
efficiency. They must rid themselves of this reliance on a non-existent guide, they
must learn the virtue, the power and the practical worth of self-authority
(1930/1970, 121).
154
Curiously, the Realists presented as a novel discovery the fact that judges are
rarely bound by common law precedents, and are in fact largely free to man.pulate
preeedents iojustify the outcome they destre. This great ‘discovery’ had of course been
made even more forcefully by Jeremy Bentham more than ,50 years earlier. Indeed, the
realists seemed unaware of the view that the attempt to crystallize and organize common
law ‘rules’ was a development owing more to the Langdellian efforts to confront chaos
and uncertainty in the law. Instead, the realists maintained that judicial subjectivity was
inevitable and, therefore, that the only meaningful focus of study was judicial behavior,
method and technique.
The question that emerges from a rehearsal of this familiar engagement is to ask of
the effect of openly invoking the problem of certainty in the law; that is, does realism
ultimately endanger its own claim to truth by repeatedly calling attention to the 'fictive'
Status ofjudicial reason. I would suggest instead, that the result of this process of
demystification was not enlightenment, but simply to defuse the critical tension inherent to
the problems ofjudicial power. In short, the realist argument served to reinstantiate the
power of the American judiciary. Their 'radicalism' tended to conceal the fact that they
were, because of their institutional location and academic concerns, ultimately little more
than apologists for the Anglo-American tradition ofjudicial supremacy. Just as Pound's
'radicalism' was better understood as advocacy of a more far-sighted adjustment by the
legal profession to the incursions of the legislature than those most of his colleagues were
prepared to make at the turn of the century, so the later realist critiques were a renewed
attempt to justify and maintain professional hegemony in the face of an increasingly
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insistent ba.age of popular legislation. As Bruce Ackemtan has observed, the reahsts
were "profoundly conservative, not tconoelasttc. Rather than transfomnng traditional
legal discourse, the realist critique allowed the profession to survive the New Deal without
restructuring its basic conceptual equipment." (Ackerman 1984, 5).
In criticizing the formalism and rigidity of the ‘nineteenth century’ schools of
jurisprudence, Roscoe Pound had already stressed that there was more to law than rules
and principles. Besides the substantive doctrinal content of legal rules, the law, according
to Pound, also consisted of methodology and purpose. Relying on Pound’s initial insights,
but moving beyond them, the reahsts suggested little relevance for legal doctrine, in a
substantive sense, and urged that it be pushed into the background in any critical analysis
of the law and legal system. And, although most realists accepted Pound’s argument that
law exists for social purposes, that is, as a means to accomplish those ends, they rejected
Pound’s suggestion that it was the responsibility ofjurists to determine what the goals and
purposes of the law should be. Following Llewellyn’s (and Holmes’) lead, the realists
maintained the need for a separation of is and ought, contending that normative evaluation
was outside the scope of a truly rea/A/ jurisprudence. Instead, the dominant realist
position was that the principal concern of legal analysis should be the scientific study of
techniques and methods used by judges in their production of legal doctrine.
This criticism of, and apparent move away from. Pound’s attention to the
purposive elements of the law - and the role of the legal profession in its development -
was important, but not as significant as it might at first seem. That is, I would suggest
that the realist position simply subsumed Pound’s valorization of the common law and
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tant centering of the judge into a quest for an empirical understanding oftliis
process. The realists sought to focus attention on the question ofjudicial method.
Methodology, until then, had largely been neglected. Yet. with the innuence of Holmes’
work, it had slowly but steadily come to the foreground. By the |.)20s, it had become an
object of principal concent for realist scholars. (See, e.g.. Summers 1982, 136).
According to Bruce Ackerman, "[w]hat was desperately required was a method by
which one might coniinue talking in largely traditional ways about particular disputes
without raising the large abstractions that had gotten the common law into such political
troubles. It was precisely this that Realism could offer the profession." (Ackerman 1984,
1 7). This emphasis on method rellected the Realist’s awareness that the Anglo-American
judge was free to dominate the doctrinal elements of law through professional techniques
of adjudicatton. Although such domination had been argued for at least since Coke’s
elaims on behalf of the ‘artidcial reason’ of the law, the realist-inspired emphasis on
method should be understood as an integral part of the development of the discourse of
legal modernism; a discourse that was constituted by, and in turn constituted the changing
nature of professional authority and legal expertise that began with Holmes, was
developed by Pound, and would come to fruition in the 1920s and 1930s.
In his influential essay. Modernist Painting," Clement Greenberg contends that
[t]he essence of Modernism lies. ..in the use of the characteristic methods of a discipline
to criticize the discipline itself, not in order to subvert it, hut to entrench it morefirmly in
its area ofcompetence." (Greenberg 1966, 101. My emphasis). This is, 1 believe, both the
impulse behind, and the effect of the realist emphasis on judicial method. Although
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Greenberg’s analysis is devoted to modernism m painting, it is nevertheless useful as a way
of getting at a type of cntical thought exemplified m legal realism. Greenberg observes
[mlodemism used art to call attention to art. The limitations that constitute themedium of painting - the flat surface, the shape of the support, the properties ofpigmen - were treated by the Old Masters as negative factors that could be
acknowledged only implicitly or indirectly. Modernist painting has come to regard
096^^1 02
acknowledged openly.
The realist disparagement of the importance of legal doctrine is, in many ways, similar to
Greenberg’s characterization of modernist art. Initiated by Holmes, adopted and
promoted by Pound, it consisted of a vigorous attack on the role of conceptual categories.
Such categories merely served a mystifying function and inhibited a direct examination of
the law-making process. Corresponding to this was an elevation of the role of experience.
The abstract was denigrated at the expense of the concrete; the universal derided in favor
of the particular; the general displaced by an emphasis on the narrow or specific.
Ultimately, products of thought were discredited, while those things that could be
observed were privileged. Finally, the claim for connections among things and events was
deemphasized in favor of an understanding of discontinuity and the uniqueness of each
event.
This empiricist attitude permitted the realists to justify a disdain for the
conceptualistic jurisprudence of Langdell and other formalists. However, there was also
an inevitable tendency toward the valorization of subjectivity, an emphasis on the ad hoc
nature of adjudication, and, ultimately, a justification ofjudicial freedom. Bruce
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Ackemian seems correct, then, to have stressed the essentially conservative nature of
realism, while fully acknowledging its liberal attitude towards the reform legislation of the
New Deal. While accepting such legislation in a partieularist way, realist methodology
thwarted any movement toward the development or expansion of doctrinal content or
principles of the New Deal. Instead, it pushed to the center of attention the principle of
juristic empmcism; the result was to privilege the continued domination of the legal
profession - judge and lawyer. The realist flight to particularism, to narrowness, to
minute inspection and observation, served, then, to deflect attention from the ideological
conflicts which were a part of the historical crises to which the New Deal ostensibly was
directed.
In another context, Georg Lukacs defended literary realism (specifically, socialist
realism), against abstract expressionism by observing that
[gjreat realism...does not portray an immediately obvious aspect of reality but one
which is permanent and objectively more significant, namely man in the whole
range of his relations to the real world, above all those which outlast mere fashion.
Over and above that, it captures tendencies of development that only exist
incipiently and so have not yet had the opportunity to unfold their entire human
and social potential. (1977, 48).
To dwell on the surface of things, as much of legal realism was content to do, privileging
the immediacy of (visual) experience, inevitably renders the object of analysis, according
to Lukacs, "opaque, fragmentary, chaotic, and uncomprehended.
"
(Lukacs 1977, 39).
Certainly, legal realism - at least its most prominent exponents - recognized the reality of
judicial creativity and the resulting uncertainty of the law. Yet, it might be the case that
they failed to truly probe the depths ofjudicial freedom', the impact ofjudicial subjectivity
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on the process of decision. A plausible rendering of realist work may be that their purpose
was not to celebrate the possibilities of legal uncerta.nty, but to demonstrate how the old
claims to certainty were grounded in myth - the myth of fomialist reasoning and the false
efficacy of coneeptualistic legal categories. Yet, this process of demystification was only
the first step in the process of forging a new, more empirically sound, legal certainty.
Turning again to Lukacs’ work on literary realism, perhaps we can get some hint
of what legal realists were gesturing towards: "to penetrate the laws governing objective
reality and to uncover the deeper, hidden, mediated, not immediately perceptible network
of relationships that go to make up society." (1977, 38). Lukacs goes on to observe,
however, that
[sjince these relationships do not lie on the surface, since the underlying laws only
make themselves felt in very complex ways and are realized only unevenly, as
trends, the labour of the realist is extraordinarily arduous, since it has both an
artistic and an intellectual dimension. Firstly, he has to discover these relationships
intellectually and give them artistic shape. Secondly, although in practice the two
processes are indivisible, he must artistically conceal the relationships he has just
discovered through the process of abstraction....This twofold labour creates
immediacy, one that is artistically mediated. (1977, 39).
Ifwe use Lukacs’ insights into the critical potential of literary realism as something
of a heuristic construct by which to evaluate legal realism, then I believe the latter work
tends to come up short in the comparison. This is so I think because of the realist
emphasis on an empirical posture. In this sense, I would suggest that a more compelling
exponent of the realist position is, somewhat ironically, Benjamin Cardozo40; ironic
because Cardozo is not generally considered to be a part of the realist movement.
‘^“Although, as we will see below, Cardozo ultimately relies on a rather nebulous ‘social
science’ to rescue some of the potential problem areas of ‘sociological adjudication’.
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Moreover, he was subjected to a rather snide and condescend.ng critique a, the hands of
one of realism’s central figures - Jerome Frank. And, Cardozo, devoted the bulk of one
of his final, and most important, extra-judicial works to a critique of "neo-realism," as he
called it. (Cardozo 1932/1947). Yet, in that same piece - an address to the New York
State Bar Association - Cardozo ultimately identifies his own work with the realist
movement. Nevertheless, Richard Posner justified his decision to "pass over" those
thinkers traditionally identified with American legal realism in his treatment of American
jurisprudence for the following reason: "At least about the large questions of
jurisprudence...the legal realists had little to say that Holmes and Cardozo had not said
earlier." (Posner 1990, 20). Obviously, this does not settle the matter. Perhaps, however,
it does lend some support to my decision to characterize realism as a form of legal
thought, or way of talking about the law, that emerged sometime before the published
work of those who were, perhaps, more self-conscious of this jurisprudential
development. And, perhaps, it lends some support for my decision to end the discussion
of this line of legal thought with an examination of Benjamin Cardozo, who, I believe, best
understood the problem ofjudicial subjectivity and, in response, provided the most
interesting attempt to come to terms with its implications - a problem that I see as
occupying the heart of what I have tried to characterize as legal modernism', a problem
that still drives much work in American jurisprudence.
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Cardozo and the Common Law Judge
In his theoretical writings, Cardozo, like Pound, attempted to maintain the
authority of the common law against the perceived threat oflegislative encroachment.
More specifically, Cardozo sought to enhance the role of the judiciary in the governing of
a society in a state of flux. Cardozo’s work suggests both a conception of the common
law’s role in society and an argument as to how the judiciary - the appellate bench in
particular - should fulfill that role. As such, it provides an implicit framework for the role
of the lawyer in society as well.
Underlying much of Cardozo’s extra-judicial work was the understanding that the
United States was a pluralistic, continuously developing society. Such an observation is
not particularly profound; yet, it is important to the development of Cardozo’s
jurisprudence. According to Cardozo, fundamental social norms are never fully shared
among citizens within the larger political community. Nor are they static over time.
Instead, they reside within the continuous flux of social and political development. This
conception of society entailed an integral function for the common law. That is, for
Cardozo, the common law ought to articulate and enforce that limited set of norms that
citizens in a pluralistic and evolving society do hold in common at any given time. More
importantly, according to Cardozo, the principal task of the common law judge - the
appellate judge in particular - is to restate ]\isi what those shared beliefs are, thereby
enabling citizens to recognize and reaffirm what it is that they hold in common.
The attempt to confront two fundamental problems in the law drove much of
Cardozo s theoretical work. The first was the problem posed for a common law.
162
precedem-based system by the proliferation of eonilicting preeedent. A problem, as I have
suggested above, eoncemed mueh of the aeademie and practicing bar from the 1870s
onward. The second problem was that caused by the continual transformation of the
social order m which all law operates. For example, Cardozo opened his 1923 lectures at
the Yale Law School with the following observation:
In 'Tif ‘he need of some restatement
t V 1
certainty and order out of the wilderness of precedent This is thetask of legal seienee. The second is the need of a philosophy that will n^^^d at
The first problem complicated the task of both judge and lawyer and threatened to reveal
inconsistency or worse, contradiction, in the process of common law adj udication, thereby
calling into question the legitimacy of the entire system ofjustice. For Cardozo, however,
the nature of the problem suggested its response; that is, the need for some mechanism by
which jurists could catalogue and classify legal doctrine and thus scientifically manage
access to relevant legal precedent. Cardozo’s first attempt at a resolution to this problem
was his call for a "Ministry of Justice" (1921) and, ultimately, would find him giving full
support to the Restatement project launched by the newly formed American Law Institute.
The second problem, in part subsuming the first, called for efforts beyond the
taxonomic tasks assumed for the Restatements. That is, beyond the categorization of
already existing precedent - the job of legal science - there was also a need for legal
philosophy; a need arising from forces external to the law itself In his "Address to the
New York State Bar Association," Cardozo observed that the felt need of contemporary
jurists to find refuge in philosophy "has its origin in causes more profound and
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fundamental [than the] avalanche of precedents." (Cardozo 1932/1947, 8). Rather, it
emerged as "a response to the agitations and the promptings of a changing civilization
demanding outlet and expression in changing forms of law and a jurisprudence and
philosophy adequate to justify the changes." (1932/1947, 8). Law and society required a
philosophical jurisprudence which was capable of understanding and explaining the
"growth of the law;" one responsive to the needs of reconciling the apparently conllicting
demands between rest and motion," and "stability and progress." (Cardozo 1928/1947,
252).
Cardozo's ideas concerning the need for a "principle of growth" is best understood
within his larger framework of how the law functions. According to Cardozo, the
problem of the law’s growth cannot be fully grasped without lirst having some
understanding of the law’s social origins. (1923/1947, 247). That is, Cardozo viewed the
common law as the codification of norms of behavior that were traditionally observed by
people within their respective societies. For example, in The Nature ofthe Judicial
Process, Cardozo suggests that "[Ijife casts the moulds of conduct, which will some day
be fixed as law. Law preserves the moulds, which have taken the form and shape from
life." (1921/1947, 132). These norms, in turn, refiect behavioral patterns that have proven
useful to social groups overtime. (1921/1947, 150).
According to Cardozo, at any moment in history, many of these norms will be
widely endorsed by, and enforced among, members of a given social group. For example,
m Paradoxes ofLegal Science, he notes that "[t]here are certain forms of conduct which
at any given place and epoch are commonly accepted under the combined influence of
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reason, practice and tradition, as moral or immoral." (1928/1947, 274). Consequently,
these norms create widely shared expectations of how one ought to behave. Depaitur.
from expected behavior will be condemned and, perhaps, fonnally sanctioned. Yet,
Cardozo denied that societies share, or that they should adopt, any one set of nonns.
Rather, he believed that the norms that govern individual's lives are historically and
geographically contingent: "The forms of conduct...are not the same a, all times or in all
places." (1928/1947, 274). Moreover, it was not simply that norms of moral obligation
were specific to certain times and places, but that this cultural web of expectations and
obligations - inculcated in individuals through formal education and less formal
expressions of public opinion - constituted the very identity of a given social group.
(1928/1947, 282-283). For Cardozo, then, individuals may lead seemingly atomistic
existences; nonetheless, they always live within the existing structures of society and not in
isolation from them. (1928/1947, 305-306).
Cardozo insisted, then, that "[l]aw accepts as the pattern of its justice the morality
of the community." (1928/1947, 274). A community, for Cardozo, was any social group
that shared norms defining the obligations owed by individual members to one another in
their social interactions. Such norms, in modem, industrializing societies, were not fixed,
but varied in several important respects: between different communities at the same time,
and within the same communities across time. Further, Cardozo recognized that modem
American communities were, somewhat paradoxically, heterogeneous. Relying on the
work of the sociologist Albion Small, Cardozo suggested that American communities
form "a union of disunions, a conciliation of conflicts, a harmony of discords."
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(1928/1947, 306). That is, Cardozo sought to stress the inherent plurality of communities;
yet. it was a pluralism that existed always w.thin a larger unity. Further still, he hoped to
identify the continual process of evolution communities. Both perspectives
informed Cardozo’s understanding of the importance of the common law in social and
political life and determined, in large measure, his views on the role and function of the
common law judge.
Cardozo’s work is informed, then, by a particular image of social life; the basic
idea of which IS that members of a given society recognize certain norms that m turn
define the obligations citizens owe to one another. These norms establish expectations
about how people ought to behave in various circumstances. Traditionally, according to
Cardozo, these expectations were reinforced by means of education, indoctrination, or the
sanction of community opinion. However, with the complexity ofmodem society, we
have developed laws and legal institutions to arbitrate and settle definitively the content of
these obligations. Even so, these laws will naturally tend to enforce those obligations that
have gamed a certain standing and recognition within a community. As Cardozo observes
in Paradoxes ofLegal Scienee, "[t]he judge, so far as freedom of choice is given to him.
tends to a result that attaches legal obligations to the folkways, the norms or standards of
behavior exemplified in the life about him." (1928/1947, 260).
Importantly, however, when norms of obligation are incorporated into the
common law, they gain a special status. That is, once these norms are written into a
judicial decision, the naturally coercive power of public opinion is reinforced by the
greater coercive power of the state. Thus, for Cardozo, "[djuties that had been conceived
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of as moral only, w.thou, other human sanction than the opinion of society, are found to
be such that they may effectively and wisely be subjected to another fom, of sanct.on, the
power of society. (1928/1947, 277), The common law, Cardozo observed,
,s that part of
customao. behav.or tha, has been "stamped tn the judical min, as law, and thereafter
circulate[s] freely as part of the coinage of the realm." (1923/1947, 199),
As a matter of description, then, Cardozo seemed to believe that the law generally
reftecs historically recognized nonns of obligation. More importantly, Cardozo no, only
though, tha, the common law does reflect and enforce community standards of obhgat.on;
he believed tha, i, ought to: "Law accepts as the pattern of „s just.ce the moral.,y of the
community whose conduct it assumes to regulate." (1928/1947, 274). Given this
perspective, for Cardozo, the proper role of the common law judge is to articulate those
obligations observed and respected by the community. That is, he assumes the ability of
the judge to recognize and interpret the ‘social text’ in which a given community’s moral
beliefs have been inscribed. While this might initially suggest a monolithic view of social
life, Cardozo insisted that any given community is inevitably pluralistic and constantly
evolving over time. Thus, the task for the common law judge is to determine the point at
which he goes beyond simply enforcing obligations widely recognized and followed in the
community, and starts to impose an artificial orthodoxy. The task is to determine which
among the full range of moral duties recognized by different groups deserve legal
recognition. To assist them in the accomplishment of this task, Cardozo recommended
that judges "follow, or strive to follow, the principle and practice of the men and women
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of .he comnn.„i.y „ho„
.he social mind would rank as in.elligen, and virtuous.
(1928/1947, 274).
Stanley Brubaker (1979) has characterized this position as a form of Platonic
perfectionism. Brubaker portrays Cardozo as believing that the puprose of law in a libera,
and democratic society is to define, articulate, and enforce the standards of intelligence
and virtue prevalent among the noblest portion of the citizenry. By enforcing the code of
conduct endorsed by such a group, society itself "rank[s] as intelligent and virtuous;" and
law acts a s a mechanism for imposing the norms of the society's most developed persons
on society as a whole. (Brubaker 1979, 250). For Brubaker, ”[,]he social mind in
Cardozo's jurisprudence...has as its final cause the cultivation of in.elligen. and virtuous
people." (1979, 250).
Such an interpretation certainly gains some support from Cardozo’s many
addresses to lawyers and law students, wherein he maintains that, at its best, the practice
of law both requires nobility of character and ennobles its practitioners. (See, e.g.,
Cardozo 1939/1947). However, I think these impulses may be better understood within
the context of the Progressive-era politics which Cardozo subscribed to, with its emphasis
on government by experts and of a type of moral perfectionism that seemed to undergird
many efforts at social and political reform. Moreover, Cardozo rarely seems to suggest
that it is the duty of the common law judge to contribute to the common perfection of the
citizenry. Rather, for Cardozo, in a pluralistic and democratic community, the state
cannot hope to impose a comprehensive view of human perfection on a citizenry whose
moral views often diverge. In this sense, I think that Brubaker fails to appreciate the
168
ambiguity in Cardozo’s thought. Moreover. Brubaker tgnores the modernist elements
driving Cardozo-s attempt to work through the relationship between state and individual
wtlhin the context of a legal order. That ,s. Brubaker discounts the real intportanee of
pluralism, and its implications, to Cardozo’s thought. The notion of pluralism within a
larger union reBected Cardozo's attempt to identify and control certain antinomies
fundamental to modem life which are reflected in the title, Paradoxes ofLegal Seicce.
There, Cardozo attempts to provide the theoretical foundation from which the common
law judge could recognize and, thereby, constrain the tension between individual and
society, stability and growth, freedom and restraint.
For Cardozo, ”[t]he state exists to subordinate to law, and thereby to order and
coherence, the rivalries and struggles of its component groups and individuals. It is thus,
m the words of [Albion] Small ‘a union of disunions, a conciliation of connicts, a harmony
ofdiscords’." (1928/1947. 306). The law's function, then, is to maintain a peaeeful
coexistence; common law judges are to strive to enforce a standard of decent conduct that
reflects a minimum ethical code to which all members of a pluralistic community can
subscribe. That is, law, for Cardozo, must identify "a minimum ethics, that is to say the
whole combined requirements of morals, whose observance, at a given stage of social
development, is absolutely indispensable." (1928/1947, 277). If the citizens in a pluralistic
community cannot agree about many questions of religion or morality, they can and do
agree that, as they go about their individual lives, they ought to treat each other according
to certain standards of respect and care. According to Cardozo, the common law
functions well when it captures those standards in its rules and finds points of agreement
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that can bind the diverse membership of the community. In his estimate, the principal
function ofjudges was "not to transfonn civilization, but to regulate and order i,
(1928/1947, 286).
Language and the Judicial Function
Cardozo’s conception of the common law’s function may be further elaborated by
considering why he thought the proper use of language was vital to the realization of ,ts
funetion. In this way we can gain a better understanding of his basic notion that judges
articulate those norms that form the core of their respective communities.
Law IS expressed through language, but it is not something separate from
language. It does not exist prior to or outside of language; instead, it structures the very
reality it then seeks to describe. That is, legal language not only describes a given legal
relationship; it creates it as well. Thus, legal language is both descriptive and instrumental.
Indeed, it is this instrumental charaeter of legal language that poses the difficulties w.th
which Cardozo seeks to engage. Legal language is articulated in response to concrete
situations. And, it is beeause the outcome of legal discourse carries such great
eonsequences for the everyday lives of members of a given community that the element of
continuity in that discourse takes on such great importance.
Throughout his writings, Cardozo displayed an appreciation of the importance of
language for the work of courts; he readily acknowledged the obvious point; judges trade
in words. For Cardozo, "[t]he sentence of today will make the right and wrong of
tomorrow." (1921/1947, 1 13). And, while he was well aware of the potential for legal
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language ,o inhibit action and obscure thought, he was equally aware of the fact that ,t
could be harnessed for constructive punroses. Because judicial rulings def.ne and enforce
the obligations that c.tizens whhin a pluralistic community owe to one another, the manner
in which they are delivered affects the viability of the principles they put forth. For
example, in his essay, "Law and Literature," Cardozo observes that "[t]he argument
strongly put is not the same as the argument put feebly. The strength that is bom of form
and the feebleness that is bom of lack of form are in truth qualities of the substance. They
make it what it is." (1930/1947, 340). It would seem to follow from this that judicial
opinions are, in Cardozo's understanding, cracial elements in the proper exercise of the
judicial function. That is, they are not mere recitations of authority; rather, judicial
opinions, for Cardozo, represent the means for an explication of the exact dimensions of
moral obligations and of giving content to the fomial and generalized rules of the common
law.
As noted above, for Cardozo, the function of the common law is to develop rules
that capture the evolving core of moral sentiments shared by members of the judge’s
community. As a consequence of this fact, Cardozo suggests that we must understand
also that the exact contours of this web of obligations are never easily defined. The
principal difficulty here derives from the fact that the judge is confronted with a "social
mind that is both complex and constantly evolving; it is a text that is never fully articulate.
As Cardozo was to observe: "The moral code of each generation supplies a norm or
standard of behavior which struggles to make itself articulate in law." (1928/1947, 261).
John Goldberg, in an important study of Cardozo’s thought, observes that "[i]t is precisely
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because the content of the social ntind is contpiex and evoiv.ng
,„a,. in rendering h,s
decsions. the judge simultaneously shapes that social mind he ostensibly
,s trying to read.
That is, the judge makes clear what is only scuart.culate, by translating moral sentiments
into legal rules." (Goldberg 1990, 1344).41 Thejudge also animates these rules and
makes them more compelling, according to Cardozo, by dehberately employing language
aimed at persuading the legal profession, and society at large, that a particular rule or
outcome adheres most closely to beliefs already held. In short, thejudge both discovers
and creates the social mind. (1923/1947, 228)
Cardozo captured this interplay between discovery and creation m several ways.
For example, he spoke ofjudges having to "interpret the social consciousness"
(1932/1947, 13); he referred also to "reiteration" and "restatement," both of which capture
his belief that the principal role of the common law judge is to restate that which has
already been expressed, albeit cryptically, by the community. (See, e.g., 1921/1947, 162).
Cardozo’s own extra-judicial writings are exemplary of the relleralive method. When one
reads Cardozo’s most famous work. The Nature ofthe Judicial Process, one is
immediately struck by the extent to which his philosophical writing is little more than a
mosatc of quotations from other thinkers. Recognition of this fact has often lead to the
dismissal of Cardozo as an unoriginal or derivative thinker. Edwin Patterson was more
generous in his appraisal, suggesting that "[Cardozo’s] inveterate habit of quotation
expressed his genuine humility and his belief that he was a product of the culture of his
"Much of the argument in the remaining pages is heavily indebted to Goldberg’s treatment
of Cardozo’s work
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epoch." (Patterson 1939. 74). I would suggest, however, that there was something
at work here. For Cardozo, was a fully self-consc.ous method of legal analysis - a
method he recommended to all common lawjudges. At the hear, of this reiterat.ve mode
of thinking rs the same basic insight that infomrs much of Cardozo's legal thinking. That
is, in the midst of social flux and intellectual complexity, the fundamental task of the judge
.s to define and amplify - to reiterate - the basic points of agreement among citizens m the
community.
It is generally understood that the common law is the product of an incremental
process; but, a major par, of the process, for Cardozo, is reiterative. Cases that apply a
particular rule of law continually restate that rule in slightly different contexts. This
movement helps to reinforce a set of opinions about the obligations individuals owe to one
another. In this sense, Cardozo maintained that "fundamental [legal] conceptions once
attained form the starting point from which are derived new consequences, which at first
tentative and groping, gain by reiteration a new permanence and certainty." (1921/1947
124). If, through reiteration, the contours of legal principles become better defined, the
members of a society will have clearer rules to guide their conduct. Ideally, then, judge-
made law will help to give members of a pluralistic community their moral bearings and
articulate what they share, even as the content of what they share changes over time. This
IS a task that can be accomplished to define and articulate moral obligations. According to
Cardozo, judges serve their communities by helping the citizenry elaborate, order, and
examine prevalent moral intuitions, even though those intuitions are contested and exist in
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a constant flux. It is in this manner, says Cardozo, that the judge helps
regulate" the community, providing for both "stability and growth."
to "order and
Common Law Adjudication and the ‘Method ofSociology’
Although Cardozo never developed a precise methodological prescription from
which judges could satisfy the confl.eting demands of stab.lity and growth, he did provide
an analysis ofcommon law adjudication that purported to show why it was realistic for
judges to believe that they could consciously adapt the law to changes in social mores,
without undermining the rule of law. This argument culminated in his exposition of the
style of adjudication he characterized as the "method of sociology." With this method,
judges were to examine legal issues and decide certain cases by direct reference to the
mutually recognized obligations that fonned the core of their communities. It is important
to add, however, that Cardozo intended the scope of its application to be limited only to
cases that crossed a certain threshold of difficulty - one that came after the methods of
philosophy," "evolution” and "tradition” had been turned to and found inadequate to the
task. It IS some indication of Cardozo’s uneasiness with this method that, even in the
cases that suggested reliance on the method of sociology, he urged caution. Such
limitations were important to Cardozo’s prescriptions for adjudication because they helped
to ensure that judges would not use the method of sociology in a way, or with a
frequency, that threatened the demands ofstare decisis, a principle that he still found
important to the legitimacy of the judicial function. Nonetheless, Cardozo readily
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admitted that judges should /eg./ute, but that they should do so only interstihally; that is,
only in the gaps left by the other sourees of law. Cardozo exp.atned th.s as follows:
ittlelrrC^oToTa^y^ - -tde existing rules
direction and its distance. (1921/1947, 133)
^ ^ ^
Aceordtng to Cardozo, the method of sociology calls for the judge to apply
standards which have been distilled from the more general ideas and beliefs then current n,
society. This suggests a certain similarity to the method of tradition; yet, for Cardozo, the
method of sociology was qualitatively different from the other three methods. As Edwin
Patterson has observed, with the methods of philosophy, evolution, and tradition - unlike
sociology - established authontative materials provide the legal doctrine." (Patterson
1939, 162). That is, the other three methods embodied what might be teimed ‘ordinary’
modes ofcommon law reasoning. It was the unique quality of the method of sociology, at
least as Cardozo saw it, that it raised concerns about the ability of particular laws to
function for socially desired ends. That is, the method of sociology explicitly recognized
that judges must sometimes ask not only what the law on a given question is, but also
what the law ought to be. The method of sociology, for Cardozo, was concerned with
what values a particular adjudication would promote.
According to Cardozo, the common law traditionally achieves any particular goals
only indirectly; that is, it seeks to promote a particular vision of social welfare through the
formulation of general that, when consistently applied, will help to attain those goals. The
‘radicalism’ of the method of sociology, at least for Cardozo, was that it dispensed with
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the indirection tha, was a, the heart of the common law. prccodcnt-bascd, system.
Instead, the method of sociology asked judges to temporarily
‘forge,
' the bonds of
accumulated precedent and Mrecfy address the social usefulness of a legal rule. In doing
so. ,t explicitly adopted a perspective external to the common law by looking a, the
justification of a particular doctrine in light of the fact that ”[,]he final cause of law is the
welfare of society." (1921/1947, 133).
Cardozo-s reference to "social welfare" here is not to an abstract ideal, but ,0 the
shared values of a particular society. Therefore, when a judge uses the method of
sociology, he is to examine prevailing assessments concerning the relative worth of
different beliefs, practices, rules, and institutions. He provided an example of the
application of the method in his second series of Storrs Lectures, referring to a New York
case in which the Court of Appeals changed the common law of the state to make an
action for "criminal conversation" (a civil suit brought against a party engaged in adultery
with one’s spouse) available to women, where it had been available only to men. Cardozo
explained that "social, political, and legal reforms had changed the relations between the
sexes, and put woman and man upon a plane of equality. [Contrary precedent] founded
upon the assumption of a bygone inequality were unrelated to present-day realities, and
ought not to be permitted to prescribe a rule of life." (1923/1947, 231-232). The method
of sociology asks, then, whether the leal doctrine in question squares with prevailing
norms on which there is some degree of consensus.
Nonetheless, Cardozo was anxious to insist that he was not advocating a radical
departure from accepted judicial practice; that is, a judge was still expected to analyze
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difficult cases by first developing analogies from past precedent. It was only when there
was a question of law or fact that was open to more than one plaustble solution under
existing precedent, and that could not be resolved by reference to history or present
practice; or, where existing precedent was clearly out of step with prevailing norms, that
the judge was encouraged to reconcile ‘directly' proposed dispositions of the case by what
he perceived to be contemporary community values. Indeed, Cardozo was anxious to
note that his methodological prescriptions effectively advocated a form ofjudicial
restraint. That is, in articulating the method of sociology, Cardozo sought to make public
what was heretofore in the shadows. In so doing, he tried to persuade judges that they
serve their role best in attempting to perform it directly only on rare occasions. The
method of sociology, in Cardozo’s view, was an indispensable analytic tool, but it was not
the judge’s only tool. Yet, by offering the option of the method of sociology, even under
a fairly narrow set of circumstances, he wanted judges to recognize that his prescription
for dealing with the "tyranny of concepts" (formalism), did not undermine the common
law itself.
What, then, are judges actually doing, according to Cardozo, when they use the
method of sociology? They are, he says, interpreting the "social mind;" which means that,
m any evolving, pluralistic community, they will be involved in the attempt to determine
which among various competing beliefs in that community form its ethical core. Thus, for
Cardozo, adjudication under the method of sociology is more than simply a matter of
conducting a ‘poll’ to determine "the whim or humor of the hour." (1928/1947, 281).
Rather, the judge is called upon to identify the ‘deeper’ judgment of the community, even
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when it is embodted in a minority view. Given this. Cardozo’s method of soctology
somenmes seems more an aspiration than actual method - one incapable of actually
constraining judicial behavior, but serving more as a translator’s guide. Moreover, one
might ask whether th.s methodology served to replace a "tyranny of concepts" with the
tyranny of sociological adjudication; where the common law judge imposed his own
reading of the
-social text' onto the law. not under cover of formal rules, but through Ihe
authority of sociological ‘method’.
Cardozo anticipated, but ultimately dismissed, anxieties provoked by the specter of
common law judges using the courts as a forum for the expression of their personal biases:
"The judge, even when he is free, is still not wholly free. He is not to innovate at pleasure.
He IS not a knight-errant, roaming at will in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty or of
goodness." (1921/1947, 164). In part, Cardozo was willing to exempt such possibilities
out of his belief that most cases simply did not require the application of the method of
sociology, but instead involved a relatively unproblematic application of prior case law.
Further, anticipating the arguments of contemporary neo-pragmatists such as Stanley Fish,
Cardozo suggested that even when judges were to employ the method of sociology, they
still functioned as part of an ongoing profession with rules, traditions, and habits that were
part of a deeply felt culture which served to ensure a certain regularity in professional
behavior.
Yet, even if a thoroughly ‘professionalized’ judge, familiar with and responsive to
the duties and responsibilities of his office, will not engage in arbitrary decision-making,
the question remained as to whether such judges will still not be susceptible to ‘deeper’
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subconscous n,o„vations. Cardozo did no, dismiss this problem ,„i,e so
.uichly, hu,
addressed u a.
.he end of T„e Nan.re of,„e MUaa, Process. There, he aeknowledge
.hat, although the method of sociology requ.res judges to in.etpre, the mores of their time.
founr Xtetin^oflT'' on [a
Although education might help minimize the element of subconscious bias, Cardozo
conceded that it could never eliminate it. Consequently, he insisted that, to identify those
portions of the social mind to be incorporated into law, judges must exercise self-
conscious discretion. It would seem, however, that in his appreciation of the abilities of
the judiciary, Cardozo was nonetheless willing to subject citizens to the potentially anti-
democratic authority ofjudges. Thus, although Cardozo sought to provide a comective
for the tendency within common law adjudication to valorize precedent at the sake of
everything else, he did so only through identifying a new theoretical ‘problem space’:
judical subjectivity. Yet, the answer to the problem of subjectivity, for Cardozo, lay in
the need to distinguish between the subjective origins of a judicial account of the social
mind and its subsequentjustification.
In The Nature ofthe Judicial Process, Cardozo had suggested the theoretical
implausibility of the classical tradition in jurisprudence because of the inevitability of
human subjectivity; "In this mental background every problem finds its setting, we may try
to see things as objectively as we please. None the less, we can never see them with any
eyes except our own." (1921/1947, 1 10). Although Cardozo emphasized the subjectivity
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ofjudicial decision-making, and the resultant potential for indetenninacy in legal doctnne,
he concluded by finding certainty and stability in sources external to the law. In doing so,
he reassured his listeners that nihilism need not prevail from h.s reaUs, observations.
Rather, anticipating anxiety over h.s claims of the inherent subjectivity of the judical
process, he responded by noting that "[w]e may wonder sometimes how from the play of
all these forces of individualism, there can come anything coherent, anything but chaos and
the void. Those are the moments in which we exaggerate the elements of difference. In
the end there emerges something which has a composite shape and truth and order."
(1921/1947, 123). Cardozo’s confidence that uncertainty and complexity were
manageable, that some sort of objective binding was possible, was grounded in a belief in
the potential for social science - as the necessary adjunct to the method of sociology - to
provide the certainty and stability that "scientific jurisprudence” had once promised, but
now clearly lacked. As with Holmes and Pound, Cardozo seemed to place his faith for the
future of law, outside of law. This, somewhat paradoxically, in order to maintain the
authority of law.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION: REALISM AND/as;the reconstitution oe professional authority
In this work. I have attempted to explore the responses of three Ameriean legal
theorists to a perceived crisis in American law and for the legal profession. 1 have
charactenzed the situation as a ‘cnsis’ by recourse to the tenn legal ,no,lernis„, m order
to capture the dominant tropes through whieh it was discussed: uncertainty and
complexity in the law. The ‘responses’ (jurisprudential writings) were not always self-
consciously directed at meeting this crisis - although often they were - but 1 believe that
concern for the continued legitimacy and authority of the law and its principal carriers, the
legal profession, in a situation of uncertainty and complexity, was always present. And,
although the period I examine stretches from 1870 to the early 1930s, 1 believe that much
of what was involved here continues to have relevance for our understanding of the
relationship between the legal profession and the law.
Philhpe Nonet and Philip Selznick observed that "[cjritics of law have always
pointed to its inadequacy as a way of ministering to change and achieving substantive
justice. Those anxieties remain, but today a new note is struck by repeated references to a
cnsis of legitimacy." (1978, 4). This crisis may be understood as posing a threat to our
ability to sustain a belief in the foundational principle of our legal system - the rule of law.
Indeed, for some, the very persistence of the ideal of the rule of law in contemporary legal
thought may present something of a puzzling phenomenon. From this perspective, one
might assume that the myth of the rule of law had been sufficiently debunked, if not by
181
legal realisn,, then by pos.-,oalisl socio-logal scholars working both wilh.n and o,aside ,he
legal academy. Noneibeless, as Allan Mmehinson and Pa.riek Monaban have recently
noted: "Tbe rule ollaw is a rare and prolcat, prittciple ofour political tradition. It has
withstood the ravages oL.iurre and retains a contemporary clanon-eall to political justice.
Apparently transcending partisan cottcerns, it is embraced and venerated by virtually all
shades orpohtical op, t, ion. The rule of law’s central core comprises the enduring values
of regularity and restraint, embodied in the slogan of,, governmem ofhws. not men"
( 1 987, xiii).
A target orthc contemporary radical critique oflaw is the very
.deal of the rule of
law. The assault on this foundational concept of liberal legalism has been led, most
recently, by a group of legal academics associated with the Conference on Critical Legal
Studies (CLS). In large part, the CLS argument may be understood as a more
sophisticated restatement of the familiar refrain: all km is politics, 'fheir position is
grounded in the critical recognition of an allegedly fatal blow to the rule oflaw ideal - the
"indeterminacy thesis" - which can be understood in contrast to the notion of rational
detcrmmacy, a claim that the authoritative legal materials and their reasoned elaboration
by judges yield pre-existing, discoverable, right answers to legal questions.
While betraying a continued allegiance to the ‘ judgc-ccntcrcdncss’ of traditional
common law legal theory, contemporary critical legal theorists nonetheless maintain that
judicial decision-making is not rationally determinate, and that there is no distinct mode of
legal reasoning that is separable Irom political ideology. For example, critical theorists
such as Duncan Kennedy (1976) and .loseph Singer (1984), argue that the inherent
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mdetemiinacy of language in general, and legal rules in particular, justify doubts about the
determinacy of any legal system and the exercise of power legitimated through reference
to such a system. To the extent that liberalism rests on a foundation of determinate rules
and the.r application, it thus becomes necessary for liberalism to rebut this form of rule-
skepticism in order to (re)claim legitimacy. As Singer suggests: "Determinacy is necessaty
to the ideology of the rule of law, for both theorists and judges. It ,s the only wayjudges
can appear to apply the law rather than make it" (1984, 12). The claim that law is not an
autonomous sphere of activity, separate from the realm of politics, problematizes the
traditional understanding of the judge as a neutral arbiter of legal disputes, objectively
Identifying and applying the law to a given factual situation. Rather, the rule of law, from
this perspective, seems little more than an ideological cover for the arbitrary and
unconstrained exercise of political power. Moreover, CLS’s claims ultimately would seem
to undermine the legitimacy of the practicing bar, whose authority and power rest on its
monopoly over professionally ‘determinable’ legal doctrine and procedural rules.
According to John Brigham and Christine Harrington, this realist approach
suggests an interesting paradox;" that is, "although it (realism) is treated as a given by
legal academics and social scientists, it is also continually advanced as a vanguard project"
(1989, 41). Moreover, Brigham and Harrington suggest that "[rjealism manifests an
essentially anti-law rhetoric while serving as the rationale for law-reform movements and
as the basis of a modem legal orthodoxy" (1989, 41). Building on the work of Brigham
and Harrington, Austin Sarat and William Felstiner, in a study of divorce lawyers and their
clients (1995), have found that many members of this sub-specialty within the profession
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often characterize the legal sys.ent, in their interactions with clients, as a highly
indetemnnate and radically subjective decision-ntah.ng process. Legal rules are sa,d to
play imie part m a given decision. Rather, the idiosyncracies of the judge are
predominant. The only constraining factor in an otherwise arbitrary (from the clienfs
perspective) process is the lawyer's knowledge and understanding of the "hidden
transcripts" of the law - how the system really works. Knowledge of the judge, how he
or she has ruled in the past, which clerk will help with late filings, etc., constitutes the
knowing suhjec, - the experienced lawyer who can give a more or less competent
prediction of future behavior. Individual experience supplants "special access to an
objective body of knowledge" (i.e., the fomral legal rules) as the basts of professional
authority. The legitimacy of this realist expertise, however, exists in a constantly uneasy
tension, always threatening its own undoing. What is real here is not an unmediated
object, accessible in the external legal world; it is, rather, a professionally and discursively
mediated account of the legal process and its distortions. What is real is the lawyer’s
perspective, the legitimacy of which is determined by a principle of professional
recognition.
Although limited in scope, Sarat and Felstiner’s work might seem to provide some
empirical support for claims CLS wants to make against the legal system as a whole.
Certainly, as others have observed, however, much of the CLS argument is not original to
them (see, e.g., Stumpf 1996). For example, James Flerget has noted that ”[t]he critical
legal scholars are th latest in a long line ofjurisprudential thinkers to direct our attention
to the judicial process in order to point out that ‘hard’ law is really soft, that legislated
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rules and precedents do not detennme the outcome ofcases u, court, and that a false
percept,on nevertheless persists that judges are somehow bound by the rules of law laid
down elsewhere- (Herget 1995, 59). This is not something those associated with CLS
would attempt to deny, however; in fact, most readily acknowledge their nrtellectual debts
to the legal real.sts of the 1930s and 1940s, the sociological jurisprudence of Roscoe
Pound and Benjamin Cardozo; and, beyond that, to the seminal work of Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr. (see, e.g.. Singer 1984, 48).
I have looked ‘backward’ as well, examining those texts which provided a large
part of the theoretical backdrop for debates within contempora^ junsprudcnce. I began
wtth a brief discussion of the emergence of Langdellian formalism. Several important
interpretations of the period have argued that formalism was instrumental to the
consolidation and maintenance of political and economic power by privileged capitalist
interests m a period of rapid industrialization. 1 have suggested, however, that the
emergence of formalism was due, in large part, to a perceived threat to the
epistemological structure of legal doctrine, thereby threatening the continued legitimacy of
the legal profession as well.
Although he provided little in the way of an extended theoretical discussion of
these matters, it is nonetheless clear that Langdell sought to advance the notion that the
law (in both its practice and study), is an autonomous discipline. By this, he meant to
erect boundaries around the law, creating a space within which legal expertise could
reside. The developing sense of chaos caused by a precedent-based system spinning out of
control could be tamed, Langdell believed, within these boundaries, through the scientific
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arrangement of the ,e.,s of the law - appellate opinions. The relevant
could then be inferred from this, now manageable, lihrar,. The new h
principles of law
protessors o. taw - were to be the caretakers of this body of knowledge, prov.dtng the
judiciary with the appropriate material from which to deduce the •eneeee,.
‘correct’ legal outcome
m any given case. Their decisions were governed by reason alone; the rule of law
preserved.
Locating the study and arrangement of these texts within the newly emergent
universities, clothing its students with the prestige of scientific expertise, held obvious
attractions for a legal profession desperate to enhance Its prestige and legitimacy. The
‘scientific’ character of the inquiry elevated the study and practice of law to a level of
specialized, technical expertise, available to the few only after years of study. To remove
the investigation of law to the domain of ‘neutral’ expertise, separate from the world of
politics and policy, was an important means by which the legal profession could assert
dominion over the law. In a legal space characterized by the judicial application of
determinate rules to analogous factual situations, lawyers could claim a monopoly to
represent citizens in legal matters. This ‘classical legal consciousness’ was soon enough
shorn of LangdelTs version of scientific method, but the formalist undergirding of
professional authority remained - some semblance of which remains to the present day.
This was not my principal target, however. Almost from its inception, Langdellian
formalism (and its successors) came under attack, both for its methodological shallowness
and conservative political implications. It is this attack, most often associated with the
movement known as legal realism, that I was interested in. However, because of what I
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was looking for, my approach was somewhat different than that generally found in the
Hterature. The most obvious difference is that I ehose to focus on the important
theoretical work that preceded legal realism: Holmes, Pound, and Cardozo. My
assumption was that most ofwhat is important to the realist position was already evident
in this work. More importantly, though, instead of focusing on the critical engagement
between realism and formalism, picking a winner, and calling ,t a day, I have had
something else in mind: in the wake of the critique of legal formalism - a type of legal
reasoning that implies a justification of professional claims to the authority of legal
expertise - what stands in its place? What constitutes a reaUst version of legal expertise;
what are its implications for the legal profession, and for the relationship between non-
lawyer citizens and their laws? This seems to me to be a very large task, and what I have
done here is, 1 believe, only a beginning - but it is no less necessary because of that.
To set about accomplishing this task, I have engaged in a fairly close reading of the
principal theoretical texts of Holmes, Pound and Cardozo. Like Langdell and his
successors, they also were responding to the problem of uncertainty - doctrinal
indeterminacy - and complexity in the law, with its attendant consequences for the status
and legitimacy of expert authority. All three emphasized the inherent indeterminacy of the
law and sought to debunk the formalist approach of constraining it through the proper
organization and understanding of legal doctrine. If, however, adjudication is not a matter
of reason, but one politics instead, are there any truly meaningful constraints on judicial
behavior? And, can lawyers still lay claim to a specialized and technical expertise?
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As I have shown above, none of tl,e three wished, in the.r erit.ques of legal
formalism, to leave the situation of legal uncertainty intact. They simply believed that
formalism provided an inadequate resolution to this problem; in part because its adherents
misunderstood the real nature and proper function of the law itself. Holmes, Pound and
Cardozo accepted uneertainty and complexity in the law as a fact; they sought, however,
to numage it - through "external standards,"
"prediction,” "social interests."
"jural
postulates," or the interpretation and rearticulation of a "social mind;" and through the
incorporation of the social sciences into the law. The false science of Langdell must be
replaced by a ‘true’ science of the social world. Law must be approached as an
instrumental means to non-legal ends; as such, law should be understood as nothing more
than the product of particular interests. What this suggested to me was the formation of
an alternative orthodoxy - a ‘realist legal consciousness’ - from which claims to
professional expertise could be nourished. Like formalism, realist forms of reasoning and
justtficattons of professional authority have certain political implications. This is perhaps
most evident in Holmes, Pound and Cardozo’s arguments for the continuing relevance
and authority of the legal profession, vis-a-vis other forms of expert knowledge, in a
rapidly modernizing society. Each was clearly intent upon maintaining the status and
privileges of the American legal profession. One claim to the authority of the legal
profession (formalism) was rolled back only to be reconstructed in another, equally
pervasive form.
Further, the critique of formalism is grounded in epistemological claims that have,
I believe, important ethical and political implications separate from, but related to.
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at.en,p,s ,o rccharaCer.ze
,he logi,in,a,e authority of the legal profession as a whole.
Rcahsnr beeomos a way of ‘seetng’ the world and
-talking- ahottt it. However, ,n the
wake of the eritique of formalism, what will now support the claim to a monopoly over
the representation of citizens in legal matters?
In Chapter Two, I made reference to the contemporary legal philosopher, Davtd
Luban and Ins understanding of the idea of legal modernism through the concept of the
"Copemican Revolut.on." W.th its emphasis on the tmportanee of situated perspeet.ve,
Copemieanism, Luban rem.nded us, taught us to mistrust our everyday understanding of
the world we live in. The implication of this for legal modernism is that "[t]l,e truth about
legal structures must be radically different from the way they manifest themselves in
practice." (Luban 1994, 3). For Luban, Holmes serves as the quintessential legal
modernist. This aspect of his work is evident from the earliest published material in the
1870s, to his last major jurisprudential effort, "The Path of the Law," published in 1897;
the attempt to look beneath the surface of the law in the belief that appearances too often
deceive. This tendency, though less obvious in the work of Pound and Cardozo, is still
there, a product of Holmes’ influence on their thought.
I returned to Holmes in order to examine the emergence of the idea of legal
indeterminacy in his extra-judicial writings. In doing so, I sought to emphasize an aspect
of Holmes’ theoretical work that, to date, has not received the attention I believe it
deserves - the articulation of a type of perspectivism that is related to the identification of
indeterminacy m the law. Holmes went to great lengths to look at the law from a lawyer’s
point of view; in particular a common law lawyer. Further, along with the emergence of
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the idea of legal
.ndeten^inaey, in fact as a corollary lo il, we can find ,n Holmes' work
the origins of a dislincl.ve fonn of legal discourse; a new language of power ifyou will,
and with it, the outline of a different fonnr of legal knowledge. What is generally idenl.fied
as Holmes’
"prediction theory" of law, 1 would sttggest, may be better understood as an
attempt to reconstitute the grounds of legal knowledge, or expertise, and professional
authority. In contemporary critical legal theory, indetenuinacy generally ts deployed as a
debunking trope; Holmes helps us to see its constitutive elements as well. His
perspectivism - here, the attempt to conceptualize law from the practicing lawyer’s point
of view - discursively carves out a space within which professional (legal) experience
could provide the basis for a reconstituted form of expert authority.
Holmes jurisprudenee contains within it an implicit reconceptualization of legal
practice. This new juridical discourse of expertise and professional authority subsumes a
discursive space’ of law - judge, lawyer, client and common law legal doctrine - arc
reconstructed in Holmes’ modernist jurisprudence. In my opinion, the work of Roscoe
Pound and Benjamin Cardozo fleshes out, in important ways. Holmes’ seminal
contributions to American jurisprudence. The project of this dissertation, then, was to
examine this (re)construction of the space of law in late nineteenth and early twentieth
century American legal thought. Further, I sought to explore the implications of this
reconstruction, implications which, I believe, still resonate in contemporary jurisprudential
discussions.
One of the concerns which animated this project had to do with what 1 perceived
as the elision of the normative possibilities of law - and, therefore, the possibility of a
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democrat.cally meaningful understanding ofjustice - in the reconstructed juridical space of
realism; what I have characterized as legal modernism. The focus of legal modernism, 1
argued, was not on the normative content of law, but the observable behavior of legal
officials, whose decisions are explained by the political, economic, or psychological
interests that really motivate them. Law becomes mere epiphenomena. Legal experts
must stake their claim to professional authority on the ability to recognize the interests at
play; to see things ‘hidden’ from the rest of us. The concern was with the tendency to
attribute our understanding of law to what the legal profession says is law and, thus, with
an apparent foreclosure of any meaningful possibility to construct our own normative
world through law. It is to suggest a certain professional hegemony over the ethical
possibilities within the space of law. My argument, then, was that the realist/modemist
account of law, however compelling as a critique of formalist legal reasoning, ser\'ed as
well to reclaim the authority of professional expertise in the wake of its own (apparent)
assault. That is, realism advanced in the wake of its claim at having demystified the
obfuscations of formalism, while simultaneously eliding its own role in constituting a new
legal space that is no more real and, ultimately, no more hospitable to popular access than
that which went before.
My reading, here, is admittedly anachronistic. As suggested above, I approach the
work of Holmes, Pound and Cardozo, not as an historian of American legal ideas; but as
one informed by contemporary issues and concerns. In turn, I believe that an engagement
with these texts provides a theoretical space outside of the present, from which to reflect
back on the present. We continue to live under the impact of a realist tradition in law that
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begins with the jurisprudence of Holmes. Pound and Cardozo. But. we seem far less
aware of how realism works to preserve legal/professional authority. This means that we
tend to reject the self-presentation of law as an objective system of abstract rules, neutrally
applied by
.ndependent judges whose access to the law is through a direct course of legal
reasoning in which they have been specially trained. It means that we are suspicious of,
and seek to pierce, the false appearance that law creates. It means that law is nothing
more than what theyWge says it is. And, it means that we no longer believe that law can
make any claims of its own; rather, it is valued only as a means to some other end. As I
suggested at the beginning of the dissertation, this is generally viewed as a progressive
development. Defenders of a formalist faith are naive, or worse; to •believe’ in law is
simply to miss the point
. Without defending formalism itself, I do want to register a
strong suspicion of its realist critique. I do so because it has been my sense that in
constantly performing its critique of formalism, certain "consequences” of realism have too
often avoided critique - a realist justification of legal expertise being my specific concern.
This concern has been given some empirical illumination by the recent work of
Austin Sarat and William Felstmer on the relationships between divorce lawyers and their
clients. In their investigation, which seeks to operationalize some of the basic theoretical
insights of Brigham and Harrington’s critical work on realism, Sarat and Felstiner heard
lawyers consistently debunk their clients’ belief in the relevance of legal rules to the
adjudication of claims within the legal system. What was relevant was a knowledge of
people and places far more inaccessible to the average layman than the rules themselves.
What Sarat and Felstiner were describing was realist legal consciousness at work. They
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were witness ,o non-lawyer cit.zens experiencing a loss of control v,s-a-vis the law and,
thereby, ever more dependent on the legal expert. The truly meaningful world of Ihe law
was not the one they saw with their own eyes, it was something h.dden to them. A, the
end of his chapter on the "Sociology of Law," Max Weber observes that,
hat, a result of technical and economic developments, the legal ignorance of thelayman will increase. The use ofjurors and similar lay judges will not suffe tlstop the continuous growth of the technical element in thelw and hence of itscharacter as a specialists’ domain. (Weber 1978, 895).
My argument has been that, in the wake of the crisis of legal modernism, the
emergence of a realist discourse of law and its critique of the inadequacies of fomialism's
response to that crisis, realist jurisprudence has not slowed the developments Weber
speaks of; it has, in some ways, exacerbated them.
In suggesting this, I perhaps expose a certain naivete that the late Grant Gilmore
cautioned against. Gilmore opened his Storrs Lectures at Yale Law School by reminding
his audience that.
[f]rom the beginning of social time there have been institutions like courts which
have generated.. .something like law. In all societies beyond the most primitive a
professional class of lawyers and judges has emerged and maintained itself In most
societies at most periods the legal profession has been heartily disliked by all non-
lawyers: a recurrent dream of social reformers has been that the law should be (and
can be) simplified and purified in such a way that the class of lawyers can be done
away with. The dream has never withstood the cold light of waking reality. Thus
there has always been law and there have always been lawyers (1977, 1).
While I wish to challenge Gilmore s conflation of law with lawyers, believing that
there is something in law worth maintaining beyond its professional representations, my
point, however, is not to situate the argument within the tradition of Bentham and
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Rantoul, seeking some plan of cod.fication ,ha, would render lawyers rrrelevam to the
workings of a new legal order. Rather, I wish simply to examine the emergence of a new
justiftcafon for expert authonty, one grounded in the identification and problemat,3at.on
ofjudicial subjectivity. But. in so doing. I wish to suggest as well a critical reading of this
new defense of the legitimacy of professional power. During a period of tremendous
social and economic change, the traditional defense of the legal profession’s authority -
formalism - began to seem more and more out of place and in danger of losing credibility;
It appeared to the emergent critics as little more than the rhetorical mask of illegitimate
power and injustice. Claims to professional authority once grounded in the detemiinacy of
legal rules were challenged by a positivist expertise based on the observations and
predictions ofjudicial behavior. This modernist sociological jurisprudence, or realism,
seemed to many better able to support claims to professional authority under these new
historical conditions - a moment of crisis for the American legal profession. Ostensibly
critical of the classical orthodoxy, this emergent movement in legal thought promised the
availability of a progressive politics through the unmasking of purely formal justifications
of legal decisions, thus exposing their real bases in the interests of relevant legal actors.
By saying this, 1 have not meant to suggest that realism supplanted formalism as
the dominant image of law from which the legal profession could draw its theoretical
sustenance. Rather, both now lead a complex coexistence. Indeed, in some ways, this
provides the realist vision with much of its continuing potency. It is an example of what
Stanley Fish has referred to as the law’s ability to contain and deploy what would appear
to be mutually contradictory discourses as one; "a discourse continually telling two stories.
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one of which is denying that the other ,s being told" (Fish 1991, 203). Yet, when one
reads the contemporary critical literature, this is nowhere in evidence. Peter Gabel and
Paul Harris (1982-83), working from a realist/CLS perspeelivc, provide a good example
of this sort of analysis. Rejecting the l.beral-legalist valorization of the rule of law. Gabel
and Harris observe "that the legal system ,s an
.mportanl publ.c arena through which the
state altempts - through manipulation of symbols, images, and ideas - to legitimize a
social order that most people find alienating and inhumane" ( 1 982-83, 370). Nonetheless,
Gabel and Harris insist that "the very public and political character of the legal arena gives
lawyers, acting together with clients and fellow legal workers, an important opportunity to
reshape the way that people understand the existing legal order and their place within it"
(1982-83, 370).
1 hey identify both what is at stake and what are the possibilities for critical legal
thought and practice. Yet, they seem largely ignorant of their own complicity in the
reproduction of domination through the very legal system they critique. For Gabel and
Warns, politics is ubiquitous and it overwhelms law. Law’s ‘weakness’ here can be
understood m the recognition that currently existing law is nothing more than an elaborate
rhetorical cover, masking the distribution of power among various interest groups and
individuals. Law is, then, nothing more than the product of these social and political
interests. Even so, the (radical) lawyer still has an important role to play, according to
Gabel and Harris, in the advancement of a progressive politics within the traditional
institutional apparatus of law. This role is, in part, to help clients understand law by
piercing law’s pretensions to fonnality and political neutrality.
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I concede that there is much to agree with in Gabel and Harris’ analysis, I would
argue as well that the image of law that informs this critique ultimately works to
undermine their stated des.re for a ’democratic’ reshaping of the legal order. Crudely put:
why do we need lawyers, radical or otherwise, to engage in critical pohtieal (or legal)
analysis? Clearly there is nothing unique that the radical lawyer, as lawyer, has to offer to
those interested in progressive po/hicn/ activity. The question remains open regarding the
citizen s ability to achieve political ends within the space of law.
In another context, Sarat and Felstiner suggest that,
[i]n a legal order whose legitimacy is said to rest on the claims of fonnalism
procedural justice, and, to a lesser extent, on those of equity, the law talk of the
divorce lawyer’s office is replete with ‘rule skepticism’....If the presentation of a
formalist front...is necessary to legitimate the legal order, then the presentation of
the legal process at the street level may work to unwind the bases of legitimation
that other levels work to create. While critical scholars are devoted to proving the
proposition that legal rules are indeterminate and to enlisting practicing
professionals in the project of demystifying and exposing the claims of legal
formalism, divorce lawyers seem routinely to be engaged in this same project as
they counsel clients (1995, 107).
In light of this recognition, Sarat and Felstiner (see, e.g., 1995, 87) express some
amazement that contemporary critical legal scholars such as Gabel and Harris continue to
advance realism as a "vanguard project" (Brigham and Harrington 1989, 41), even though
its basic tenets seem to be accepted and routinely articulated by at least one segment of the
practicing bar. This is attributable, I would suggest, to the fact that realism has not been
adequately analyzed as a discourse of expertise which serves to ground professional
authority. This dissertation has attempted to show that the paradox, first suggested by
Brigham and Harrington, and later observed by Sarat and Felstiner - of lawyers identifying
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.he i„de,erm.„acy of rules w.thin
.he legal system ,n order ,o advance
.heir own cla.ms ,o
authority based on the contingencies of ‘local knowledge' - has a theoretical dimension to
It; one that has a history, and is better understood once located within that theoretical
tradition I have examined above.
In laying out a partial history of this development, focusing on certain key texts
from that history, I do not wish my argument to be understood as calling for the return to
a pre-reahst. or formalist, grounding for professional authority. Rather, in suggesting that
realism should be understood not so much as a critique of formalism, but as another
attempt to ground professional authority, I wish to call into question the very conflation of
law with the legal profession. I have sought to do this in order that we might law claim to
the ethical project of law - justice - a project that, otherwise, seems secondary to the
endless processes of professional closure.
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